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This document comprises appendices for the doctoral thesis Acts of reference and 
the miscommunication of referents by first and second language speakers of 
English (Ryan, 2012). 
 
The appendices are numbered here to match the chapters (but not necessarily the 
sections) they correspond most closely to in the main thesis. As such, Chapter 2 
presents a review of additional literature leading to the theoretical framework of 
the main study. Chapter 3 presents reviews further literature relating to SLL use of 
RE types. Chapter 4 provides a number of further details relating to the methods 
used in the study. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 present material in support of the findings 
presented in the corresponding chapters of the main study. In some cases, these 
are extended extracts for the examples discussed in the main body of the thesis; in 
other cases additional examples are presented. Chapters 8 and 9 present 











This chapter presents further details of issues raised in Chapter 2 of the main body 
of the thesis. Section 2.1 presents a review of a few key issues in definitions of 
reference from the philosophy literature, while Section 2.2 presents a similar 
review for definitions of reference in the linguistics literature. Section 2.3 
provides additional details in relation to the concept of common ground. Section 
2.4 reviews alternatives to Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1990, 2001). Finally, 
Section 2.5 provides an overview of the factors identified in the literature as 
affecting referent accessibility. This discussion provides the basis for the 
accessibility coding system outlined in Chapter 4.  
 
 
2.1 Reference in philosophy 
 
The body of philosophical work on reference is extensive and diverse, and only a 
very selective range is discussed here. It should be noted, for example, that the 
term reference is typically used in a much broader sense in discussions of the 
philosophy of mind (Neander, 2006, p. 374). 
 
In the philosophy of language, underlying the notion of reference is the issue of 
how language relates to the world. It has been argued that certain expressions 
(semantic reference), or uses of expressions (speaker reference), refer to a real 
world entity in a way that has been variously described as pointing (Martin, 1987, 
p. 38), indicating (Lycan, 2000), picking out (Carlson, 2004), or enabling the 
audience to pick out (Donnellan, 1966) a specific real-world entity. That is, in 
discussions of semantic reference, a referring expression is said to bear a relation 
to an entity in the real-world in so far as it ‘stands for’, or is a ‘sign’ for, that 
entity. For example, in certain contexts, the expression ‘Barack Obama’ may be 
said to bear a direct connection with the real-world person elected in 2008 as the 
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President of the United States: the expression ‘stands for’ the person. In speaker 
reference (the focus of the present study), the speaker indicates a real-world 
referent to the hearer. 
 
The following discussion concentrates on some of the background issues relevant 
to the discussion of speaker reference in the present study. As discussed in the 
main thesis, the definition of reference and the starting point for the discussion is 
the view put forward by Bach (2008). 
 
 
2.1.1 Referents and existence 
 
Many philosophers have discussed the requirement that a referent must exist in an 
ontological sense in order to be referred to. In a widely discussed example, 
Russell (1905) argued that the proposition The present King of France is bald is 
logically false, as it is based on a referring expression  that does not refer to 
anything (p. 491) (Russell uses the term denoting phrase). Srawson (1950) argued 
against the idea that such propositions were false, but agreed that existence is a 
precondition of reference, arguing that, in relation to the King of France sentence 
“we simply fail to say anything true or false because we simply fail to mention 
anybody by this particular use of that perfectly significant phrase” (p. 331).The 
sentence fails to refer because there is no such real-world entity to refer to.   
 
A consequence of this precondition of existence means that uses of language to 
indicate mythical figures (e.g. Santa Claus) and fictional characters (e.g. Sherlock 
Holmes) are often considered in philosophy to be non-referential, or at least not 
genuinely referential. These have been labelled a parasitic form of reference 
(Searle, 1969, p. 79), feigned reference (Bach, 1987, p. 215) or pseudo-reference 
(Bach, 2008, p. 31).  Searle (1969, p. 78) argued that one can only refer to 
fictional characters in the very limited sense of referring to a character as a 
fictional character: 
      
In normal real world talk I cannot refer to Sherlock Holmes because there 
never was such a person.  If in this ‘universe of discourse’ I say “Sherlock 
4 
 
Holmes wore a deerstalker hat” I fail to refer . . . . But now suppose I shift 
into the fictional, play acting, lets-pretend mode of discourse.  Here if I say 
“Sherlock Holmes wore a deerstalker hat”, I do indeed refer to a fictional 
character (i.e. a character who does not exist but who exists in fiction) and 
what I say here is true. 
 
Carlson (2004, p. 82) cites a rare dissenting voice in Meinong , who argued that 
such expressions do refer, and that non-existence is merely a property. Carlson 
comments that this position “strikes many as ontologically a bit bizarre”. Carlson 
(p. 95) cites an alternative in the possible worlds approach of Hintikka (1983), in 
which such objects do exist “but in other possible worlds from our own. So when 
we make reference to them, we are doing so in those worlds where they do exist, 
just not this one.” 
 
This type of reference to a fictional character can be distinguished from the type 
of reference that occurs within a text when the author makes repeated mentions of 
a character (Bach, 2008, p. 31). In the latter case, Bach (1987, pp. 215-216) argues 
that such reference is intended to be treated by the reader (in the act of reading) in 




2.1.2 Singular thoughts and singular expressions 
 
A further feature of philosophical accounts is an analysis of the conditions under 
which a speaker may refer to a real-world entity and a hearer may resolve that 
reference. The crucial concept here is the notion of singular thoughts. A singular 
thought is a mental representation of a particular entity that is formed through 
perceiving it, being informed of it, or remembering it (after it has been perceived) 
(Bach, 2008, p. 18). After encountering an entity, one is in a position to make an 
internal representation of that entity, and to think of it as a distinct, specific 
individual. Similarly, entities that other people have encountered can be held as a 
singular thought through a “chain of communication” in which there is “a 
representational connection, however remote and many-linked, between thought 
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and object” (2008, p. 18). Thus, in this account, one cannot hold a singular 
thought about an entity that is only understood through description, such as: 
  
1. The inventor of the wheel 
2. My great-great-great-grandchildren 
 
Such people are not in any sense known to or known of by the speaker. They exist 
only as descriptions that the hearer understands, rather that knows. Therefore they 
cannot be thought of except in terms of a description. Thus, in this account, 
descriptive reference is a misnomer and is not truly referential. 
   
The linguistic counterpart of singular thoughts is singular terms. Singular terms 
are expressions which indicate particular individuals (e.g. Barack Obama, my first 
cat), rather than general terms (cat, men). Singular terms include proper nouns 
(Barack Obama, New Zealand), definite descriptions (the red pencil, the 
President), singular personal pronouns (you, she), and demonstrative pronouns 
(this, those) (Lycan, 2000, p. 13). Philosophical discussions of reference tend to 
take singular terms as a starting point, and may further restrict the set of referring 
expressions. It is important to note, however, that reference occurs in particular 
instances of these linguistic being used; all referring expressions may also be used 
in non-referring ways. For example, most philosophical accounts would agree that 
the underlined expressions in the following examples do not refer: 
 
1. What is the origin of the name ‘Ryan’? 
2. When I retire, I will get my first cat. 
 
In most accounts, Example 1 is not referential because the proper name ‘Ryan’ is 
not used to refer to any individual by that name. The utterance merely presents the 
word in order for it to be commented on (Searle, 1969, pp. 75-76). Example 2 is a 
case of ‘descriptive reference’: here the referent is known only descriptively and 
not through any experiential connection, so one cannot form a singular thought 





2.1.3 Events  
 
As discussed in the main body of the thesis, many linguistic approaches to 
reference include uses of NPs that relate to events (the accident, the wedding, 
Hurricane Katrina), while approaches from philosophy generally appear to hold 
that this is not a matter of reference (e.g. Bach, 2008). The present study follows 
the latter view, and this subsection briefly outlines why. 
 
It is, perhaps, not immediately clear why events cannot qualify as referents. 
However, the obvious ontological differences between events and physical objects 
may, in themselves, be sufficient to treat reference to entities as being 
communicatively different to the use of NPs to indicate events. In particular, the 
existential status of events is fundamentally different from that of entities. In 
Bach’s (2008) view, referents are always entities that exist (or previously existed) 
‘out there’ in the world; events do not exist, as such, and are (informally) 
discussed in terms of ‘happening’ and ‘occurring’. 
 
A more important issue may be that reference involves individuation. (Here, I 
draw upon arguments made by Boersma, 2009 but reach conclusions that are 
fundamentally different from his). In referring to an entity, the speaker singles out 
that entity. Such singling out presupposes that the individual can be individuated. 
As Boersma states, it seems that we can “clearly individuate one event from 
another” (p. 174), particularly in many of the types of examples Boersma 
provides, such as ‘this coin toss’ or ‘that die roll’. However, unlike our perception 
of people and most objects, Boersma notes that: 
 
We decide what counts as an event and hence what events there are. This 
can be seen (somewhat, at least) on an intuitive level by considering the 
difficulty of saying what the parameters of a given event are. Exactly 
when was the 1948 Presidential election? When did it begin? On election 
day? On the day that the first candidate is nominated? In asking, ‘When 
did it begin?,’ to what does the it refer? (The answer cannot be: to the 
1948 Presidential election, because that is circular and vacuous in this 
context.) Or, when was the battle of Waterloo? Did it start when the first 
shot was fired? When Napoleon advanced his troops past a certain point? 
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The point of these examples and questions is that the individuation of 
events is not a clear-cut, straightforward notion even at an intuitive level. 
(2009, pp. 174-175) 
 
Boersma’s observations suggest a problem in discussing the miscommunication of 
events. As Boersma’s examples suggest, a question such as ‘How many people 
died at the Battle of Waterloo?’ could elicit a range of correct answers, depending 
on when the perceived boundaries of the event. In some cases, it even seems that 
two people could be ostensibly thinking of the same event, yet they could be very 
little overlap (perhaps no overlap) between the event-elements that each 
individual is thinking of. Therefore, if successful reference involves interactants 
identifying the same referent, then it is not entirely clear how to distinguish some 





There is some discussion in the philosophy literature over the relationship 
between anaphora and reference, although as Bach (1987, p. 221) notes, it has 
been a focus for linguists far more than philosophers. Anaphora (or anaphoric 
reference) occurs when a stretch of discourse involves second and often 
subsequent mentions of an entity. These are generally through the use of a more 
attenuated noun phrase, such as a pronoun.  
 
Anaphoric pronouns are considered semantically underdetermined in that they 
generally require the presence of an expression in another part of the text – its 
antecedent – to disambiguate its reference. However, the nature of this connection 
is a matter of some dispute. One view, developed in linguistic theories such as 
binding theory and apparently assumed in some philosophical accounts, is that 
there is a strong syntactic (as well as semantic) element to the relationship 
between an anaphora and its antecedent (e.g. Büring, 2005). As Bach notes, 
“conventional wisdom has it that an anaphoric pronoun refers to whatever its 
antecedent refers to and that this is a matter not of speaker intention but of 
sentence grammar” (1987, p. 221). Geach (cited in Lycan, p.31), for example, 
suggests that such an expression “merely abbreviates a boilerplate repetition of 
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the antecedent phrase”, so that an anaphoric pronoun has a meaning “precisely 
equivalent to” its antecedent; Brown and Yule (1983) discuss the inadequacy of 
such a view, demonstrating the role of antecedent predicates in determining how 
anaphors are interpreted (also Yule, 1982). 
 
An alternative view in philosophy, argued by Bach (1987), is that anaphora is 
based on pragmatic rather than syntactic principles. To Bach, the presence of a 
referential expression (the pronoun’s antecedent) simply means that the repetition 
of that entity is possible with a less explicit referring expression (i.e. a pronoun). 
As he argues, “being mentioned elsewhere in a sentence is just one way of being 
salient” (1987, p. 221). This view appears to be similar to that of some linguists 
working in pragmatics, such as Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al (1993). Bach 
acknowledges that there must be some sort of rule governing some forms of 
anaphora, but argues that “whatever its precise formulation, it must be a pragmatic 
rule, even though it adverts to intra-sentential structural relationships” (1987, p. 
235). Ariel (1990) raises the possibility that the cognitive principle behind 
sentence-level anaphora is accessibility, although she argues for a weaker version 
in the work cited.  
 
 
2.2 Linguistic approaches to reference 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, reference is usually defined much more broadly in 
linguistics than in philosophy. The purpose of this section is, firstly, to outline the 
range of phenomena that may be considered referential in linguistic studies, and to 
more closely consider the notion of reference in a few key studies, including those 
by Gundel et al. (1993) and Ariel (1990, 2001). 
 
The term reference, as it is discussed in the present study, relates only to people 
and physical entities (although, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is acknowledged that 
reference may also be possible to some abstract entities). Within linguistics and its 
subfield, reference is typically treated much more broadly. Under the 
classification used by Perdue (1984), for example, the term reference 
encompasses spatial relations (e.g. below, in), temporal relations (e.g. before, 
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ago), distances (e.g. five meters, very far), durations (five metres, very far), and 
social relations as encoded in politeness forms (1984, p. 138).  Chini (2005, p. 67) 
identifies referents as belonging “to one of the following five domains: persons 
and objects (= entities), times, places, actions-events, modalities.” Similarly wide 
definitions are used in some studies of L1 and SLL referential communication 
(e.g. Bongaerts, Kellerman, & Bentlage, 1987; Glucksberg & Krauss, 1967). 
Similarly, Chafe (1994, p. 69) sees events and states as being transformed into 
referents through the process of nominalization.  
 
Although conceptions of reference from both the linguistics and philosophy 
literature are fairly diverse, there are a number of general observations which can 
be made indicating general divergence in the two fields. Firstly, as the discussion 
has suggested, linguistic definitions of reference are nearly always very broad 
(e.g. Ariel, 1990; Chafe, 1996; Du Bois, 1980; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 
1993). Secondly, linguistic definitions typically encompass both descriptive 
reference and most (and often all) anaphora. Thirdly, linguistic accounts tend to 
privilege mental representations of entities over the actual existence of real-world 
entities and related criteria such as ontological existence. These points will be 
elaborated in the discussion that follows  
 
However, despite certain features common to many accounts of reference, there is 
a suggestion that there may be a lack of clarity and consistency across the various 
accounts: many works of linguistic reference do not define their use of key terms, 
and this extends to not explicating the basis on which they distinguish referential 
and non-referential noun phrases, nor defining key terms such as referential and 
referent. This may obfuscate key positions on issues such as the relationship 
between speaker reference and semantic reference, whether existence is a 
requirement, whether descriptive reference qualifies as reference, whether 
singular thoughts are required, and generally where to draw the distinction 
between reference and non-reference. For example, Clancy’s (1980) landmark 
study of reference in English and Japanese includes a footnote noting “the noun 
phrases in this paper include only those which were referential” (p. 132), but there 
is no clarification of how this distinction is made (although, in fairness, Clancy’s 
work does appear in the same volume as Du Bois (1980), who spends 
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considerable time defining reference). In other works, for instance Ariel (1990, 
2001), positions become clear only through extensive and intensive reading. 
Studies in L2 reference often neglect to clarify these terms (e.g. Hendriks, 2003; 
Kang, 2004; Swierzbin, 2004), although they may clarify related distinctions.  
Hendriks (2003), for example, focuses on reference maintenance and defines this 
as “all linguistic expressions referring to a protagonist after the first act of 
referring to that particular protagonist” (p. 299).   
 
In neglecting to clarify their use of the term referential, it seems that many 
linguists and applied linguists appear to assume that there is a shared, and non-
problematic linguistic definition of reference. Even before examining and 
comparing different linguistic studies, there is a problem with this assumption. 
Specifically, considering the number of key debates within the field of 
philosophy, and the frequency with which linguists cite philosophical sources, it 
seems likely that various philosophical positions, as well as perspectives from 
psychology, computational linguistics, and cognitive science, may have 
influenced individual linguists.  
 
Nevertheless, some landmark linguistic works on reference (Ariel, 1990; Du Bois, 
1980; Gundel et al, 1993; Karttunen, 1976) and some broader-based linguistic 
works (Bickerton, 1981; Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Huebner, 1983) do provide 
varying degrees of information regarding key terms from which various 
assumptions can be examined. These reveal certain areas of commonality 
suggesting a general ‘linguistic approach to reference’, as well as areas of 
divergence. This appears to be partly due to the varying extents to which linguists 
follow philosophical traditions, and partly due to the formative influence to 
linguistics of Saussure’s (1966) notion of signs.  
 
 
2.2.1 The influence of Saussure 
 
While Saussure’s (1966) work is not about reference, it appears to have 
influenced the way in which linguists approach reference. Whereas philosophy 
has looked at the connections between language and the world, interest among 
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linguists has traditionally tended to reflect Saussure’s (1966, pp. 11-13) speaking 
circuit. The speaking circuit is a model of conversing and is represented 
graphically as the to and fro of communication between two or more speakers, in 
which mental concepts in the brain are transmitted by speech organs to the 
receiver’s ear, and on to the brain. Thus the focus is on interactants and how they 
communicate through a combination of physiological and psychological means. In 
other words, it is a focus on language in relation to speakers and communication, 
rather than language in relation to the outside world.   
 
For considerations of reference, the most relevant aspect of Saussure’s work is the 
argument that language consists of signs. A sign is a two-part whole, consisting of 
a ‘sound-image’ (the signifier) and concept (the signified) which are “intimately 
united, and each recalls the other” (p. 66). A sign can be thought of as the 
combination of a lexical unit and its meaning. Saussure argues that a sign is a 
concrete linguistic entity, but when taken alone, each of its constituent parts (the 
signified and the signifier alone) is “a mere abstraction” (p. 103). He argues that 
“a succession of sounds is linguistic only if it supports an idea”, and concepts 
(when considered alone) “belong to psychology” rather than linguistics (p.103).   
 
Crucially, “the linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound image” (1966, p. 66). The second part of this equation (‘name’ vs. ‘sound 
image’) has important implications for the Saussurian system, but it is the first 
part that is of particular interest here: thing as opposed to concept. Therefore it 
would seem that genuine words (rather than nonsense words or babbling) are 
connected to internal representations that are shared by speakers. However, 
Saussure does not discuss reference: the connection between a concept and a 
singular thought (the individuating of that concept into a mental representation for 
a particular individual) is not discussed, nor is the connection between a singular 
thought and a real-world referent.   
 
Nevertheless, what is relevant in Saussurian linguistics is that the utterance of a 
word signifies a concept. This emphasis on a mental dimension appears to have 
been adopted many linguists working with reference. For example, Piwek & 
Cremers (1996, p. 837), specifically define referents as being “mental 
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representations of objects”. As discussed in the following subsections, such a 
view is also strongly apparent in the works of Gundel et al (1993) and Du Bois 
(1980).   
 
 
2.2.2 Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski, 1993, 2005 
 
Although brief, Gundel, Hedberg, Zacharski (1993) provide one of the more 
explicit position statements defining their use of the term reference or referent, 
(mainly in a footnote, pp. 276-277). Further details are provided in a later work 
(2005) where they discuss referential pronouns without NP antecedents, where the 
antecedent was a “non-nominal . . . that evoked a fact, proposition, activity, 
situation, etc.” (p. 352). Vague uses of they are identified as being “only loosely 
referential” (p. 355), and may relate, for example, to “people in in general” (p. 
356). Gundel et al. state that, as a consequence of focusing on speaker reference, 
“we believe that indefinites may be used either referentially or nonreferentially” 
(1993, p. 276). They provide the following example as one which could be used in 
either way: 
 
3. A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam. 
 
In this view, a referential use of an indefinite is when the speaker knows, and is 
speaking of, the student who cheated, while a non-referential use is when the 
speaker expresses the meaning ‘one unknown student cheated’. In this account, 
then, speakers perform an act of reference when they use a linguistic expression to 
encode a particular referent. In contrast to Bach’s (2008) conception of speaker 
reference, there need be no attempt to disambiguate the referent for the intended 
audience. Rather, it is enough to merely signal to the audience that the speaker has 
a particular referent in mind. To the extent that the addressee is required to access 
a referent, this referent may simply be a general concept, such as when meeting 
the minimum criteria for the cognitive status category type identifiable. As Gundel 
et al explain, the criteria for the use of the indefinite article is met when “the 
addressee is able to access a representation of the type of object described by the 
expression” (1993, p. 276, emphasis added). However, all higher statuses require 
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that the addressee be able to “retrieve an existing representation of the speaker’s 
intended referent or construct a new representation by the time the sentence has 
been processed” (p. 276, emphasis added). 
 
Another notable position outlined by Gundel et al. (1993, p. 276) regards the use 
of definite expressions. Their position is that: 
 
Definite expressions are always [emphasis added] used referentially in the sense that 
speakers intend to refer to a particular entity in using them – either one they are 
acquainted with and intend to refer to irrespective of whether the description actually fits 
(Donnellan’s ‘referential’ use), or one which the description actually fits, irrespective of 
whether the speaker is directly acquainted with it (Donnellan’s ‘attributive’ use). 
 
This is a major departure from Bach’s (2008) definition of speaker reference 
adopted in the present study. To Bach, speaker reference involves the speaker 
referring the addressee to an entity, so that the addressee can identify it. However 
Gundel et al’s use of the term referential is much broader, and includes most uses 
of NPs. The attributive/referential distinction is not discussed at all by a number 
of linguists such as Du Bois (1980) and Huebner (1983) but it would seem that 




Before reviewing reference as it is defined in other linguistic studies, it may be 
useful to firstly address the issue of time (adding to the discussion in Chapter 
2.1.4 of the main body of this thesis), which is included in Gundel et al.’s (1993, 
2005) Givenness Hierarchy approach to reference. One example is the expression 
in the morning presented by Swierzbin (2004, p. 87): 
 
  It’s like he’s sleeping in this little thing on the side of the house 
  and, and then, hm, in the morning he wakes up 
  and he decides to go swimming 
 
Swierzbin argues that “one could perhaps argue in the case of the morning that the 
next morning after he slept was to be inferred” (p. 87). However, Swierzbin also 
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points out that this expression has quite different uses in examples such as what 
time do you get up in the morning? or she wakes up during the night  “when no 
specific morning or night is meant” (p. 47). Like a number of others (Gundel et 
al., 2005; Lyons, 1999), Swierzbin proposes that these examples are cases of 
definiteness through inference. For example, a particular situation (e.g. entering a 
bookstore) may invoke a number of expected entities and roles (e.g. sales 
assistant, cash register, bookshelves) which can be referred to using the definite 
article (Sanford & Garrod, 1981). However, it is not clear that this provides a 
plausible account of in the morning. For example, it is not clear on what basis in 
the morning in 4 could be considered definite unless definiteness is also attributed 
to 5 in the following examples: 
 
4. Our vervet monkey is most active in the morning. 
5. Our vervet monkey is less active at night. 
 
It seems more likely that such cases are best accounted for as conventional uses of 
the definite article (independent of the definite/indefinite distinction) rather than 
being explicable through a scenario or inferential-based account. This has been 
previously argued for by Abbott (2006) in relation to pairs of examples which 
show conflicting rules from use, such as: 
 
 I heard it on the radio. 
 I saw it on TV. 
 
Overall, even in the broadest possible notion of reference, it seems illogical to ask 
on which morning or mornings vervet monkeys are active in. The conclusion, 
then, seems to be that not all uses of definite expressions (or, at least, nouns 
modified by the) are referential. Having rejected the possibility that all definite 





2.2.4 Discourse referents 
 
A notion that is similar to Gundel et al’s conception of reference, is Karttunen’s 
notion of discourse referents (Karttunen, 1976). A discourse referent is an entity 
that is raised in discourse, in such a way that it may be referred to by a referring 
expression such as a pronoun or definite NP. Karttunen illustrates the concept 
with the following examples: 
 
 (1)  a.  Bill has a car. 
        b.  It is black. 
        c.  The car is black. 
        d.  Bill’s car is black.  
 
 (2)  a.  Bill doesn’t have a car. 
        b.  *It is black. 
        c.  *The car is black. 
        d.  *Bill’s car is black. 
 
Example (1a) introduces a discourse referent that can subsequently be referred to, 
since it “implies the existence of a specific car” (p. 366). However no car is 
introduced by (2a), and so (2b-d) “are inappropriate, since they presuppose the 
existence of something that is not there” (p. 366). Discourse referents must, 
therefore, must be presupposed to exist, yet this existence need not relate to an 
existence independent of discourse. Karttunen presents the following examples to 
illustrate this point: 
 
(1) Bill saw a unicorn. The unicorn had a gold name. 
(2) Bill didn’t see a unicorn. *The unicorn had a gold mane. 
 
The notion of discourse referents is further developed by Heim (2002), who re-
phrases it as metaphorical file-keeping: expressions that introduce entities into a 
discourse (some indefinite expressions) create a new file card, while references to 






2.2.5 Du Bois, 1980 
 
A particularly clear account of the referential/non-referential distinction in the 
linguistics literature is provided by Du Bois (1980). Du Bois’ account is grounded 
very strongly in linguistic data, and there is only very brief acknowledgement of, 
and little concern for, the issues that have been debated in philosophical 
approaches to reference. The result is a conception of reference that appears 
strong in its internal coherence, and which is quite distinct from those of 
philosophy, and very similar to that of Gundel et al. Du Bois states that a “noun 
phrase is referential when it is used to speak about an object as an object, with 
continuous identity over time” (1980, p. 208). Like Gundel et al, this has much in 
common with Karttunen’s (1976) idea of discourse reference. Indeed, Du Bois 
introduces the metaphor of a mental file that Heim (2002) also adopted in her 
adaption of Karttunnen’s concept. Indefinite referential noun phrases activate a 
mental file for an object, while definite expressions typically refer back “to a 
previously opened file” (Du Bois, 1980, p. 209). 
 
Among the linguistics works reviewed here, Du Bois (1980) provides perhaps the 
clearest position statement on the nature of the referent. As noted, to Du Bois, a 
referent may be any object with an enduring identity. This includes a very broad 
range of entities, both concrete and abstract: 
 
The object here may be a physical object or an objectified concept; it may be specifically 
known or it may be unknown; it may exist in the real world or in some hypothetical 
world; there may be one or more than one object. As long as a noun phrase is used to 
speak about such objects and the objects are conceived as having continuity of identity, 
the noun phrase is referential. (pp. 208-209) 
 
Thus a referent is a mental representation of an entity or concept. These 
representations can be of the most basic form, being simply the nomination of a 
token (or tokens) of a general concept, without any particular distinguishing 
feature. From another perspective, referents are the individuated entities mentally 




Just as the range of possible referents is very broad, so is the range of possible 
referring expressions. An expression “may be identifiable or nonidentifiable, 
specific or nonspecific, generic or particular, and it may exhibit various phoricity 
features. Most of these feature contrasts are applicable only to referential 
mentions, not to nonreferential mentions” (Du Bois, 1980, p. 217). As mentioned, 
Du Bois’ account appears similar to that of Gundel et al. (1993) although Du Bois 
appears to extend the concept of reference further in his treatment of indefinites. 
As discussed (p. 12), Gundel et al consider ‘a student’ in the following utterance 
to have both a referential and a non-referential reading, with the latter meaning 
one unknown student. 
 
6. A student in the syntax class cheated on the final exam. 
 
However, Du Bois appears to consider both readings to be referential. The crucial 
matter is not that the speaker has a particular student in mind, but that the 
expression prompts the creation of a new mental file that can later be referred to. 
 
There are, however, a number of indefinite expressions that Du Bois (pp. 209-
217) considers to be non-referential. Although not always explicitly stated in other 
works, it is likely that most of these would also be considered non-referential in 
nearly all other linguistic accounts. These include predicate nominals (e.g. He is a 
policeman), noun modifiers (a pear tree), nouns within negative scope in a 
sentence (e.g. I don’t have a car), certain speech acts (e.g. I now pronounce you 
man and wife), and what Du Bois calls predicate conflation, in which a verb and 
object are conflated to “express a unitary predicate concept rather than to refer to 
an actual object”. An example of this is: 
 
7. They went out pear-picking yesterday. 
 
Here, the word ‘pear’ does not refer, but helps to express the concept of pear-
picking. A further example presented by Du Bois is: 
 




For this example, Du Bois points to the insensitivity of the expression ‘wearing 
one’s lenses’ to semantic number (i.e. in the example text, the expression is plural, 
even though there is only one lens) and argues that this is because ‘wearing one’s 
lenses’ is non-referential as it expresses a ‘monolithic concept’. Although some 
linguists would likely consider many examples of predicate conflation to be non-
referential because no particular entity (e.g. no particular haircut) is indicated, it 
appears that Gundel et al. would consider ‘[wearing] my lenses’ to be referential 
since a definite expression is used and it appears clear which pair of glasses is 
indicated. This likely difference in position seems to arise because Du Bois’ 
appears to take the linguistic data as his starting point, while Gundel et al. perhaps 
take a broader view that accounts for more of the cognitive processing aspects of 
communication. 
 
In summary, Du Bois’ concept of reference is very far from the view expressed by 
Bach (2008) and is very broad in terms of the possible referents and referring 
expressions it allows. Its motivation is to provide an account of linguistic 




2.2.6 Ariel, 1990, 2001 
 
Compared to the linguistic approaches discussed so far, Ariel (e.g.1985; 1988a, 
1988b, 1990, 2001, 2004) appears more heavily influenced by philosophical 
approaches to reference. However, his departure from standard linguistic 
approaches to defining reference is not explicitly stated, and Ariel’s position on 
some of issues is only discerned through extensive reading of her work. For 
example, that Ariel distinguishes referential from attributive use is directly stated 
as an aside in a later work (Ariel, 2001, p. 38), but is not directly stated in her 
major work on reference (1990). Similarly, a footnote relating to Givon’s topic 
hierarchy states that she excludes indefinites and generics from her anaylsis “since 
I find them irrelevant to the point I am making” (1990, p. 225). As such, it appears 
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that Ariel has at least partially adopted a framework from the philosophy of 
language. 
 
As with the Givenness Hierarchy, there is an emphasis in Accessibility Theory 
(AT) on references being made to the mental representations of referents. If a 
mental representation does not currently exist for the hearer, then an expression 
which introduces the referent to the discourse (e.g. a presentative, such as voila) is 
not referential (1990, p. 47). Ariel argues that “[s]ince it is naive to assume that 
referring expressions directly refer to physical entities (be they linguistic or other 
kinds of objects), we must assume that in all cases an addressee looks for 
antecedents which are themselves mental representations” (1990, p. 6).   
 
Ariel discusses the matter of existence (the existential presupposition), and argues 
that the type of context retrieval is of crucial importance in this regard. 
Encyclopedic context (accessing a referent from one’s long-term memory) and 
physical context (a mental representation connecting to one’s sensory perception) 
both carry an assumption of existence based on trust in memory and senses. 
However, entities that are invoked through discourse (relating to the context of 
linguistic data, which Ariel labels linguistic context), do not commit one to the 
belief that they exist. One may, for example, believe that one’s interlocutor is 
indulging in fantasy or simply lying. It is not clear what Ariel’s standpoint is on 
reference in fiction, although it could be presumed that it is similar to her view on 
real-world linguistic reference. Ariel’s position on existence, then, is much more 
liberal than what is proposed by many philosophers (e.g. Bach, 2008; Russell, 
1905; Searle, 1969; Strawson, 1950). 
 
 
2.2.7 Bickerton, 1981, and Huebner 1983, 1985 
 
Another linguistic work presenting a definition of reference is Huebner’s (1983, 
1985) adaptation of Bickerton’s (1981) treatment of articles. In his study of creole 
languages, Bickerton claims to discern the human genetic program or bioprogram 
that enables language development to take place. On the topic of reference, 
Bickerton (pp. 221-234) introduces the notions of percept and concept, in which 
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the former relates to the perception of an individual (e.g. a mosquito) and the 
latter relates to the generic notion (e.g. mosquito). He argues that these are 
fundamentally different cognitive processes, and this is reflected in linguistic 
systems as the distinction between specific and generic. Concerning English 
articles, Bickerton (pp. 248-249) distinguishes two relevant variables,  +/- 
presupposed, and +/- specific, that combine into four semantic combinations that 
correspond with the use of articles in English. Huebner (1983, 1985) applies 
slightly different terminology to Bickerton’s distinctions, and presents the four 
categories as: 
 
(1) Generics: non-specific, assumed known to the hearer 
(2) Referential definites: specific, assumed known to the hearer 
(3) Referential indefinites: specific, assumed unknown to the hearer  
(4) Non-referentials: non-specific, assumed unknown to the hearer 
 
The term specific is used when a noun phrase signifies a particular entity. The 
distinction between specific and non-specific is behind the ambiguity in some 
uses of indefinite noun phrases, and also behind the subsequent range of possible 
pronouns. For example: 
 
(5) I am looking for a hammer. (later) I found it. (specific indefinite noun 
phrase)  
(6) I am looking for a hammer. (later) I found one. (non-specific indefinite 
noun phrase) 
 
While Huebner considers categories (1) and (4) to be non-referential (as they do 
not individuate an entity or entities), Bach’s (2008) position is that (3) is also non-
referential, and so are some uses of definite NPs categorized as (2).  
 
Unlike many, Huebner, provides the following gloss for the category ‘non-
referentials’ (1983, p. 133): 
 
a. Equative noun phrases [nouns in the predicate nominal position] 
b. Noun phrases in the scope of negation 
21 
 
c. Noun phrases in scope of questions, irrealis mode [hypothetical] 
 
Overall, then, the positions of Huebner (1983, 1985) and Bickerton (1981), are 
also markedly different from the philosophic tradition exemplified by Bach 
(2008). To Bach, speaker reference requires that the referent be known by the 
hearer, and thus the category of ‘referential indefinites’ would be considered a 
contradiction in terms. It appears that, to Huebner (1983), reference does not 
involve the four-place relation described by Bach in which a speaker refers an 
audience to an entity via a referring expression (2008), but a three way relation in 
which the hearer’s role is outside the act of reference. In philosophical terms, 
then, it appears that this conception of reference is a matter of the speaker having 
a singular thought, and expressing that thought, but without necessarily intending 
the audience to identify the referent. 
 
 
2.3 Common ground  
 
In the definition of reference adopted from Bach (2008), an act of reference 
requires that the speaker indicate an entity for which the hearer holds a singular 
thought. To do so requires, firstly, that the speaker and hearer both hold singular 
thoughts about the referent, and importantly, that they recognize that this is true of 
each other. Secondly, in choosing an appropriate RE, the speaker must make 
judgments relating to the hearer’s current cognitive state in relation to the referent.  
 
Both of these concerns relate to closely related concepts that emphasize the 
known overlap in the interlocutors’ knowledge, such as common knowledge 
(Lewis, 1969), mutual knowledge (Schiffer, 1972), shared knowledge (e.g. 
Gundel, 1985), mutual manifestness (Sperber & Wilson, 1986), or common 
ground (Stalnaker, 1978, cited in Clark, 1996). Although these concepts vary in 
crucial ways, they all emphasize that such knowledge is “a necessary condition 
for performing an act of communication” (Schiffer, 1972, p. 30). Following Clark 
(1996), the term common ground is used in the present study, although in the very 




In relation to reference, it is crucial for the felicitous introduction of new referents 
into discourse that the speaker and the hearer not only both know the referent, but 
that they are aware that this knowledge is part of their common ground. This can 
be illustrated by considering the use of widely held names, such as, in the New 
Zealand context, David or Stephen. It is likely that many hearers will know 
several Davids, yet when a speaker uses this name, the hearer will attempt to 
identify a bearer of that name who is known to both parties. In a study of the use 
of demonstrative reference, Clark, Schreuder and Buttrick (1983) argue that 
interlocutors “must weigh every part of common ground that might be pertinent” 
(p. 257). Clark et al. show that at least four elements of common ground are 
involved: salience, assumptions about the speaker’s goals, what has been asserted 
by the speaker, and what the speaker has presupposed. 
 
Common ground also plays an important role in determining what counts as a 
felicitous RE in a particular context. Firstly, interlocutors judge each other’s 
cognitive state in relation to referents. For example, if speakers consider referents 
to be dimly recalled by their addressees, then more semantic content will typically 
be used to single out the referent. Similarly, if the hearer knows that a speaker’s 
attention is directed towards a particular referent, then they may interpret 
semantically vague expressions (such as pronouns) as referring to that entity. 
 
In a second, broader sense, common ground also restricts which REs are felicitous 
in relation to a particular hearer. For example, the use of a nickname or a definite 
description will not serve to identify the referent unless the hearer knows (or can 
work out) that this RE relates to the intended referent.  
 
 
2.4 Referring expressions as a system 
 
In Chapter 2 of the main thesis, the main claims of Accessibility Theory (AT) are 
reviewed. As discussed in Chapter 2, AT is just one of several theories accounting 
for the use of referring expressions (REs) in discourse. This subsection reviews 
the main competing theories, focusing on the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, 2010; 
Gundel et al., 1993, 2005), theories of topic marking (e.g. Givón, 1983c), Chafe’s 
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discussion of discourse ‘flow’ (1994), neo-Gricean approaches (e.g. Levinson, 
2007) and post-Gricean approaches (e.g. Wilson, 1992). 
 
 
2.4.1 The Givenness Hierarchy 
 
The Givenness Hierarchy (GH) proposed by Gundel, Hedburg, and Zacharski 
(1993) is often closely identified with AT, but differs in a number of key respects. 
This subsection focuses on differences between the two theories and draws 
heavily on Gundel (2010). 
 
Like Accessibility Theory, the GH proposes that different noun phrase forms 
“serve as processing signals to the addressee” (1993, p. 276). This enables the 
addressee to restrict the parameters of their search for a referent. However, unlike 
Accessibility Theory, GH accounts for the use of pronouns and determiners rather 
noun phrase types. The Givenness Hierarchy makes a clear distinction between 
the procedural information encoded in pronoun/determiner choice and the 
conceptual information that is lexically encoded, focusing only on the former 
(Gundel, 2010). Similarly, names are also excluded from most accounts of GH, 
although Mulkern (1996) proposes to incorporate them into an expanded GH. 
Unlike Accessibility Theory, therefore, the GH does not include all definite 
expressions, although it does include indefinite expressions. The hierarchy is 
presented in Figure 2.1: 
 
Figure 2.1: The Givenness Hierarchy, Gundel et al. 1993 
 
in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely > referential > type 
      identifiable            identifiable 
 
it  that  that N  the N  indefinite  a 
  this      this N 
  this N 
 
As indicated, the six cognitive statuses (e.g. ‘in focus’) are conventionally related 
to one or more determiners or pronouns (e.g. it). Although similar, the term 
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cognitive status is not to be equated with accessibility. Rather, pronouns and 
determiners are said to encode cognitive statuses that “provide procedural 
information about the manner of cognitive accessibility, i.e. where and how a 
mental representation of the intended interpretation is to be accessed, thereby 
guiding the addressee in restricting possible interpretations” (Gundel, 2010, p. 
152, emphasis added). The individual statuses are based on a number of general 
distinctions derived from linguistic and psycholinguistic research. For example, 
referents that are in focus are the current focus of attention; referents that are 
activated are in working memory; referents that are familiar have a representation 
within memory (Gundel, 2010).  
 
Importantly, the GH is an implicational scale. That is, by using an expression 
from this scale, the speaker is indicating to the listener that all of the cognitive 
statuses to its right (but not to its left) on the scale are met. Thus an entity that is 
familiar is also, by definition, uniquely identifiable, referential, and type 
identifiable. This means that an entity could be referred to using a form associated 
with a lower cognitive status, but not by using a form associated with a higher 
status. For example an entity that has the cognitive status ‘familiar’ may be 
referred to with an expression associated with ‘uniquely identifiable’, but not by 
expression associated with the status of ‘activated’.   
 
This feature would seem to leave open the possibility of speakers frequently using 
an expression for lower status. Indeed, the GH is, overall, tolerant of over-
explicitness. However, Gundel et al. (1993) argue that use of the scale interacts 
with Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (Grice, 1989, p. 26): 
 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
 
In short, speakers should say as much, and only as much, as required and, 
therefore, the expression signalling the highest cognitive status should ordinarily 
be used. By selecting an expression for a particular status, the speaker implicates 




Gundel et al. (1993, pp. 302-303) also propose that the interaction of Q1 and Q2 
can account for the distribution of NPs, including the relative scarcity of 
demonstrative forms reported in various studies. Because pronouns and 
demonstrative pronouns encode very little semantic information, Q1 requires 
either being precise with pronoun choice (i.e. select he/she/it whenever 
applicable), or using a lexical expression. Nouns typically contain sufficient 
lexical content for identification, and so evoke Q2, discouraging the use of a 
demonstrative determiner. 
 
In the present study, a key focus is to investigate SLL competence in the use of 
REs, and in this regard three aspects of the GH make it a less suitable framework 
than Accessibility Theory. Firstly, Accessibility Theory holds that each RE type 
conventionally encodes a different degree of accessibility, while the GH focuses 
only on pronouns and determiners. Secondly, in considering the felicity of NP-
cognitive status mapping (i.e. form-function mapping) in SLL speech, adoption of 
the GH framework would effectively limit the analysis to just three or four 
distinctions (in focus, activated, familiar, and perhaps uniquely identifiable) as the 
remaining distinctions conventionally relate to referents that are hearer-new. 
Thirdly, Accessibility Theory appears to make stronger predictions than the GH in 
relation to over-explicitness. Specifically, whereas Accessibility Theory proposes 
that referents are conventionally encoded according to their accessibility, the GH 
makes its strongest predictions only in relation to which determiner and pronoun 
types indicate a cognitive status that is too high for the referent (although Gricean 
principles also constrain the use of forms that indicate a lower status). As such, 
the GH is generally tolerant of over-explicitness.  
 
 
2.4.2 Topic marking 
 
Givón (e.g. 1983a; 1983b, 1984) proposes a hierarchy of topic marking, in which 
linguistic forms are associated with more or less predictable topics. One of the 




[Givón] claims that discourse is built of clause-level units which (a) 
comprise the same theme, and (b) tend to repeat the same 
participants/topic continuity. In this view, topic continuity, those instances 
in which the same topic extends over numerous clauses, is the unmarked 
form. Topic change is the marked form. 
 
Thus, Givón’s proposal is that the signalling of topic maintenance is most readily 
achieved through attenuated forms such as zero anaphora and unstressed 
pronouns; predictable shifts in topic require some degree of signalling in the noun 
phrase; less predictable changes in topic require more explicit noun phrases. 
Brown (1983) provides the following hierarchy (slightly adapted from Givon, 
1981), with zero anaphora associated with the most predictable topics and 
cleft/focus constructions with the least predictable topic shifts: 
 
Zero anaphora 
Clitic pronouns/verb agreement 









Among researchers working within the topic-marking framework, this general 
order of items in the hierarchy is widely agreed, although there is some minor 
variation in the forms that are included. For example, Givón (1983a) adds the 
additional category of ‘referential indefinite NP’s’ as the final last category on his 
list. 
 
Unlike AT, the topic-marking approach also considers the order of sentence 
constituents. These include the categories of left dislocation (LD) and right 
dislocation (RD), both of which are features of spoken English and involve the 
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specification of an element elsewhere in the clause. Examples from Brown (1983) 
are: 
  
LD:   The cheese they made there, they sold most of it to the miners. 
RD: It bothered her for weeks, John’s smile. 
 
Similarly, the hierarchy includes Y-movement, which occurs when a NP is moved 
from its standard sentence position to front of the clause: 
 
1. The cheese they sold mainly to the miners. 
 
There are, then, obvious overlaps as well as substantial divergences between 
Givón’s theory and AT: the latter distinguishes among a broader range of RE 
types, while the former applies to some grammatical structures and some 
indefinite NPs. More notable is the focus within Givón’s approach on marking 
specifically for topic rather than attempting a broad account of NP use. This 
approach has its origin in considerations of how speakers organize the delivery of 
information. For the purposes of the present study, then, Givón’s framework is not 
entirely suitable as it does fully account for RE selection (e.g. the distinctions 
between this + N, that + N, the + N). 
 
 
2.4.3 Information flow  
 
Like Givón’s approach to topic, a number of approaches to discourse consider the 
way that coherence is maintained through considerate delivery of information. 
Chafe (1994) uses the term flow to describe how the structure of information 
affects the relative ease with which the mind processes discourse. Chafe uses the 
term activation cost to describe the relative cognitive demands of recovering 
information. He distinguishes between three degrees of consciousness in relation 
to information at a particular time in conversation: given information is activated 
in consciousness; accessible information is semi-active; new information is 
inactive. Chafe explains NP selection in terms of the effort involved in moving 
information that is in an active/semi-active/inactive state at time t1 to an active 
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state in time t2 (the succeeding point in the discourse). Information that is 
activated at t1 requires less effort to activate at t2 than semi-active information, 
which in turn requires less effort than inactive information. In short, “[g]iven 
information is typically verbalized in English with a weakly accented pronoun, 
new and accessible information with an accented noun or noun phrase” (p. 81). 
 
This account (Chafe, 1994) represents the development of a full theory that 
incorporates distinctions presented by Chafe in earlier work (1976). For the 
purposes of the present study, a disadvantage of Chafe’s three-way distinction 
between active, semi-active and inactive is that it appears to make weaker 
predictions in relation to RE selection, and also leaves unclear the issue of how to 
account for differences between similar forms (e.g. that man vs. the man). 
 
 
2.4.4 Neo-Gricean and post-Gricean approaches to reference 
 
This subsection summarizes those pragmatic approaches to reference associated 
with neo-Gricean and post-Gricean theory. These approaches contrast with those 
presented in previous subsections by arguing that RE selection and resolution are 
entirely pragmatic matters, and that there is no need to suppose that there are 
partially grammaticised form-function relations holding between RE types and 
degrees of accessibility. Thus, while Ariel (1990) and Gundel et al. (1993) have 
specifically associated their theories with Relevance Theory and Gricean maxims 
respectively, Relevance theorists (particularly Reboul, 1997; Scott, 2008) have 
argued that their accounts need no recourse to AT or the Givenness Hierarchy. 
 
Although it appears that Grice wrote little about reference, a number of neo-
Gricean accounts of reference have been proposed. For example, Geluykens 
(1994) suggests that RE selection results from the interaction of two conflicting 
pragmatic principles arising from Grice’s Quantity Maxim. These are a principle 





The Clarity (C-) Principle 
‘say as much as you must to avoid ambiguity’ 
i.e. use of full NP whenever you have to 
 
The Economy (E-) Principle 
‘say as little as you can get away with (given C) 
i.e. use a PRO-form whenever you can 
 
These two principles are in conflict, and Geluykens argues that it is this tension 
that generates appropriate RE selection. Geluykens supports this hypothesis 
through evidence of repairs indicating that the speaker has erred in balancing 
these principles. Related principles and arguments are presented by Huang (2000). 
 
More recently, Levinson (2007) has proposed a system in which three conflicting 
principles operate. These are defined by Levinson (p. 31) as follows: 
 
 Recognition: Restrict the set of referents so as to achieve recognition. 
 Economy: Don’t over-restrict the set of referents explicitly. 
Circumspection: Show circumspection by not over-reducing the set of referents explicitly. 
 
Levinson finds that speakers try “to satisfy all of the constraints concurrently, thus 
optimizing person-reference” (p. 68), but when a reference fails, there is a clear 
order of precedence: recognition is prioritized over the other principles, and 
circumspection is prioritized over economy (p. 66). 
 
Other researchers have taken a Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986) 
approach to accounting for RE selection and resolution (e.g. Scott, 2008; Wilson, 
1992). Relevance Theory (RT) is a cognition-based account primarily concerned 
with how hearers/readers interpret language and replaces Grice’s cooperative 
principle and conversational maxims with a single principle of relevance. 
Underlying RT is the idea that language is under-determined in the sense that 
utterances have many potential meanings, but that these potential interpretations 
are more or less relevant within the local context of language use. A key 
characteristic of human cognition is to arrive at the most relevant of these 
interpretations without entertaining other possibilities (Wilson, 1992). A central 
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feature of RT accounts of reference is that speakers avoid being over-explicit and 
under-explicit because these result in processing costs to the hearer that result in 
no additional cognitive/communicative benefit. For example, Scott (2008) argues 
that a felicitously used RE such as this black cat is interpretable because the RE 
carries conceptual information (i.e. I refer to one cat which is black) and 
procedural information (e.g. proximal/distal distinction in this/that), and that the 
role of REs “is to guide the hearer not just to the intended referent but to an 
overall interpretation” (p. 284). 
 
It remains somewhat unclear whether neo-Gricean or Relevance approaches can 
account for reference without recourse to some version of Accessibility Theory. 
While Scott (2008) and Reboul (1997) have argued that it can, Ariel (2008, pp. 
48-53) provides a number of examples that she argues do require an AT-type 
explanation. Ariel presents two main forms of evidence for the AT account. 
Firstly, a number of examples are purported to show that the choice between some 
RE types cannot be explained by the semantics of the REs. For example, Ariel 
cites it, this and that as being equivalent in informational content. Although it is 
may be countered that this and that are semantically marked as proximal and 
distal respectively, Strauss (2002) has argued that this traditional distinction fails 
to account for the use of demonstratives. Strauss proposes an alternative, more 
pragmatic account that is perhaps closer to Ariel’s position.  
 
A second, related, form of evidence presented by Ariel (2008) is examples of 
speakers repairing references through a substituted RE that provides no additional 
semantic information. This argument was, it seems, first raised by Ziv (1991) and 
is perhaps most clearly exemplified in data from Jucker and Smith (2004, pp. 157-
158) in which he is repaired with the man, with substantially improved clarity. 
However, relevance and Gricean theorists may not be convinced. In various 
guises, pragmatic theorists have argued that the greater effort required to produce 
(and process) fuller forms such as the man comes with a guarantee of relevance 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986). 
 
In summary, a number of entirely pragmatic accounts of reference have been 
proposed, and it remains unclear whether these need support from a theory of 
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conventional use of RE types to mark accessibility or cognitive status. However, 
what is clear is that, in practical terms, although Gricean and RT accounts have 
explanatory power, they appear to have limited predictive power and, further, they 
suggest no practical way of analyzing large data sets. In contrast, AT suggests that 
if accessibility can be accurately measured, then RE selection can be accurately 
predicted. The Givenness Hierarchy also has predictive power, particularly insofar 
as predicting the highest cognitive status marker that can be felicitously used.  
 
 
2.5 Cognitive accessibility  
 
This section summarizes a broad range of findings relating to the factors that 
contribute to an entity’s accessibility. Nine key factors are identified and 
discussed in the following subsections. These are distance, syntax, competition, 
salience and topicality, episodes and boundaries, parallelism, genre and mode, 
speaker internal factors, and animacy. In addition, Subsection 2.5.10 briefly 
discusses issues in determining overall accessibility. These factors are relevant to 
the development of the coding system for accessibility discussed in Chapter 4, and 
to further discussion of the findings in Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
 
 
2.5.1 Distance  
 
One of the most intuitively obvious factors influencing NP selection is the 
distance between a RE and the most recent previous reference to that entity. This 
presumably reflects general facts about memory decay and changes in focal 
attention. Studies confirm the hypothesis that when the distance between 
references is small then high-accessibility markers are typically used, and the use 
of low-accessibility markers increases with greater distances (Ariel, 1990; Arnold, 
Bennetto, & Diehl, 2009; C. Brown, 1983; Givón, 1983b; Schiffrin, 2006). This 
linguistic evidence for a distance effect is supported by experimental evidence 
relating to language processing. For example, Ariel (1990) cites Clark and Sengul 
(1979) who show that readers comprehended pronouns and definite descriptions 
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more quickly when the referents of those REs were previously referred to in the 
preceding clause. 
 
The concept of distance is typically measured in terms of either the number of 
intervening clauses (C. Brown, 1983; Clancy, 1980), sentences (Clancy, 1980), 
lexical items (Ariel, 1999), or propositions (Toole, 1996), although it also seems 
possible that temporal distance between references (e.g. substantial pauses before 
resuming a discourse) could be a factor.  
 
The occurrence of pronouns at a lengthy distance from its antecedent means that 
distance alone cannot account for RE selection, and this has lead some researchers 
to reject the distance hypothesis (e.g. Fox, 1987b; Tomlin, 1987). However, from 
an AT perspective (Ariel, 1990, 2001), this is readily explainable as distance is 
just one of a number of factors potentially influencing accessibility. 
 
Overall, distance does appear to be one of the main factors influencing 
accessibility. Consequently, it plays a prominent role in the systems of 
accessibility measurement developed by Toole (1996) and Ariel (1999), and in the 
analysis of topic marking in many studies (see Givón, 1983c). In some studies 
(e.g. Ariel, 1988a; Givón, 1984), distance has performed adequately as the only 
measure taken. A key question, however, is the unit for measuring distance. The 
lexical unit is perhaps too small to be practical for the present study (Ariel, 1999, 
uses this measure but only for a study of resumptive pronouns). This is discussed 
further in the following subsection, whereit is established that clauses are an 
important unit in measuring accessibility. 
 
 
2.5.2 Syntax and clauses 
 
Binding Theory (e.g. Chomsky, 1982) proposes three structural principles that 
account for some distributional phenomena in the use of pronouns, lexical REs, 
reflexives (e.g. herself) and reciprocals (e.g. each other) (the term anaphor applies 
only to reflexives and reciprocals in the Chomskyan tradition). These are 




“A. An anaphor is bound in its governing category. 
B. A pronominal is free in its governing category. 
C. An R- expression is free”  
   
These principles account for linguistic rules such as the following (adapted from 
Haegeman, 1994), where * indicates a grammatically unacceptable form: 
 
1. Poirot1 admires *him1/himself1. 
2. Poirot1 admires him2/*himself2. 
3. Bertie1 said that he1/2 felt rather ill. 
 
Although reflexives are not a focus of the present study, of particular importance 
here is the suggestion that there are clause level constraints on how pronouns and 
lexical REs are interpreted. To put it simply, in a simple sentence, the use of an 
object pronoun indicates that the object is not co-referential with the subject 
(Examples 1 and 2), while in embedded clauses, pronouns can be either co-
referential or non-co-referential with the main clause subject (Example 3). Such 
features support Arnold’s contention that “[w]ithin a clause, the relative 
accessibility of entities is more strongly determined by syntactic and thematic 
prominence” than by distance (2010, p. 190). 
 
Such syntactic accounts are not the only way to account for the phenomena 
underlying these examples, Bach argues against syntactic accounts and proposes 
that “being mentioned elsewhere in a sentence is just one way of being salient” 
(1987). Ariel (1990, pp. 97-98) adopts the slightly weaker position that AT 
“constrains possible grammaticalization processes involving pronominal forms” 
(p. 98). Huang (2007) argues that apparent syntactic constraints are actually 
grammaticalized features of language use arising from neo-Gricean principles.  
 
In a further approach, Gernsbacher (1990) draws attention to clausal boundaries 
(and other types of boundary) and the effect on memory. For example, she cites 
research demonstrating sharply decreasing language recall after a single 
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intervening clause, and greater difficulty resolving pronouns when there is an 
intervening clause between an anaphor and its antecedent. 
 
For the present study, the most relevant aspect of these phenomena is that the 
clause appears to be an important structural boundary. That is, referents appear to 
have highest accessibility for the duration of the clause in which they are most 
immediately represented. Clauses, therefore, are an appropriate unit for the 
measurement of distance. However, for the purposes of analyzing spoken 
discourse, some researchers (Tomlin, 1987; Toole, 1996) have found it useful to 
treat clauses as the linguistic realization of a proposition. An advantage of this is 
that partial clauses with elided elements may be frequent in speech, and can be 
distinguished from abandoned clauses and thus counted as a factor in determining 
distance. The present study, therefore, follows Toole (1996) in adopting Tomlin’s 
definition (1987, p. 461) (discussed in Chapter 4).  
 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that there are syntactic constraints on the 
distribution of zero in spoken English, which effectively restrict zeros to the 
position of syntactic subject (Williams, 1988). The use of zeros in other syntactic 
positions is interpreted as an error irrespective of accessibility: 
 
4.  John bought an ice cream but Ø dropped it. 





A further factor established in the literature as influencing accessibility is 
competition. This occurs when multiple referents can potentially compete for the 
resolution of a RE. For example, Clancy (1980) found that in both English and 
Japanese oral narratives, most high-accessibility markers (pronouns and/or zeros), 
were used when there were no intervening referents between an anaphor and its 
antecedent. This is particularly the case for zero in English. In both languages, the 
presence of just one intervening referent substantially increased the likelihood that 
a lexical RE would be used, and the effect increased with further intervening 
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referents. Clancy concluded that competition played a stronger role in prompting 
lexical REs than did distance or structural boundaries measured in terms of 
clauses and sentences (p. 143). 
 
In a more recent study, Schiffrin (2006) found that “next-mention pronouns are 
less frequent when the referent is potentially ambiguous” (p. 172). Similarly, 
Brown (1983) found that the average potential for ambiguity (i.e. the competition 
factor) was least for those referents encoded with high accessibility markers (zero 
and unstressed pronouns). However, counter to the predictions of AT, in Brown’s 
findings, the + N and names were typically found in cases of less competition than 
demonstrative forms. In interpreting this finding, it is important to stress that AT 
does not reduce accessibility to any one factor and so there could be accessibility-
based explanations for this finding. 
 
A number of psycholinguistic studies also support the notion that competition 
plays a role in accessibility. For example, the Information Load Hypothesis 
(Almor, 1999) proposes a model in which the capacity for memory “is determined 
by not only the number of stored items but also by their activation (e.g., Just & 
Carpenter 1992) such that higher activation can result in more competition and 
therefore in higher cost” (Almor & Nair, 2007, p. 91). Similarly, competition 
plays a key role in Gernsbacher’s (1990) Structure Building Framework, in the 
form of the processes of enhancement and suppression, which relate, respectively, 
to how reference to an entity increases its accessibility and decreases the 
accessibility of other entities. 
 
More generally, the competition hypothesis is supported in linguistic approaches 
such as that articulated by Givón (1983a), and is reflected in the referential coding 
systems used by some researchers (Schiffrin, 2006; Toole, 1996). In many 
approaches, competition is presumed only to occur when the competing referents 
are “semantically compatible (most commonly in terms of animacy, humanity, 
agentivity or semantic plausibility as object or subject)” (Givón, 1983a, p. 14). 
This is motivated by the recognition that many REs preclude certain 
interpretations due to semantic features (such as he being marked for male). More 
recently, however, Arnold and Griffen (2007) have presented psycholinguistic 
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evidence suggesting that competition also arises from referents that are not 
semantically compatible with the RE. They suggest that the cognitive strain 
involved in maintaining a discourse model with multiple referents produces a 
competition effect. 
 
A general problem appears to arise in establishing exactly what qualifies as 
competition for nonhuman entities, as nearly all can be referred to with the 
pronoun it. In particular, a problem arises in that utterances made regarding the 
weather and other situational factors also frequently involve it. For example, in 
uttering it’s hot in relation to a bowl of soup, it is unclear whether the day’s 
temperature should be considered competition. In short, it is often unclear how to 
determine exactly which referential and non-referential entities (and non-entities) 
are in competition for resolution of expressions relating to non-human entities. 
 
For the purposes of the present study, a distinction is drawn between competition 
arising from semantically compatible (hereafter matching) referents and a more 
general competition effect from multiple (non-matching) entities. As with 
previous studies, only matching referents are to be counted as competition, as 
these appear to have the greatest direct effect on accessibility marking, and it is 
unclear how to incorporate the more general concept of competition into the 
analysis. The analysis will, however, include an identification of the number of 
referents in each narrative and consideration will be given to the prediction that 
narrative retellings with more referents in a particular scene will tend to result in a 
greater number of low-accessibility markers due to processing load. 
 
 
2.5.4 Salience and topicality 
 
There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the salience of a referent 
influences the choice of RE used to refer to it. The more salient a referent is, the 
higher its accessibility is likely to be. Entities may, for example, be salient as a 
result of being prominent within the physical context or through discourse 
topicality (Ariel, 1990). As with much discourse, the narrative elicitation task 
used in the present study does not involve referents that are physically present, 
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and so topicality is the major factor in salience in the task used in the present 
study.  
 
Ariel (1990) draws a distinction between discourse topics (global) and local 
topics, and cites studies indicating that discourse topics are more frequently 
pronominalized than local topics. It is not entirely clear how Ariel defines 
discourse and local topic, but the former may be related to the concept of 
quaestio, insofar as texts are designed to answer a fundamental, implicit question 
(the quaestio) (Klein & Perdue, 1992; von Stutterheim & Klein, 1989). In this 
view, retellings of the present narrative task (see Chapter 4) are structured around 
answering the implicit quaestio ‘what happened to Charlie?’ In recognizing this, 
addressees are expected to maintain a relatively prominent role for Charlie in their 
mental model irrespective of whether there is a substantial distance between the 
current and previous mentions of Charlie. This is supported by evidence from 
psycholinguistic research (e.g. Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Morrow, 1985; 
Sanford & Garrod, 1981). Studies also indicate that references to main characters 
tend to be pronominalized more frequently than references to minor characters 
(Clancy, 1980; Morrow, 1985; Redeker, 1987), and that only main characters can 
be introduced (Clancy, 1980; Smith, Noda, Andrews, & Jucker, 2005) and re-
introduced (Klein & Perdue, 1992) with pronouns. It is important to note that, 
overall, AT sees the pronominalization of main characters as the result of main 
characters having high accessibility, rather than as a result of their discourse 
profile as main characters (Ariel, 2004). This position is supported by the finding 
that references to minor characters decrease the accessibility of main characters 
(Gernsbacher, Robertson, Palladino, & Werner, 2004). 
 
Similarly, it is somewhat unclear how Ariel defines local topic, although 
topicality can be distinguished at the clause level (for which, in English, subject is 
sometimes considered to be a grammaticalization of topic), and various larger 
units including sequences of clauses, and (in written text) paragraphs, sections, 
chapters and entire works (Givón, 1983a, p. 7). Above the clause level, local 
topicality can be established in at least two main ways. Firstly, repeated mentions 
of an entity increase its topicality and therefore accessibility. Gernsbacher and her 
colleagues present experimental evidence for this in a series of studies 
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(Gernsbacher, 1990; Gernsbacher et al., 2004), and account for the findings 
through the proposed processes of suppression and enhancement. Once an entity 
has been established as part of a topical chain of references, it is likely to reappear 
in the immediately following clause.  
 
Secondly, local topicality is established partially through the syntactic position of 
REs. That is, topicality is usually associated with the syntactic subject in English, 
or through other focusing structures (e.g. there is . . .; left-dislocation). Topics are 
typically thought of as being, in some sense, given/old information, and are 
therefore associated with higher accessibility. One illustration of this is that the 
maintenance of local topics in coordinate structures is frequently able to be 
achieved with a zero in the second topic position. Indeed, this is one of the very 
few felicitous uses of zero in written English: 
 
2. He went to the library and Ø returned a book. 
 
Williams (1988, 1989) argues that the use of zero in other contexts is not (as often 
presumed) indicative of error, and demonstrates that zero is also found in spoken 
English in parallel clauses with overt coordination (Example 3), and when “the 
exophoric referent is clear from context” (Example 4): 
 
3. He just walked into the crossfire. Ø Never knew what hit him. 
4. (at a lecture) Ø Sure knows his stuff. (1989, p. 154) 
 
What is clear from examples 2 and 3 is that an important element in creating a 
permissible context for zero in English is topic maintenance. This is further 
supported by syntactic rules barring the use of zero in other syntactic positions 
(e.g. zeros are not permitted in object position in English). Example 4 
demonstrates that topicality is not the sole factor in permitting zero (the felicity of 
this example appears to be partially due to the lack of any competition, and also 
what is predicated on the referent). 
 
Finally, experimental research by Gompel and Majid (2004) indicates that 
pronouns relating to entities that have been referred to multiple times are easier to 
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process than those relating to less frequently occurring antecedents. As Gompel 
and Majid note, this supports saliency accounts of pronoun resolution. 
 
In short, a suitable measurement of salience or topicality involves an assessment 
of global topicality and local topicality. For the purposes of this study, global 
topicality is equated with references to either of two main characters, and local 
topicality is to be measured in terms of the frequency of references to a particular 
entity in the immediately preceding utterances. The referent that is the topic of a 




2.5.5 Episodes and boundaries 
 
A further factor affecting accessibility is discourse boundaries. Chafe’s early 
speculation was that discourse boundaries, such as a change of scene, would 
involve the introduction of a new set of entities into “the consciousness of the 
addressee, presumably pushing out old ones” (1976, p. 33). A great deal of 
linguistic and psycholinguistic evidence has subsequently confirmed this effect, 
and the types of relevant boundaries include those involving related sequences of 
events (scenes), shifts in time and place, and larger episodes. In spoken language, 
boundaries can be established through prosody and other discourse markers, while 
in written language, sentences, paragraphs, sections and chapters all signal 
boundaries. Linguistically, pronouns tend to be used within episodes, while 
lexical REs are typically used when the referent traverses episode boundaries. 
 
Among the early psycholinguistic evidence, Sanford and Garrod (1981) 
demonstrated that, in narratives, the accessibility of principal actors (including 
main characters and other central entities) remains high after temporal and spatial 
boundaries (hereafter defined as episodes), but auxiliary entities (minor characters 
and other entities) are often scenario-dependent, in that they are strongly 
associated with particular scenarios (e.g. waiters in a restaurant scenario), and 




More generally, the influence of episodes on cognitive accessibility has been 
related to the structure and limited capacity of memory (Tomlin, 1987, p. 456), 
and to processes involved in building a discourse model (Gernsbacher, 1990). 
Similarly, in a study of narrative comprehension, Black and Bower concluded that 
“episodes act as separate chunks in memory” (1979, p. 317). 
 
However, the use of full REs cannot entirely be explained in terms of referents 
being less accessible after boundaries, and Vonk, Hustinx and Simons 
demonstrate that speakers also use low-accessibility markers to actually indicate 
the presence of such a boundary (1992). Conversely, high-accessibility markers 
signal a continuation of theme. 
 
Linguistic evidence supporting the episode hypothesis is found particularly in the 
studies by Fox (1987b) and Tomlin (1987) (also Clancy, 1980; Schiffrin, 2006). 
Similarly to Vonk et al. (1992), Fox argued that pronominal references in spoken 
discourse signal the continuation of a thematic sequence, and that use of a full NP 
signals that the sequence has closed. Analyzing spoken discourse from within a 
conversation analysis perspective, Fox gave a number of examples of how such 
sequences remain open, including being positioned in the middle of an adjacency 
pair, when a turn expansion is made, and when an adjacency pair is tied to a 
preceding pair (e.g. through post-elaboration). Fox argued that the ability of an 
adjacency pair to tie to pairs other than the immediately preceding one accounts 
for the phenomena of long-distance anaphora (see Subsection 2.5.1). 
 
To summarize, a strong episode-hypothesis predicts that “[i]ndividuals will use 
full nouns on first mention after an episode boundary; individuals will use 
pronouns to sustain reference during an episode” (Tomlin, 1987, p. 475). 
However, it does not appear that the episodic hypothesis can fully account for RE 
selection. In particular, competition appears to be a substantial factor, and Tomlin 
specifically controls this variable in his data collection (1987). Perhaps a revised 
episodic/competition hypothesis could be revisited in future studies as a possible 
account of RE marking and a potential alternative to Accessibility Theory. 
However, a number of potential problems remain with such a theory, particularly 
around determining the various types of boundary in different modes of 
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communication, genres, and text types (relevant here is Toole’s, 1996, critique of 
Fox, 1987). At present, the universal applicability of AT (where boundaries are 
seen as just one factor contributing to accessibility) appears more convincing. To 
conclude, following Toole, episode boundaries are to be included in the coding 
system for accessibility in the present study. Syntactic boundaries formed at the 
clause level were discussed in Subsection 2.5.2.  
 
 
2.5.6 Parallelism  
 
A number of researchers have identified parallelism as a factor that strongly 
influences the interpretation of anaphoric pronouns (e.g. Chambers & Smyth, 
1998; Gernsbacher, 1990; Grober, Beardsley, & Caramazza, 1978). In short, the 
parallelism hypothesis may be summarized as: 
 
In successive parallel structures, there is a preference to interpret parallel 
grammatical NP constituents as relating to the same referent.  
 
In parallel structures, the use of a zero or unstressed pronoun in the second 
structure indicates co-reference, while the use of a stressed pronoun or lexical NP 
indicates reference switch. 
 
The principle of parallelism is perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the following 
example from (adapted from Kehler, p. 157): 
 
6. Sarah Palin admires Hillary Clinton, and George W. Bush 
absolutely worships her. 
 
In this example, there is a strong preference to interpret her as being co-referential 
with Hillary Clinton (to signal otherwise requires the use of contrastive stress). As 
Kehler points out, this interpretation is strongly preferred in spite of the seeming 
implausibility (given our world knowledge) of Bush (a Republican) worshiping 
Clinton (a Democrat), and the much more plausible possibility that he admires a 




It should be noted that Ariel (2004, pp. 109-110) specifically rejects the 
parallelism principle and maintains that accessibility can account for such data. 
However, the findings from previous studies appear reasonably convincing; 
therefore, the present study follows the previous studies mentioned in including 
parallelism in the analysis of accessibility.  
 
 
2.5.7 Genre and mode 
 
Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 1990, 2001) proposes that a single principle accounts 
for RE selection. The features are not, therefore, variable among cognitive genres 
(e.g. narratives, descriptions) or social genres (e.g. recipes, love letters) (to use 
Bruce’s, 2005, 2008, distinction), nor between the spoken and written modes or 
different registers. This contrasts with what Ariel (2004) calls a discourse profiles 
approach, in which processing cues and strategies for reference resolution arise 
from knowledge of prototypical discourse patterns. 
 
Within the discourse profiles approach, Fox (1987a, 1987b) presented 
comparative analyses of pronoun and lexical REs used for referent tracking in 
conversational speech, written expository texts, and written narrative texts. 
Among Fox’s findings were indications that pronominal reference is more 
frequent in conversational English than in written expository texts, and that for 
these text types, the average distance between an anaphor and its antecedent is far 
greater in the spoken data (2.52 clauses) than in the written data (1.21 clauses). 
The contrast was much less marked between the written narratives and the 
conversational data. Fox concluded that “there is no single rule for anaphora that 
can be specified for all of English” (Fox, 1987b, p. 152), and further, “that it is 
entirely clear that a structural approach to texts is critical for our understanding 
of anaphora” (1987b, p. 142, emphasis added). 
 
Underlying Fox’s research approach was the perspective that “any treatment of 
anaphora must seek its understanding in the hierarchical structure of the text-type 
being used as a source of data” (1987b, p. 1), and the view that written and spoken 
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“modes are fundamentally different in the units that serve to organize them” (Fox, 
1987b, p. 3). To this end, Fox (1987a, 1987b) analyzed conversational interactions 
through a conversation analysis approach (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974), the written expository texts through rhetorical structure analysis (Mann, 
Matthiessen, & Thompson, 1982), and the written narratives through a modified 
story grammar (Rumelhart, 1975).  
 
However, in a critique of Fox’s approach, Toole (1996) argued that by using three 
substantially different systems of analysis for the three types of text, there was no 
basis on which to make a valid comparison between these types of text, and, 
therefore, Fox’s results may have been due to differences in the methods of 
analysis. In short, having assumed that the three types of data were sufficiently 
different to warrant separate systems of analysis, it was perhaps unsurprising that 
Fox found that the results of the analysis diverged in crucial ways. 
 
Toole’s own analysis supports Ariel’s (1990, 1999, 2004) findings in suggesting 
that the single principle of accessibility can account for RE selection in all of the 
data examined, concluding that “[t]he factors which affect referential choice are 
universal and apply regardless of genre” (Toole, p. 286). Implicit in this (rather 
dated) definition of genre is that there are no differences in accessibility marking 
between the spoken and written modes. Although consistent with the predictions 
of AT, this last point may be somewhat surprising as Fox (1987b) identifies some 
seemingly relevant differences between the two modes. These include the 
opportunity for clarification requests and prosodic confirmation in spoken 
discourse, and the fleeting textual trace of spoken language. Similarly, in a 
summary of previous research, Chini observed that “[r]eferential devices are 
normally more explicit in written formal texts” (2005, p. 68) although it is unclear 
which studies support this interpretation. In short, there currently appears to be no 
convincing evidence of such differences. 
 
It must be noted that most studies reporting on genre-specific aspects of reference 
are not based on current definitions of genre. For example, Toole selected 1000-
word excerpts from “science-fiction novels, academic book reviews, informal 
conversations, and current affairs interviews”. Of these, it is unclear how informal 
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conversations can be considered to constitute a genre, and no details are provided 
of these conversations. Under Bruce’s (2005, 2008) definition of genre, the three 
remaining types of data constitute different social genres, each of which may be 
presumed to contain multiple rhetorical moves and, therefore, contain multiple 
cognitive genres (e.g. a science-fiction novel might alternate between recounting 
events, explain a process, describe a location, etc.). In short, it is unclear whether 
previous studies investigating the relationship between accessibility, REs, and 
genre have focused on data that is meaningfully comparable in terms of genre. 
The major exception to this is Schiffrin’s (2006) comparison of oral narratives and 
lists. 
 
Schiffrin (2006) examined four factors influencing the use of a pronoun in 
subsequent mentions: recency, potential ambiguity, topicality, and boundaries. Of 
particular interest is that Schiffrin concluded that boundaries had a more 
substantial effect on the accessibility of referents in lists than in narratives. 
Several possible explanations are offered for this, such as boundaries being more 
sharply delineated in lists (Schiffrin, 2006, pp. 176-178). Schiffrin also identifies 
other aspects of genre that may affect accessibility. For example, although the 
effect of potential ambiguity (competition) appears to be the same in both genres, 
Schiffrin found that potential ambiguity occurred more frequently in narratives 
than in lists. She suggests that this may be because “narratives disambiguate 
referents by actions (their predicates) but lists are often filled with stative 
predicates . . . with little semantic content” (p. 172). These findings suggest that 
the individual factors that influence accessibility may be more or less influential 
within different cognitive genres. 
 
In short, while current evidence appears to suggest that the more abstract and 
general approach of Accessibility Theory better accounts for RE selection than 
Fox’s (1987a, 1987b) genre specific approaches, Schiffrin’s (2006) findings 
suggest that some factors affecting accessibility (such as the strength of boundary 
delineation) may vary in their realization between different genres. It is suggested 
that the relation between genre and accessibility marking be revisited in future 
studies working within a current framework for genre, such as that of Bruce 
(2005, 2008). With this in mind, the present study will examine data elicited from 
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a single, well-researched communicative task (narrative retellings), although it 
should be noted that there may be variations in the rhetorical moves (and therefore 
cognitive genres) that individual speakers select. The analysis will also be 
restricted to spoken data. 
 
2.5.8 Speaker internal factors 
 
Arnold (2010) notes that most accounts of reference assume that RE selection is 
entirely motivated by concern for recipient design. However, there is mounting 
evidence that cognitive load also influences a speaker’s RE selection. For 
example, Arnold and Griffin (2007) argue that the cognitive demands involved in 
maintaining multiple characters in a mental model of discourse lead to greater use 
of lexical REs (as discussed in Section 2.5.3 of this appendix). Arnold and Griffen 
present evidence suggesting that this is motivated by the speaker’s own 
processing needs rather than those of the addressee. 
 
 
2.5.9 Animacy  
 
Fraurud (1996) reported an animacy effect on pronoun use, such that 100% of 
pronouns relating to non-human referents in a sample of Swedish narrative data 
had an antecedent in the present or immediately preceding sentence, compared to 
87% of pronouns with human referents. Animacy theorists (Dahl & Fraurud, 
1996; Fraurud, 1996; Yamamoto, 1999) have typically sought to account for this 
as a distinction in individuation (i.e. the extent to which an entity is treated as an 
identifiable individual) attributable to the anthropocentric perspective in human 
cognition. Similarly, Ariel (2004, p. 95) argues that “nonhuman entities are not as 
salient to us as humans are”. 
 
In the present study, the results of piloting the analytical methods for establishing 
accessibility suggested that inanimate objects provide little or no competition to 
human referents. For instance, human referents were able to be reintroduced with 
pronouns after multiple intervening clauses, but only if all the entities in the 
intervening clauses were inanimate objects. This finding contrasts markedly with 
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those found here and elsewhere for the competition effect of even one human 
referent (irrespective of gender; cf. Subsection 2.5.3). Accordingly, a simple 
binary distinction is made in the present study between the competition provided 
by animate and inanimate entities. Future studies may wish to explore in greater 
detail the competition effects of entities with varying degrees of animacy. 
 
 
2.5.10 Implications for the present study: Determining accessibility 
 
The studies reviewed in this section demonstrate that a wide variety of factors 
appear to influence referent accessibility. Future studies are likely to reveal more 
such factors. Such findings have been incorporated into AT, with Ariel (1990, 
1999, 2001) stressing that accessibility is a result of multiple factors. This is 
supported by evidence (Ariel, 1999) showing that the sum total of several 
accessibility-related factors more accurately reflects the distribution of RE types 
than do any single factor.  
 
This complexity poses a substantial problem for efforts to determine referent 
accessibility in discourse. As cognitive accessibility cannot be directly quantified, 
Toole (1996) and Ariel (1999) aim for a best estimate of accessibility based on a 
number of grammatical and discoursal factors known to impact on accessibility. 
These include the factors identified in subsections 2.5.1 to 2.5.5 above. The 
system of accessibility analysis developed for the present study (see Chapter 4), is 
a development of Toole’s (1996) system. In light of the discussion in Subsections 
2.5.6 to 2.5.9 above, Toole’s system is to be supplemented with the factors of 
global topicality (operationalized as main character), parallelism, and animacy. 
Possible genre effects are noted and, to some extent, controlled through the use of 
data from a single retelling task. Effects of non-matching competition (i.e. 
cognitive load) will be analysed indirectly through assessing the number of 
referents in each retelling. 
 
Finally, it is emphasized here that cognitive accessibility cannot be directly 
assessed. However, it can be approximated through an analysis of those factors 
most closely associated with accessibility effects. This is done with an 
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understanding that “the weightings assigned to the various contributing factors are 








This chapter reviews a selection of some of the more important SLL studies 
relating to use of the main RE types. These are presented in order from highest 
accessibility markers through to the lowest, beginning with zeros in Section 3.1, 
pronouns in Section 3.2, demonstrative forms in Section 3.3, names in Section 





A number of studies report that learners at the lowest levels of proficiency rely 
heavily on zero, with the referential system basically involving a choice between 
zero and lexical NP (Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). This appears to be true 
irrespective of the learners’ source and target languages. However, at low-
intermediate levels, use of zero tends to decrease, and zeros are only gradually 
reintegrated into the referential systems of higher proficiency learners, reaching 
target-like frequency only at the highest levels of competency. As a number of 
researchers have commented, this appears surprising because, firstly, for the 
participants in a number of studies, the source language permits extensive use of 
zero. Furthermore, the acquisition of an empty form appears substantially less 
demanding than acquisition of, for example, pronouns. However, Muñoz (1995) 
essentially argues that English zeros may lack saliency for learners whose source 
languages use zeros much more widely, and who have come to recognize 
pronouns as the unmarked high-accessibility marker in English. Furthermore, 
learners (particularly in foreign language learning contexts) may lack sufficient 
exposure to English zeros “to allow the internalization of the syntactic restrictions 
under which zero anaphora is used” (p. 525). However, studies also show less 
frequent SLL use of zero in target languages that use zero extensively, for 
example English and Dutch learners of Japanese (Nakahama, 2003; Yoshioka, 
2008). Furthermore, Hendriks reported frequent use of zeros for referent 
49 
 
maintenance contexts in both L1 Chinese (31%) and L1 German (26%), yet her 
Chinese learners of German underused this form (9%). However, non-target-like 
use of zeros is not restricted to underuse/avoidance. In particular, Williams (1988, 
1989) reported advanced English SLL speakers and speakers of Singaporean 
English using zeros in syntactic constructions not found in her L1 data, and in 
contexts where there was a substantially greater distance between the zero and its 
antecedent than found in target-like English. Also of note is the suggestion that 
only high-proficiency SLLs have the language competence with which to 
maintain entities in the topic position over longer stretches of discourse (e.g. 
through passive voice), thereby creating the contexts in which zero is most 





English pronouns present a substantial problem for many learners as they are 
marked for a number of distinctions (gender, number, subject/object/possessive), 
and may vary in syntactic distribution between the source and target language (cf. 
Spanish and English object pronouns), and may vary in frequency between 
languages (cf. English and Japanese). Furthermore, they frequently occur in 
natural speech in an unstressed form and may therefore go unnoticed by some 
hearers. In addition, English requires the use of a pronoun for high accessibility 
referents in syntactic contexts where they are typically omitted in other languages, 
as illustrated in this example (Gundel & Tarone, 1983, p. 284): 
 
The boy made a sandwich and put it/*Ø in the bag 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, researchers have noted the absence of pronouns at 
low levels of language competency (e.g. Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). Even 
at higher levels, pronouns may be omitted (i.e. use of zero), or avoided in favour 
of lexical NPs (e.g. Fakhri, 1989; Kang, 2004). Klein and Perdue made the 
following generalizations for learners of various source and target languages: 
 
 Definitely referring lexical NPs are used before overt pronouns; 
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 Singular anaphoric pronoun reference appears before plural; 
 Human appears before inanimate; 
Nominative appears before oblique. (p. 318) 
 
Felix and Hahn (1985) also reported a developmental sequence in which first-
person pronouns and you or he were initially used for all persons, followed by 
recognition of number, development of third person pronouns, and finally gender. 
Interestingly, it has been reported that certain types of pronoun error do not occur 
in learner data, and this has been attributed to constraints that exist in all 
languages (Gundel, Stenson, & Tarone, 1984; Gundel & Tarone, 1983). 
 
No studies were identified relating to SLL acquisition of stressed pronouns. 
 
 
3.3 Demonstrative forms 
 
Swierzbin (2010) notes that “very little research has specifically targeted L2 
learners’ use of demonstratives” (p. 995). Swierzbin’s review of the literature 
identifies reports of both under-use and over-use in relation to target-like 
frequency, but notes that few of these studies “are situated in a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for reference (p. 996). 
 
Using Strauss’s framework (see Strauss, 2002), Niimura and Hayashi (1994, 
1996) found that Japanese learners of English and English-speaking learners of 
Japanese had substantial difficulties, even at advanced levels, in mastering the 
demonstrative system of the target language. This occurred despite the two 
systems being similar in many respects. Niimura and Hayashi suggested that some 
of the problems were triggered by fundamentally misleading pedagogical 
grammars that focus on spatio-temporal deixis and proximity. 
 
Discussing her earlier (2004) findings, Swierzbin (2010) reported that the low-
proficiency Japanese learners in her study “used significantly fewer 
demonstratives compared to the higher proficiency learners. The latter used 
demonstratives somewhat more frequently than did the English NS, but the 
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difference was not significant” (p. 996). The range of demonstrative forms used 
was also related to level, with the lower-proficiency speakers relying on just one 
or two demonstrative forms, while the highest proficiency group typically used 
“three or all four demonstrative forms” (p. 996). Of particular interest to the 
present study is Swierzbin’s finding that, in terms of the Givenness Hierarchy 
framework, the learners in all proficiency groups usually used the demonstrative 
forms to encode the “highest cognitive status Activated” (p. 997). That is, they 
usually appropriately used the forms this, that, and this + N but not the form that 





None of the studies reviewed focused on the use of names as forms of reference 
(as opposed to address terms) by SLL learners. This lack of interest is perhaps due 
to the (apparently) relatively simple morpho-syntactic issues around names, in 
which the genitive case (and its alternatives) appears to be the major challenge. 
However, this presupposes a number of issues that have not been examined in the 
literature reviewed. Firstly, it presupposes that learners recognize that common 
nouns and proper nouns are distinct word classes and, therefore, that features such 
as articles do not apply to (most) proper nouns. Master (1987, p. 24) reported 
abandoning research into SLL use of articles with proper nouns as “there seemed 
to be no clear pattern of acquisition short of a generalized tendency to improved 
accuracy” and that there was substantial variation among learners that “tended to 
depend on his or her experience in the world.” Secondly, in many cases learner 
exposure to personal names would seem to be relatively limited in terms of range 
and frequency. It seems likely that learners learn some names very well, while 
others that are encountered less frequently, and which pose phonological 
difficulties, may be avoided. 
 
A further issue relates specifically to the use of names as accessibility markers. As 
noted in Chapter 2, in AT, first names are proposed to encode a higher degree of 
accessibility than surnames, and these in turn encode a higher degree than full 
names. Although Ariel (1990, 2001) proposes this as a linguistic universal, there 
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appear to be important variations “based in general socio-cultural preferences or, 
within a given culture, . . . based in individual or situational factors” (Stivers, 
2007, p. 73). Therefore, learning appropriate accessibility marking through name 
selection in a second language appears to involve significant sociolinguistic and 
pragmatic knowledge. 
 
Finally, it seems that some names present a substantial phonological challenge for 
learners, and it may be presumed that such names may be avoided on this basis. 
Studies of phonological avoidance, in general, appear to be rare, with Jenkins 
(2000, pp. 111-112) identifying only Celce-Murcia’s (1977) case study of one 
child; no studies were identified that specifically investigated name avoidance on 
the basis of phonological factors. Nevertheless, it seems likely that names may 
present difficulties because, firstly, the range of names in the English-speaking 
world reflect very diverse linguistic origins, and may involve, for example, 
phonological features not found in the L1, including phonemes, stress patterns, 
and consonant clusters. Secondly, it seems likely that many names have very low 
frequency in discourse and may be encountered late, if at all, in a learner’s 





Evidence from a large number of studies confirms that English articles remain a 
substantial problem for learners from source languages without a comparable 
article system. Lang (2010) describes the system as “complex, obscure, and non-
salient” (p. xxix) and “one of the most difficult challenges and one of the most 
frustrating experiences for L2 learners” (p. xxx). Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, 
articles are the most extensively studied English RE form. 
 
The broadest study reviewed is Master’s (1987) study of article acquisition in 
learners from five L1 backgrounds at four proficiency levels. Those participants 
from languages with articles (Spanish and German) were found to have 
functionally acquired (i.e. 90% accuracy) the English article system by the third 
proficiency level, while those from article-less languages (Chinese, Japanese, and 
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Russian) acquired the system only at the fourth (i.e. the highest) level of overall 
language proficiency. The participants from these article-less languages were 
found to follow a similar development pattern in which bare nouns initially 
dominate, followed by a stage of ‘the-flooding’ (substantial over-use), with the 
indefinite article integrated only later. This is supported by Huebner’s (1983, 
1985) longitudinal study of one Hmong speaker, who also progressed through 
stages of the-flooding and the late acquisition of the indefinite article.  
 
Studies investigating aspects of article acquisition have reported on a number of 
source language groups, including Japanese (Butler, 2002; Parrish, 1987), 
Swedish and Finnish (Jarvis, 2002), Vietnamese (Thu, 2005), Russian and Korean 
(Ionin, Ko, & Wexler, 2004) and Chinese (Lang, 2010). Many relate to conceptual 
distinctions such as hearer knowledge, specific reference, and countability (Butler, 
2002), definiteness/specificity (Ionin et al., 2004), or new/continuous/ 
reintroduced and topic/comment (Jarvis, 2002). Overall, the findings emphasize 
the difficulty for some learner-groups posed by articles, leading some researchers 
to suggest that articles may be avoided in favour of bare nouns, pronouns, and 









 Appendix to Chapter 4: Methodology 4
 
4.0 Introduction  
 
This chapter presents some further details of the methods used in the study. A 
brief outline of the Modern Times narrative is presented in Section 4.1. Section 
4.2 relates to Chapter 4.5 in the main thesis, and discusses some lessons that were 
learned during piloting. Much of the remainder of the chapter discusses issues that 
arose during analysis. The participant consent form is presented in Chapter 4.8. 
 
 
4.1 The Modern Times narrative 
 
Part one (watched by both interactants) 
 Intertitle: ‘The gamin – a child of the waterfront, who refuses to go 
hungry.’ A young lady is stealing bananas from a crate at the wharf and 
throwing them to other hungry children. A worker arrives and tries to 
catch her, but she escapes. 
 An office door with the title ‘President: Electro Steel Corp’. Inside, a man 
is monitoring the factory floor through closed circuit television. He sends 
orders to a bare-chested man on the factory floor to increase the speed of 
the production line. 
 In another location within the factory, Charlie Chaplin is working on a 
conveyor belt with two others. His job is to tighten the bolts of the small 
metal objects on the conveyor belt. Friction occurs between Chaplin and 
his colleague, as Chaplin struggles to keep up with the speed of the 
conveyor belt. Chaplin’s supervisor intervenes. 
 The bare-chested worker receives another instruction from the President to 
increase the speed of the production line. 
 Chaplin is replaced on the production line by a ‘relief man’ (his 
supervisor) while he goes to the bathroom. Chaplin has muscle spasms as 
he walks, as a result of the repetitive nature of his job. Chaplin returns to 




 Returning to the president's office, a secretary announces to the president 
the arrival of some visitors: a man in a suit, two assistants, and a machine 
on wheels, with a shiny dome on top. Part one finishes just as they are 
about to introduce themselves. 
 
Part two (initially watched by only one participant: ‘the speaker’) 
 Intertitle: ‘Lunchtime’. Chaplin and his colleagues are working on the 
production line, which slows down and stops. Chaplin cannot stop 
‘working’, and instinctively uses his tools to tighten the buttons on the 
back of the secretary’s skirt. 
 Chaplin’s colleague (with whom Chaplin had previously had problems 
with) pours a bowl of soup and places it on a bench and sits down next to 
it. Chaplin, who still has muscle spasms, nearly sits in the soup. His 
colleague stops Chaplin just in time and orders him to pass the soup to 
him, however Chaplin again has muscle spasms and he spills the soup over 
the man and over the floor. After a brief altercation, the man sits in his 
own soup. 
 The president and his visitors arrive on the factory floor with the machine. 
The boss selects Chaplin to be the ‘guinea pig’ in a trial of this machine, 
which turns out to be an automatic feeding machine. The dome is lifted to 
reveal four plates of food which are fed to Chaplin: a bowl of soup, a plate 
with cubes of (perhaps) bread, a corn cob that rotates as Chaplin eats it, 
and a cream pie desert. After each course, a sponge-like object wipes his 
mouth. 
 At first the machine functions well. But it soon malfunctions, and force-
feeds Chaplin too quickly. After some time, the inventor of the machine 
manages to stop it. They try again, and again it malfunctions, throwing the 
pie into Chaplin's face, and then repeatedly hitting him with the sponge. 
The inventor pleads with the president, but the president replies “It's no 
good – it isn’t practical” (shown on an intertitle). The president and his 
management team leave. Fade to black. 
 Intertitle: ‘Alone and hungry’. A bread truck is on the street, and a baker is 
delivering bread to a patisserie. The girl (the gamin from part one) stares 
longingly at the window of the patisserie, and then, while the baker is in 
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the shop, she steals loaf of bread from the truck and runs. A woman who 
was passing by witnesses the theft. As the girl runs, Chaplin is coming 
round the corner, and the two collide and fall to the ground. By this stage, 
the baker has come out of the shop and the witness tells him that the girl 
has stolen the bread. Chaplin stands and picks up the bread. 
 The baker runs over to Chaplin and the girl, and remonstrates with the girl. 
Chaplin hides the bread behind his back. At this moment, a policeman 
appears, and the baker tells him “She stole a loaf of bread” (intertitle). 
Chaplin responds “no, she didn't – I did” (intertitle), and produces the loaf 
from behind his back. Thus Chaplin takes responsibility for the theft and is 
arrested and taken away. 
 However, after the policeman and Chaplin have left the scene, the witness 
reappears and tells the baker “It was the girl – not the man” (intertitle). 
The baker and the witness then run after the policeman. The girl is arrested 
by another policeman and she is taken away.  
 Outside a tobacconist, Chaplin is placed in a ‘paddy wagon’, with six other 
men and a woman. The back of the vehicle has no door and is guarded by 
a policeman. Chaplin accidentally sits on the lap of a female prisoner. The 
vehicle stops, and the girl gets on board. Chaplin stands and offers her his 
seat, and says ‘Remember me – and the bread?’ (intertitle). Looking 
around, the girl begins to cry and Chaplin offers her his handkerchief. 
Distracted, he then sits down on the other woman’s lap again, and she 
pushes him off. He falls on her lap again when the vehicle goes around a 
tight corner.  
 The girl suddenly looks angry and determined. She stands up and tries to 
push her way past the police officer, and Chaplin follows her. At this 
moment, the vehicle is speeding around a tight corner and nearly collides 
with another vehicle. Chaplin, the girl, and the policeman lose their 
balance and fall out the open door. 
 The three characters are lying on the road, with Chaplin the only one who 
is conscious. He rouses the girl and says “Now is your chance to escape!” 
(intertitle). At that moment, the police officer regains consciousness, and 
is still holding his bat in his hand, but looks dazed. Chaplin gently rubs the 
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policeman’s head, but then grips his wrist and pulls his arm in such a way 
that the policeman hits himself in the head with the baton. 
 Chaplin again tells the girl to run away, and she agrees, and runs off 
towards the corner. Chaplin stays by the policeman. When the girl gets to 
the corner, she turns around and motions for Chaplin to come with her. 
Chaplin is unsure at first, but with the policeman waking up, he decides to 
run. Chaplin and the girl ran off down the street. Fade to black. 
 
 
4.2 Lessons learned during piloting 
 
To begin, a brief anecdote is presented here to illustrate the issue raised in Chapter 
4.4. During piloting of the data collection methods and analysis, I also spent some 
time redecorating and painting rooms in my house. Prior to painting, I used a 
product to fill the gaps between where walls met each other or met the ceiling. 
After two or three days engaged in gap-filling, I found I could not walk into any 
room anywhere without scanning for gaps and marvelling at how frequently they 
appeared. In the case of gaps, the evidence can be rather objectively evaluated, but 
I soon asked myself whether I was ‘noticing’ features in my data that had other, 
perhaps more plausible, interpretations. This issue appeared particularly relevant 
to the (uncritical) identification of accessibility marking as a trigger for 
miscommunication, as this was the metaphorical equivalent of my ‘wall/ceiling 
gaps’. In addition, because miscommunications are relatively infrequent, in a 
study such as this, there is a tendency to look ever harder for evidence of their 
occurrence.  
 
A similar lesson was later learned (during the main study) in relation to the 
miscommunication in Extract 4.1. Although this lesson was learned during the 
main study rather than the piloting, it relates to the lesson learned about the 




Extract 4.1: Steffi and Otis 
T = 20.13 
 
9 
S – and the thi old lady saw that and Ø tell the . chef 
[mmhm] and when the young lady run out the – ran 
out of them, she ah came across with Charlie, and 
er: um: and then she um: . <UNSURE TONE> bump 
him down 
O – I was very confused. 
The first thing that I 
thought was that the OLD 
lady had bumped into 
Charlie. 
 
Initially, it seemed unclear why the problem had occurred, particularly as the 
coding system indicated that the relevant RE (a pronoun) was appropriate. 
However, after repeated listening to the recording, it seemed that the 
miscommunication was triggered by an under-explicit RE (i.e. a speaker factor). 
Intuitively, this assumption seemed progressively more plausible upon each 
listening of the recording, and eventually seemed ‘obvious’. However, because 
this finding conflicted with the predictions of the coding system (a fact initially 
attributed to a limitation of the system), it was decided to confirm the finding with 
the panel of L1 judges (discussed in Chapter 4). Unexpectedly, all five judges 
(independently) interpreted the reference exactly as the speaker had intended, and 
with no apparent strain or difficulty. This suggested that hearer-based factors 
(perhaps momentary distraction) were the most likely trigger. Reflecting on this, it 
seems possible that the apparent mis-analysis of the problem may have been based 
on an implicit belief I had that speakers, not hearers, triggered most 
miscommunications. Aside from reinforcing the point made in Chapter 4.4 about 
the influence of the researcher’s theoretical orientation, this also highlighted the 
value of having independent judges with whom to confirm some interpretations.  
   
     
4.3 Identifying zeros 
 
Considerable thought was given to establishing what would be recorded as a zero 
in these data. Following trials on pilot data, a coding protocol was developed 
based on work by Williams (1988, 1989). The central principle was that zeros 
were identified as occurring where the context would have allowed a pronoun to 
have been used felicitously. The analysis was restricted to third-person subjects 
and direct objects of finite verbs. Following Williams, interrogatives were 
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excluded, as were pleonastic uses of it. In this subsection, all examples are from 
the interaction between Jake and Sonny.  
 
Zeros were not identified for successive verbs linked by a coordinator, with no 
other intervening sentence constituent. For example: 
 
the plate rotates and [ ] pushes the next bit 
 
However, zeros were recorded where there were one or more intervening words, 
including particles (of phrasal verbs).  
 
 she like gets up and Ø looks real mad?,  
 
It is, however, acknowledged that phrasal verbs do form a single semantic unit 
and so there are, perhaps, issues of validity in maintaining this distinction based 
on intervening words. Nevertheless, the ‘intervening words’ principle does allow 
greater reliability in coding than other principles that were considered. 
 
The practices in coding can be illustrated in the following extract: 
 
then this metal bar comes in and Ø
1
 pushes it in his mouth and then the 
plate rotates and [ ]
2
 pushes the next bit and Ø
3
 pushes the next bit, and 
then [it pushes] [ ]
4
 the the third 
 
1. coded zero because there is an adverb separating the two verbs 
2. not coded zero because there is no other intervening constituent 
3. coded zero because an object intervenes between the verbs 
4. not coded zero as the verb is also elided. 
 
Similar to the fourth example above is the following, where ‘starts’ is also elided: 
 




However, it appears to be relatively common for auxiliary be verbs (and 
auxiliaries such as would) to be omitted following a zero, and these were recorded 
as zeros in these data. An example is recorded in the following (where the it 
relates to an event rather than a true referent): 
 
Extract 4.2: Jake and Sonny 
T = 6.37 
8e 
J – and er . um . . Ø just kinda like bumpy ride, and then the girl comes, 
police  
 
A problem with this was that it sometimes became unclear whether the relevant 
clause was to be analysed as zero + be + finite verb or as [ ] + non-finite verb, 
and also whether, indeed, a be verb or some other type of verb had been elided. In 
such cases, inference was required and it is acknowledged that the alternative 
interpretation may also be plausible. 
 
An example of these complexities is illustrated in Extract 4.3: 
 
Extract 4.3: Jake and Sonny 
T = 2.50 
5c 
the administrator guys and the the the technicians are trying to like fix it 
and Ø
1
 like undo like the um, Ø
2
 pull down the thing  
 
In this example, “and like undo” was interpreted as meaning “they like undo”, and 
therefore a zero was coded, rather than the similarly plausible “like trying to 
undo” which would have received no zero (due to elided verb). 
 
A further coding principle is illustrated in the example below. Here, Jake 
abandoned his initial construction (offers), and the new construction (with gets up) 
was recorded as having its own subject: 
 
 so he offers, you know, Ø
1
 gets up and Ø
2






4.4 Analysing accessibility 
 
Coding protocol for people with co-textual antecedents 
Adapted from Toole (1996) 
 
The basic unit of analysis here is the referential act. Repaired references and REs 
that are repeated within a single act of reference are only counted once (e.g. for 
measures of distance, competition, and recurrence). 
 
Distance and unity 
For entity A at point X in the discourse (Ax), if the last mention: 
a. Is in the same proposition, accessibility = 4 
b. Is in the proposition immediately previous, = 3 
c. Is in this episode but not in this or the last proposition, = 2 
d. Is in the previous episode, then = 1 
e. Otherwise, = 0 
 
Notes: 
 The term proposition is defined here as “a semantic unit composed of a 
predicate plus its arguments (Tomlin, 1987, p. 461)” (cited in Toole, p. 
272). This includes structures involving reporting verbs followed by 
reported speech. 
 The term episode is defined as “a semantic unit in discourse organisation 
consisting of a set of related propositions governed by a macroproposition 
or paragraph level fame. (Tomlin, 1987, p. 460)” (cited in Toole, p. 272) 
 “Following Tomlin, embedded complement clauses are not counted as 







For a given entity A at point X in the discourse (Ax) 
a. If there are no competing human entities for Ax in the last four or more 
propositions (and no previous mention of A in that time), then the 
accessibility of Ax is increased by two. (zero competition) 
b. If there are no competing human entities between Ax in the last one, two 
or three propositions (and no previous mention of A in that time), then the 
accessibility of Ax is increased by one. (zero competition) 
c. If higher conditions (a & b) are not met and there are no matching entities 
between Ax and last mention of A, there is no change to accessibility 
rating of Ax. 
d. If one matching entity has been mentioned between Ax and last mention 
of A, then the accessibility of Ax is reduced by one. 
e. If more than one matching entity has been mentioned between Ax and 
last mention of A, then the accessibility of Ax is reduced by two 
 
Notes 
 A competing entity in this case means any other singular human referent 
(any gender). 
 “A ‘matching entity’ is defined as an entity which has the same value as 
entity A for the features of person, number, and gender.” (Toole, p. 274) 
 An embedded RE does not count as competition 




For entity A at point X in the discourse (Ax) 
a. If A has not been mentioned in the last four propositions, there is no 
change to accessibility 
b. If A has been mentioned once or twice in the last four propositions, the 
accessibility level of Ax is increased by one. 
c. If A has been mentioned more than twice in the last four propositions, the 





 Two mentions within the same previous proposition only counts as one 
 
 
Local topicality and parallelism  
a. If A is encoded as the singular syntactic topic or the syntactic focus (e.g. 
there was that man) of the immediately previous clause, then the 
accessibility level of Ax is increased by one. 
b. If A is encoded in the same grammatical position of object or indirect 
object in the present and the immediately previous clause, and the 
syntactic subject remains the same, then the accessibility level of Ax is 
increased by one. 




a. If A relates to one of the two central characters (Charlie and the girl), then 
the accessibility level of Ax is increased by one. 
b. If A relates to any minor character, there is no change to the accessibility 
level of Ax 
 
 
Notes relating to plural reference: 
 References that are included in a plural RE are counted in distance and 
saliency but not in competition.  
 A plural RE in subject position does not give topicality to a singular 






4.5 Validity of the referent tracking coding system for 
accessibility 
 
In this section, some further examples are presented of the coding system in 
operation, as well as discussion of some of the limitations of the system.  
 
The principle that speakers can structure discourse by using more explicit REs 
was demonstrated in the following sequence (Vonk et al., 1992, p. 303), in which 
the use of a pronoun in (5) appears awkward: 
 
(1) Sally Jones got up early this morning. 
(2) She wanted to clean the house. 
(3) Her parents were coming to visit her. 
(4) She was looking forward to seeing them. 
(5) She weighs 80 kilograms. 
(6) She had to lose weight on her doctor’s advice. 
(7) So she planned to cook a nice but sober meal. 
In (5), there is no difficulty in resolving the referent of the pronoun, but as Vonk 
et al point out, she seems unnatural because of the shift in theme. Vonk et al. 
argued that “when a device is used that is more specific than is necessary for the 
recovery of the intended entity, it also has a discourse structuring function. It 
marks the beginning of a new theme concerning the same discourse referent” (p. 
304).  
 
As Vonk’s example is illustrative rather than an extract of genuine speech, there 
may be a suspicion that it represents a discourse analyst’s version of the type of 
linguistic data (pseudo-sentences) that Chafe (1994, p. 47) argued “were neither 
things people would say nor things people would write”. Nevertheless, depending 
on how sentence (5) is interpreted, the infelicity of the pronoun appears to be 
accounted for in the present coding system. Specifically, if (5) is interpreted as a 
type of episode boundary, then the referent is analysed as having accessibility D4 
(Distance +1; Competition -1; Recurrence +2; Parallelism +1; Global topicality 
+1). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, although this is within the range of what 
appears felicitous for the L1 speakers, it is also a context in which intermediate 
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and low-accessibility markers account for 42.7% of L1 references in such 
accessibility contexts.  
 
An example from the literature that the current system does account for well is 
one that has been discussed in relation to Centering Theory (Walker, Joshi, & 
Prince, 1998, pp. 1-2, 6-7). Walker et al. argue that Centering Theory explains 
how the processing of the final pronoun in 10 below is apparently more difficult 
than that in 9.  
 
9. (a) Jeff1 helped Dick2 wash the car. 
(b) He1 washed the windows as Dick2 waxed the car.   
(c) He1 soaped a pane.   
10. (a) Jeff1 helped Dick2 wash the car. 
(b) He1 washed the windows as Dick2 waxed the car.   
  (c) He2 buffed the hood.   
       (1998, pp. 6-7) 
 
According to Walker et al., in (9c) Jeff is the ‘centre’, or the focus of attention, 
but in (10c) there is a shift in attentional focus, and Dick becomes the attentional 
centre. The choice of the pronoun is a poor way to signal this shift, and the 
discourse becomes strained. The present coding system, however, predicts that 
both Jeff and Dick have accessibility D5 in sentence (c) (Jeff: Distance +3, 
Competition -1, Recurrence +1, Parallelism +1, Global topicality +1; Dick: 
Distance +3, Competition +0, Recurrence +1, Parallelism +1, Global topicality 
+0). This appears to represent a limitation of the coding system. It could be that, 
the competition provided by Dick as the grammatical object of the second 
sentence should receive a lower weighting than that for Jeff as the syntactic 
subject of that sentence. 
 
It should also be noted that although AT is a theory of the use of definite NPs and 
entails certain predictions relating to RE resolution, it is not to be confused with a 
full theory of RE (or anaphor) interpretation. Thus, the coding system is unable to 




4.6 Identifying reported speech 
 
An ambiguity exists in the reference of certain NPs in English, depending on 
whether the speaker is directly quoting somebody, or merely reporting the gist of 
what was said: 
 (1a)  John1 said “it was me1”. 
 (1b)  John1 said it was me2. 
 (2a)  The lady1 said “she2 went to the bank.” 
 (2b)  The lady1 said she1 went to the bank. 
 (2c)  The lady1 said she2 went to the bank. 
 
As examples (1a) and (1b) illustrate, ambiguity of first (and second) person 
pronouns is generally avoided in written language through the use of speech 
marks (Bhat, 2004). Comparison of examples (2a) and (2b) demonstrate that the 
presence of speech marks enclosing third person pronouns generally indicates 
other-reference rather than self-reference. However, a comparison of (2b) and (2c) 
demonstrates that the absence of speech marks does not rule out either 
interpretation. 
 
For the present study, the addition of speech marks provides a convenient means 
of signalling to the reader direct and indirect reported speech, and these were 
added during the transcription process. However, an issue arises in regard to 
whether an utterance may be inferred as direct or (indirect) reported speech. Many 
speakers indicated reported speech through a change in voice quality, as if 
adopting the voice of the character. However, in some cases there appeared to be 
little, if any, perceptible phonological indication of this distinction. In such cases, 
the main grounds for these inferences were the researcher’s knowledge of the 







4.7 Data management with NVivo 
 
Initially, the NVivo 8 software package was used to manage most aspects of the 
coding of the data. NVivo is a qualitative research tool, facilitating the 
management of multiple transcripts, along with audio and video sources. 
Transcripts may be coded in multiple ways and then be ‘queried’ for 
correspondences between different levels of analysis. The appeal of NVivo is 
mostly in regard to its value as a tool for coding qualitative data, although it also 
allows for basic manual quantitative coding and analysis, and is effective in 
identifying correlations between certain types of data. 
 
NVivo was found to be particularly useful for coding potential miscommunication 
but two limitations for analyzing language became apparent. Firstly, NVivo 
cannot be used to code two overlapping stretches of text separately within the 
same node (category). This becomes problematic for linguistics-based research as 
it means that referring expressions containing an embedded reference can only be 
represented as a single item within one coding ‘node’ in NVivo. So, for example, 
whereas Example 1 contains two NPs with the potential to refer, they cannot both 
be coded separately within a definite description node (or whichever name is 
given to the node): only 1 (the coding that encompasses the embedded code) is 
recorded by NVivo. 
 
1. . . . and then the girl who stole the bananas arrived . . . 
2. . . . and then the girl who stole the bananas arrived . . . 
 
In the present study, this presented limitations not only for coding the type of 
referring expression, but also for coding the level of reference: Examples 1 and 2 
should both be coded Level 1. The partial solution for this, although not ideal, was 
to code these as follows: 
 
 [1c]  . . . and then the girl who stole the bananas arrived . . . 




However, on a few occasions, this compromise was unsatisfactory as the 
embedded referring expression occurred in the middle of an extended act of 
reference. The choice, therefore, became one of either misrepresenting the length 
of the referential episode, or omitting the smaller embedded episode at one or 
more of the nodes. Neither option was entirely satisfactory.  
 
An additional problem with NVivo is that no changes may be made to an 
imported document after it has been coded, as this ‘shifts’ any previous coding to 
a different part of the text. This became relevant on a small number of occasions 
when, for example, a zero pronoun was missed during the document preparation, 
and only identified during the fine-grained analysis that occurred during coding. 
In these cases, they were coded as a ‘free node’, and added to the totals at the end. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the use of NVivo was ultimately abandoned due, 






4.8 Participant consent form 
 
Request for Participation in L2 Spoken English Research Project 
 
My name is Jonathon Ryan and I am currently carrying out a project for my PhD 
through the Department of General and Applied Linguistics here at the University 
of Waikato. My research project is related to the use of language in interactional 
situations. I very much hope that you would be willing to help me by participating 
in a film re-telling task. Following this activity, I will ask each of the participants 
some questions regarding the conversation. Each of these activities will be 
recorded. I will analyse the data after it has been collected. 
 
If you agree to participate in the project, I will be very happy to clarify any points 
that you wish to discuss, and make arrangements with you to complete the 
following tasks: 
 
Task 1: Film re-tell task. First, you will be assigned a ‘hearer’ or ‘speaker’ role. I 
will then ask you and another participant to watch a 4-minute long film clip. I will 
then ask the hearer to leave the room while the speaker watches another 7-minute 
clip of the same film. The speaker will then report to the hearer what happened in 
the second part of the clip. This talk will be recorded on video and audio tape.   
 
Task 2: Immediately after the completion of the recording, I will ask the hearer 
some questions regarding his/her interpretation of what the speaker said. This will 
take approximately 10-15 minutes. If any clarification is required, I may then 
briefly ask the speaker some questions regarding what s/he meant. These 
conversations will also be recorded on audio tape and/or video.   
 
Please note that this research will not involve any evaluation or assessment of 
either participant. 
 
Your confidentiality will be guaranteed. I would like to assure you that the names 
of participants will not be divulged beyond those directly involved in the project – 
that is, myself and my supervisors Dr. Roger Barnard and Dr. Ian Bruce. The 
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confidentiality of participating teachers and students is preserved through the use 
of pseudonyms in all reporting of the research. Please note that the PhD thesis will 
be lodged in the university library and will be freely accessible on the internet to 
anyone. Potentially, the research findings could also in the future be reported in 
academic journal articles, education magazines, or conference papers. Should an 
article be published, I will send you a copy if you wish. 
 
Any report of the information from the research will not identify you. However, 
because the results of the research may be used in future publications, a copy of 
your recordings and transcripts will be stored for five years after the completion 
of the project, under secure conditions. After this period, the original recordings 
and transcripts will be destroyed. 
 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. You may decline to answer any 
question. Please note that you may fully withdraw from the project at any stage up 
to two weeks after your final involvement, with no need to give any reason for so 
doing.   
 
The intended outcome of this research will be a thesis submitted towards the 
fulfilment of a PhD qualification. Ultimately, the research is intended to improve 
my understanding of the teaching of English as a second language.  
 
If you are willing to participate in this project, please fill in and sign the consent 
form that is attached, and return it to me. Please retain a copy of both this letter 
and the consent form. 
 
This research project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. Any questions about the 
ethical conduct of this research may be sent to the Secretary of the Committee, 
email fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz, postal address, Faculty of Arts and Social 
Sciences, Te Kura Kete Aronui, University of Waikato, Te Whare Wananga o 




You may contact me at the following email address jgr3@waikato.ac.nz or on 
extension 6777. 
 
If you have read and understood the above information, and you agree to 
participate, please sign the declaration statement below. Please keep a copy of 
this form for your own reference. If you would like to check further details, please 
contact me at the email address of phone number above. 
 
 
I …………………………………………………………., agree to participate in 
the research project being conducted by Jonathon Ryan, doctoral student at the 
University of Waikato.  
 
I understand that my rights to privacy and confidentiality will be assured 
throughout and after my involvement in the above research project, and that I may 
withdraw from participating at any time, with no need to provide any reason for 
doing so. 
 
Signed: ……………………………………..  (Participant) 
Date:   ……………………………………… 
Contact phone number: ……………………………………… 
Email:  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 
I wish to see a copy of any publication of the research   YES   NO   (Please circle 
your choice) 
 
Signed:  ……………………………………..  (Jonathon Ryan, Researcher) 









 Appendix to Chapter 5: Referents, referring 5
expressions, and acts of reference 
 
5.1 Word count  
 
Basic raw data relating to the number of references and the length of each 
transcript is presented for the L1 and SLL speakers Table 5.1. The figures for the 
total number of words in each transcript were derived using the ‘word count’ 
query option in Microsoft Word, which not only counts the hearer’s contributions 
(which form no further part in the analysis), but also count non-linguistic items as 
words, including such things as the symbols for laughter (@) and the timestamp. 
 
The third column provides the number the number of REs used by the main 
speaker in the act of making Level I, Level II, and Level III references. The fourth 
column indicates the total number of individual acts of reference made by the 
speaker. This is always less than (or, in one case, the same as) the number of 
referring expressions, because all speakers occasionally created acts of reference 
involving two or more referring phrases. An example of this is illustrated below, 
where a speaker uses two distinct phrases to achieve a single referential act. 
 
Extract 5.1: Vicky and Francesca 
T = 0.07 
1 
V – okay, well you know how they left it, where the urchin girl, like yoh street 
homeless girl, and then Charlie was at work and there’s these guys up in the metal 
office and there’s that big like spaceship-looking, convexed, thing – it’s actually 
like a big dinner plate [huh], okay, 
 
The fourth column indicates the speakers’ total number of references and 
mentions of film-based entities in the interactions. The figures here include those 
mentions of hearer-new entities that are not considered to be referential in the 
present study (as discussed in Chapter 2), and thus the figures are greater than for 
the number of referential acts. One type of entity not included in this count is 
Level III attributive references, of the type It was her in which the pronoun it (in 
this case) refers to the attribute of being the thief. There were an additional 69 of 




This particular chart, unlike the others, presents the information hierarchically 
from the most to least number of words in the interaction. Subsequent tables are 
organised alphabetically according to the pseudonym of the speaker. 
 








5.2 Range of referents in each narrative 
 
This section presents additional findings supporting the discussion in Chapter. 





5.2.1  Number of acts of reference by each speaker 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, an act of reference is one of the basic units of analysis 
in the present study, and is defined here as a pragmatic act in which the speaker 
intends to make it clear to the hearer which referent is being indicated. The onset 
of an act of reference is typically the first element (e.g. a determiner) in the first 
referring expression, although it may also be a pre-introduction element such as 
the underlined portion in the following (see Smith et al., 2005): 
 
you remember that guy in the singlet 
 
The completion of an act of reference is the final element which ostensibly 
satisfies the speaker that the reference is resolvable. In many cases this is the 
completion of a RE, but may be some subsequent element such as self-repair, 
acknowledgment, or negotiation (Smith et al., 2005). A single act of reference 
may involve more than one referring expression, and may also involve other 
embedded references. For example, the following act of reference involving two 
referring expressions (that guy Russell and the guy with the caravan), with a 
further embedded act of reference (to a caravan, which in this case is realised by a 
single referring expression). 
 
 I saw that guy Russell. You know, the guy with the caravan. 
 
Overall, the analysis of the data transcripts shows that the L1 speakers in this 
study made approximately 50% more Level I, Level II, and Level III acts of 
reference per interaction than the SLL speakers, using an average of 158 
referential acts each compared to 104 by the SLL speakers. A substantial 
proportion of the additional L1 references relate to just two referents: Charlie, and 
the feeding machine. 
 
In relation to the two main characters, the L1 speakers made considerably more 
references to Charlie (an average of 44 per retelling) than did the SLL speakers 
(23 per retelling), but there was quite a similar frequency in relation to the girl (an 
average of 27 and 23 references respectively). For most of the minor characters 
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(e.g. the boss, the witness, the baker) the number of references were similar in the 
L1 and SLL retellings, typically averaging between two and four references each. 
However, the two minor characters most frequently referred to by the L1 speakers 
(the colleague and the second policeman, averaging six references each) occurred 
substantially less frequently in the SLL retellings (an average of two references 
each) than in the L1 data. In addition, plural references were much more frequent 
in the L1 data (average of 12) than in the SLL data (average of six). The relevant 
data for the L1 speakers is presented in Table 5.3 (p. 79) and for the SLLs in 
Table 5.4 (p. 80). 
 
There were also some significant differences in the frequency of references to 
non-human referents in the data, particularly relating to specific parts of the 
feeding machine. Whereas the frequency of references to the feeding machine as a 
whole were relatively similar (16 for L1 speakers and 12 for SLL speakers), the 
L1 speakers tended to refer much more frequently to specific parts of the machine, 
such as its dishes or mechanical components (24 for L1 speakers and 7 for SLL 
speakers). In addition, the L1 speakers referred to significantly more of the minor 
objects coded collectively as ‘other’ (e.g. a handkerchief) which were peripheral 
to the main events of the narrative (13 compared to 5).  
 
The greater number of referential acts in the L1 data partly reflects the greater 
range of entities referred to in these retellings, but is particularly associated with 
the greater number of references to Charlie overall, and the number of references 
to specific parts of the feeding machine. This reflects the greater details that the 
L1 speakers tended to provide in relation to the scene in which the feeding 
machine operates on Charlie. Although this scene is prominent in the film, one 
SLL speaker avoided mentioning it at all, while a further three (compared to just 
one L1 speaker) referred to the whole machine but did not distinguish any of its 
specific parts. Furthermore, while four L1 speakers each made between 44 and 48 
references to machine parts, the highest number of such references among any 
SLL speakers was 21. That the SLL speakers gave fewer details (or even avoided 
retelling this scene) may have been a strategic decision motivated by the difficulty 




To summarize, overall, the analysis shows that the L1 speakers tended to make 
sunstantially more references, and to a greater range of referents, than the SLL 
speakers. The greater number of referential acts in the L1 data means that there 
are more ‘places’ in these narratives where problematic reference could 
potentially occur. Furthermore, in the L1 narratives, the greater frequency of 
references to some minor characters and objects (e.g. to the second policeman, the 
colleague, the female prisoner, the conveyor belt) suggests that such referents may 
have greater saliency than in the SLL retellings. This could suggest greater overall 
competition in the resolution of REs in a typical L1 narrative. Thus while it would 
appear that the L1 retellings tend to provide an opportunity to develop a richer 
mental picture of the narrative, their referential complexity would also generally 
seem to provide more opportunity for referential miscommunication. 
 
 
5.2.2 Range of referents in the retellings 
 
In general, the L1 narratives tended to include a substantially wider range of 
referents than the SLL narratives (as presented in Table 5.2). For example, while 
80% of the L1 speakers referred to Chaplin’s colleague on the production line, 
only 30% of the SLL speakers did so. Similarly, 40% of the L1 speakers 
mentioned the female prisoner, compared to only 5% of the SLL speakers. Neither 
of these two characters are involved in any of the three major narrative events (the 
operation of the feeding machine; the theft; the escape), and thus a possible 
explanation could be that the narrower range of referents in the SLL subjects 
resulted from narrative strategies involving more selectivity over events. 
However, even in re-telling the major narrative events, there appeared to be a 
tendency for the SLL subjects to use fewer referents. For example, despite all 
narratives including the theft and escape from the police van, five of the SLL-L1 
narratives did not contain the second policeman, and four did not contain the 
baker, compared to one narrative each in the L1-L1 interactions. Similarly, 
although individual parts of the feeding machine (e.g. the bowl, the neck brace) 
were not separately coded separately, it appears that speakers in the L1-L1 
narratives tended to identify a substantially greater range of specific parts of the 








 Hearer-known character introduced as hearer-known 
 Hearer-known character introduced as hearer-new 
 Hearer-known character not mentioned by the speaker 










































































Thus, at least in terms of referents, the retellings by the L1 speakers tended to be 
substantially more complex than those by the SLL speakers. Specifically, the L1 
speakers introduce and maintain references to more characters and other entities, 
therefore increasing the ‘competition’ effect.  
 
Apparent exceptions to the general tendency for broader and more frequent 
references by L1 speakers are data for mentions of the boss and scientist. For 
example, only half of L1 speakers appear to refer to the boss, compared to 16 out 
of 19 SLL speakers. However this is misleading, since all of the L1 speakers did 
refer to the boss, but for half of the speakers this was achieved always as part of a 
plural set, as the following extract illustrates: 
 
Extract 5.2 Adele and Laine 
T = 1.46 
5-6  
A – [@all @over @the @seat] and the guy’s all like (melodramatic sigh x2) 
and then all the working men are just sitting on like a big row of benches, like 
eating?, and in front of them is the conveyor belt. And all the flash: boss 
people come along?, [yep] @and they have like a @feeding @machine 
 
Thus the plural set used by the L1 speakers to refer to the boss also includes the 
scientist, a prominent technician, and several other members apparently of the 
management team. The use of plurals explains the absence of singular referring 
expressions for not only the boss, but also the scientist. What is not clear, 
however, is why the L1 speakers typically did not distinguish between the more 
prominent members of this group. 
 
Therefore, the non-coding of plural references (discussed in Chapter 4) is 
somewhat problematic for assessing the range and frequency of referents in the 
retellings. The only plural referring expressions that were individually coded for 
referents were those indicating ‘Charlie and the girl’ (sometimes with the second 
policeman). Nevertheless, un-coded plural references were much more frequent in 
the L1 data (averaging fifteen references per speaker) than in the L2 data (average 
































































































































Adele 58 34 2 6 6 5 4 5 8 13 141
Fiona 44 32 4 1 7 3 5 4 4 3 7 114
Jake 64 32 6 3 11 9 4 6 4 16 7 24 186
Jeff 23 19 4 6 1 4 2 1 9 69
Kate 48 27 5 3 17 5 6 2 4 6 7 19 149
Kath 37 19 2 2 5 3 1 5 8 82
Lillian 17 11 4 1 2 3 4 5 47
Shaun 15 11 3 3 2 1 2 4 41
Shelley 71 39 7 2 7 4 5 1 7 13 17 173
Vicky 25 24 3 1 3 9 65
Total 402 248 40 12 58 3 37 36 13 30 59 14 115 1067












































































































Adele 18 47 2 5 6 18 7 103
Fiona 13 15 3 7 2 16 8 64
Jake 24 44 1 8 5 20 11 113
Jeff 8 4 3 2 7 9 7 40
Kate 19 45 2 6 5 27 11 115
Kath 17 8 1 9 5 11 7 58
Lillian 15 8 6 4 2 6 41
Shaun 6 2 2 3 4 17
Shelley 23 48 5 23 19 11 129
Vicky 10 1 2 3 4 20
Total 153 220 12 52 62 125 76 700



























































































Aanna 13 4 3 2 3 2 27
Albert 13 5 2 1 4 25
Alice 18 7 5 3 2 4 39
Anne 6 2 4 3 4 6 25
Becky 7 1 2 6 16
Bruce 11 20 1 5 5 6 9 57
Joel 18 6 3 4 7 38
Josie 12 5 5 5 5 8 40
Julia 21 17 5 6 7 4 60
Kane 19 7 8 2 5 41
Kyrah 6 1 4 4 1 5 21
Leonie 17 21 1 3 6 14 4 66
Martha 9 13 2 4 4 7 9 48
Michael 12 9 6 2 9 8 46
Nadia 13 12 4 10 2 6 47
Rachel 15 1 13 3 3 9 44
Sabrina 17 3 5 2 2 5 34
Shona 7 3 4 4 9 27
Steffi 9 5 2 6 10 9 41
Toby 10 2 2 4 8 2 8 36
Total 246 130 7 98 88 91 118 778





The following table presents again the figures for the number of references made 
to the two main characters, Charlie and the girl, individually and collectively. The 
figure for the percentage of overall references that these represent is also given. 
 
Table 5.7: References to the central characters 




































































L1s Adele 58 34 2 94 244 38.5%
Fiona 44 32 4 80 178 44.9%
Jake 64 32 6 102 299 34.1%
Jeff 23 19 4 46 109 42.2%
Kate 48 27 5 80 264 30.3%
Kath 37 19 2 58 140 41.4%
Lillian 17 11 4 32 88 36.4%
Shaun 15 11 3 29 58 50.0%
Shelley 71 39 7 117 302 38.7%
Vicky 25 24 3 52 84 61.9%
Total 402 248 40 690 1766
Average 40.2 24.8 4 69 176.6 39.1%
SLLs Aanna 13 22 6 41 89 46.1%
Albert 5 9 4 18 59 30.5%
Alice 15 18 8 41 97 42.3%
Anne 16 14 5 35 78 44.9%
Becky 8 11 0 19 42 45.2%
Bruce 22 29 3 54 139 38.8%
Joel 26 21 7 54 111 48.6%
Josie 18 21 16 55 111 49.5%
Julia 59 42 2 103 209 49.3%
Kane 23 29 3 55 147 37.4%
Kyrah 17 21 5 43 82 52.4%
Leonie 41 26 6 73 176 41.5%
Martha 23 18 4 45 120 37.5%
Michael 39 24 6 69 143 48.3%
Nadia 17 18 8 43 114 37.7%
Rachel 24 35 11 70 153 45.8%
Sabrina 18 24 6 48 113 42.5%
Shona 13 20 2 35 76 46.1%
Steffi 32 27 6 65 132 49.2%
Toby 28 26 4 58 119 48.7%
Total 457 455 112 1024 2310




5.3 Frequency of referring expression types in the data 
 
This section presents findings for the frequency with which RE types were used 
by each speaker. Table 5.8 presents these data for the L1 speakers and Table 5.9 










Table 5.8: L1 speakers’ use of referring expression types  







































































































































































































Adele 19 117 (1)   1 (3) (3) 12  63 2 (2) 1   224 
Fiona 13 89 (1)  6 (2)  39 1 (1) 10 (1)  163 
Jake 28 125 (1) 1 (1) 14 (1) 5 19 (2) 71 2 (10)   2 282 
Jeff 11 50 (2)  1 (1) 1  21 (4) 9  2 102 
Kate 10 134 2 (3) 1 (2) 1 (1) 14 64 (7)   1 240 
Kath  9 76 (1) (1)   20 1 (5) 4 (3)  1 121 
Lillian 3 36 (2) (2)   5 30 2 (2) 4 (1)   87 
Shaun  2 35 (2) (3)   10 2 4   58 
Shelley 14 162 (2) (1) 1 (3) (1) 1 77 1 (1) 11 (2) (1) 2 280 
Vicky 6 65  1  2 11 2 (1) 1  1 90 
Total 115 889 (9) 3 (10) 25 (14) 7 (7) 53 (2) 406 13 (33) 44 (6) 0 (2) 9 (0) 1647 


























Table 5.9: SLL speaker’s use of referring expression types  











































































































































































Aanna  6 33 (1) (1)  (2) 35 (1)  (2) 1 82 
Albert 5 21 (1) (2)  2 23 (5) 2 (1) 2  60 
Alice 8 33 (3) (6) (2) (6) 22 1 (1) 1 4 (1) 88 
Anne 7 25      39    1 72 
Becky 1 5     30 (2)   2 40 
Bruce 19 55     8 39 (2)  1 (2) 5 131 
Joel 10 33 (2)     34  9 8 (1) 8 105 
Josie 3 35  2   39 1 (2) 11 5 (1) 5 104 
Julia 9 97 (3)  6 (2)   70 (3) 15 (2)  3 210 
Kane 18 50 1 2 (1) 1 (10) 56 (3) (1) 4 (1) 14 162 
Kyrah 5 47 (2)  4  5 20 1  (1) 1 86 
Leonie 8 53 (1) 2 (2)  18 68 (2)  (2) 7 163 
Martha 10 39  (6) (1) (9) 41 3 (2)  1 (2)  114 
Michael 21 65 (1) 1 (2)  (9) 34 (3)   2 138 
Nadia 6 40 (3) 1 (9) (2) (9) 39 1   2 112 
Rachel 10 70  (3)  9 62 (7) 1 1 (1) 4 168 
Sabrina 4 51 3 (1) 11 (2)  7 28 (1)   4 112 
Shona  27    (9) 23 (1)  1 5 66 
Steffi 9 38 (5) (2)  14 (1) 51 (3)  4 (1) 3 131 
Toby 7 32  1  (14) 55 (3)  2 (1) 3 118 
Total 166 849 (8) 5 (15) 29 (38) 1 (5) 63 (69) 808 7 (40) 38 (4) 28 (16) 76 (1) 2262 


































5.4 The distribution of demonstrative REs 
 
In these data, the L1 and SLL participants infrequently used demonstrative NPs to 
refer, particularly the forms bare demonstrative and demonstrative + modifier. 
However, it is not the case that these linguistic forms were not used, rather, that 
the majority of uses of these forms were non-referential. The following tables 
present the findings for the level of reference (or non-reference) that these noun 
phrases encoded. The figures indicate that, in many respects, the L1 speakers and 






Table 5.11: Bare demonstratives 
L1 speakers (SLL Speakers) 






Prop  Nil  Uncoded  
This  4 (5)  0 (0) 0 (6) 3 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
That  14 (16) 0 (3) 33 (42) 14 (26) 2 (1) 0 (0) 
 
Table 5.12: Demonstrative + gesture 
L1 speakers (SLL Speakers) 






Prop  Nil  Uncoded  
This + gesture 0 (0) 0 (0) 8 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
That + gesture  0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (6) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 
Table 5.13: Demonstrative + NP 
L1 speakers (SLL Speakers) 






Prop  Nil  Uncoded  
This  + NP 30 (31) 14 (2) 4 (14) 0 (1) 4 (0) 1 (0) 
That + NP 20 (38) 0 (0) 8 (7) 0 (0) 3 (0) 0 (0) 
 
Table 5.14: Demonstrative + modifier 
L1 speakers (SLL Speakers) 






Prop  Nil  Uncoded  
This + modifier 8 (1) 6 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
That + modifier  7 (5) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
 
Some obvious differences are also found. For example, the SLLs used the form 
that + NP substantially more frequently than the L1 speakers. The L1 speakers 
introduced new characters with this + NP substantially more frequently than the 
SLL speakers, while SLL speakers use this form to refer to events, places, and 
time. 
 
However, the most interesting finding appears to be that pronominal-that (bare 
that) was used far more frequently to mention events, time and place than to refer 
to people and objects. An implication for the present study is that bare 





5.5 Use of stress 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, participants were found to use stress to mark a 
distinction in accessibility between two matching referents (i.e. referents encoded 
as having similar semantic features, e.g. two policemen). Stress appears to be 
placed on the referring expression when it relates to the less accessible of two 
(and presumably more) matching referents. For example, in the following extract, 
the speaker appears to distinguish between two of Charlie’s colleagues with a 
similar expression (the/that + other guy), using stress on the word other to clarify 
the distinction: 
 
Extract 5.3 Kate and Nina  
T = 0.53 
 
2 
K – you know, aw, what was the last scene?, you know how they, [well that 
machine, yeah they bring] 
N – [well there was that silver thing on a #trolley, wasn’t it] 
K – that machine into the office?, and in the next part it shows Charlie and that 
other guy1 . still doing . . whatever’s [@] happening on the conveyor belt, that . 
#I #don-, that twisting thing [‘eah] and then . it comes up that it’s lunch time?, 
and so the conveyor belt slows down. And then, so they’re kinda having a rest, 
and then Charlie’s ticking?, you know how he was ticking ‘cause he’s going [like 
this] ((twitching gesture)) 
N – [aw yeah] 
K – he’s like ((twitching gesture)). . anyway, and then the OTHer guy2 that he’s 
working with, he go- – oh no, Charlie goes away, [mm] and then the other guy 
pulls out his flask,  
 
 
5.6 Pronoun errors  
 
Two pronoun errors occurred in the L1 data, and these are presented below: 
 
Extract 5.4 Kate and Nina 
T = 4.02 
 
7-8 
K – [the homeless girl?, yeah] well, she’s walking down the street, she turns a 
corner and there’s a bakery, I’m sure it’s a bakery, anyway, there’s a truck, 
kinda backed up, um delivering some food and stuff, I think it might’ve been 
bread, and so the guy goes inside with this tray of whatever food is on the tray, 
and then she: goes, and she’s like ‘oh look the truck’s open’, [mm] and so she 
steals a loaf of bread, she runs away with it, and then, this old lady had just 
come round the corner and Ø noticed her doing it?, and so when the guy from 
the truck comes out of the bakery, . the old lady tells her, and she’s running 





Extract 5.5 Shelley and Jenny 
T = 7.17 
 
21 
S – and they both went on the ground, and then the baker comes back and 
he's – and the lady’s like ‘that lady – girl stole your bread’, or something like 
that, [yeh] and then they chase after him, and then 
J – him or her? 
S – . . HER, and him, [yep] – well no, they chase after her,  
 
An alternative analysis of Extract 5.4 is that the speaker intended to say “tell on 
her”, but omitted the preposition. 
 
 
5.7 Direct speech 
 
Data was collected for the number of times that direct speech was used in each 
interaction, with the figure given for the total number of instances of direct 
speech, and also the figure for the total number of instances in the theft scene. The 
figures here relate to dialogue involving recognised lexical items, such as the 
underlined portions in the following extract, but not to other non-lexical items 
such as the italicised portions presented in Extract 5.6 (which were a feature of 
some L1 speakers’ dialogue): 
 
Extract 5.6 Adele and Laine  
T = 5.32 
 
17-20 
A – he’s like ‘oh, take my seat’ because she had to stand up and like hold one of 
those [yep] circle things?, and he’s all like ‘remember me? I’m with the bread, it 
was me’  
L – [@@@@]  
A – [and stuff] and he was like ‘ohhhh’ like you know, sort of like . [yep@] . and 
the girl was like ‘oh’, so she takes a seat.  
 
 
In a small number of cases, it was unclear whether the speaker was using direct or 
indirect speech. There were four such cases in the SLL retellings, including three 















5.8 Generics  
 
The following table presents figures for the number of users of generic you by 
each of the speakers. Generic you is distinguished from genuine second person 
reference in which the speaker refers to the addressee (e.g. ‘Do you remember’), 
and is also distinguished from the use of you as part of the filler ‘you know’, and 
the fixed expression ‘how do you say/pronounce’. The figures below do not 
include repeats and recasts. 
 




























































































































Julia 1 1 1







Sabrina 1 2 2
Shona
Steffi 1
Toby 2 1 1




 Appendix to Chapter 6: Accessibility marking 6
 
The findings reported in this chapter support the summaries provided in the main 
body of the thesis. 
 
 
6.1 Accessibility marking in referent tracking 
 
Table 6.1 reports the percentage of all references at each accessibility degree in 
both the L1 and SLL retellings. 
 




Figure 6.1 reports details of the distribution of RE types according to accessibility degree in the L1 
data;  
 
Figure 6.2 presents the findings for the SLL retellings.  
 














D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
Ø 0 0 0 0 0 19 34 23 0
Pronoun 0 2 3 21 57 151 161 88 3
Stressed pronoun 0 0 1 0 2 3 2 0 0
This/That 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This/That + NP 0 0 3 2 3 4 2 0 0
First name 2 6 8 13 11 9 2 1 0
Last name 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Short definite description 5 29 21 18 24 7 7 0 0
Long description 0 6 3 0 0 0 1 0 0
Full name 2 5 9 12 4 6 4 0 0
The + name 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Bare noun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Indefinite 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0










D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
Ø 0 0 0 1 6 28 17 37 0
Pronoun 0 3 6 14 46 104 130 144 6
Stressed pronoun 0 0 0 1 2 5 2 4 0
This/That 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This/That + NP 0 0 2 8 4 3 4 0 0
First name 2 4 6 9 14 14 7 1 0
Last name 2 5 12 10 20 10 7 1 0
Short definite description 17 44 27 43 54 42 38 11 0
Long description 2 10 0 1 1 3 0 0 0
Full name 1 2 4 5 7 11 2 1 0
The + name 0 0 2 2 4 6 5 5 0
Bare noun 0 3 3 3 2 5 3 2 0
Indefinite 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 0 0








Table 6.2: Distribution of RE types by accessibility degree 
 
 
Table 6.3: Number of REs used at each accessibility degree 
L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL
Ø 20.0% 18.0% 16.0% 7.9% 9.5% 12.1% 3.7% 1.0%
Pronoun 100.0% 100.0% 78.6% 69.9% 75.6% 60.2% 75.9% 44.8% 55.3% 28.6% 31.3% 14.1% 6.1% 9.7% 4.2% 4.2%
Stressed pronoun 1.9% 0.9% 0.9% 1.5% 2.2% 1.9% 1.2% 1.0% 2.0%
This/That
This/That + NP 0.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.3% 2.9% 2.5% 3.0% 8.1% 6.1% 3.2%
First name 0.9% 0.9% 3.2% 4.5% 6.0% 10.7% 8.7% 19.4% 9.1% 16.3% 9.7% 12.5% 5.6% 22.2% 8.3%
Last name 3.2% 4.3% 1.0% 12.4% 10.1% 2.0% 19.4% 6.9% 8.3%
Short def. description 5.3% 3.3% 17.6% 3.5% 18.1% 23.3% 33.5% 26.9% 43.4% 42.9% 43.5% 60.4% 61.1% 55.6% 70.8%
Long description 0.5% 1.3% 0.6% 1.0% 6.1% 12.5% 13.9% 8.3%
Full name 1.9% 0.9% 3.0% 4.7% 3.9% 4.3% 17.9% 5.1% 18.4% 6.5% 10.4% 2.8% 22.2% 4.2%
The + name 2.4% 2.3% 2.6% 1.0% 2.5% 1.5% 2.0% 3.2%
Bare noun 1.0% 1.4% 2.2% 1.2% 3.0% 4.8% 4.2%
Indefinite 0.6% 2.0% 1.4%
% of D2 % of D1 % of D0% of D8 % of D7 % of D6 % of D5 % of D4 % of D3
L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL L1 SLL
Ø 0 0 23 37 34 17 19 28 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 76 89
Pronoun 3 6 88 144 161 130 151 104 57 46 21 14 3 6 2 3 0 0 486 453
Stressed pronoun 0 0 0 4 2 2 3 5 2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 14
This/That 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This/That + NP 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 3 3 4 2 8 3 2 0 0 0 0 14 21
First name 0 0 1 1 2 7 9 14 11 14 13 9 8 6 6 4 2 2 52 57
Last name 0 0 0 1 0 7 0 10 1 20 0 10 1 12 0 5 0 2 2 67
Short definite description 0 0 0 11 7 38 7 42 24 54 18 43 21 27 29 44 5 17 111 276
Long description 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 1 3 0 6 10 0 2 10 17
Full name 0 0 0 1 4 2 6 11 4 7 12 5 9 4 5 2 2 1 42 33
The + name 0 0 0 5 0 5 0 6 1 4 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 24
Bare noun 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 5 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 21
Indefinite 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Total 0 6 115 206 213 216 199 232 103 161 67 99 49 62 48 72 9 24 803 1078




6.2 Under-explicit zeros 
 
An example is presented in the following extract of a zero with Accessibility 
Degree 4. As argued in Chapter 6, although this example appears to be under-
explicit by L1-speaker standards, it appears unlikely to result in 
miscommunication: 
 
Extract 6.1: Julia and Abby 
T = 1.26 
 
3-4 
Charlie Chaplin came and he was, ah with with with his movement?, his 
gestures and all, and he . ah, HIS colleague want him not to sit on thi: . 
bowl of soup, and he took up the – and  h- he even asked Charlie Chaplin to 
pass the bowl of soup to him, so Charlie Chaplin ah took up the bowl and 
he was – his hands were shaking, and he passed thi: . . bowl of soup to his 
colleague but in in the process he spilt some of the soup because of his 
movement, and of course his colleague was so mad at him and he, ahh, he – 
I think, if I'm not mistaken, he nearly hit him, Ø bash him up for spilling his 
soup@ all over him, 
 
 
6.3 Introducing the major characters 
 
6.3.1 Introducing Charlie 
 
Table 6.4 presents how Chaplin was introduced by the speakers. Only the initial 
form selected by the speaker is presented here, so for instance, Extract 6.1 is 
recorded as ‘short name’ only, as the speaker initially appears to consider the 
expression Charlie sufficient, and only modifies this in response to an unsolicited 
contribution from the hearer: 
 
Extract 6.2: Albert and Marg 
T = 0.30 
2 
A – an- . the owner pick . d Charlie: . yea 
M – Charlie Chaplin 
A – Yeah Charlie Chapman?, 
 
In Table 6.4, a shaded box indicates the form used, with a * indicating that the 
speaker sought confirmation from the hearer through the use of a rising terminal 
or other means. The symbol # indicates that the speaker directly and overtly 























































































Adele          
Fiona           
Jake          
Jeff          
Kate          
Kath           
Lillian          
Shaun          
Shelley          
Vicky          
          
SLL          
Aanna  *∫        
Alex          
Alice          
Anne          
Becky         *# 
Bruce          
Joel          
Josie          
Julia     *     
Kane    *      
Kyrah          
Leonie   *       
Martha          
Michael          
Nadia          
Rachel       *   
Sabrina   *       
Shona          
Steffi        *#  
Toby          
 
Legend 
* High-rising terminal tone 
# Overt direct appeal to common ground 
∫ note that an alternative analysis may see this as an example of ‘reminder that’, and 
therefore indicating low-accessibility 
 
The chart is structured as a scale in which semantically light expressions are on 
the left, and heavy expressions are on the right. The chart is based on Ariel’s 
(2001) hierarchy of referring expressions, with the additional category of episodic 
reference. Episodic reference is used here to describe the introduction of the 




terminology of Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) involve instalment noun phrases, 
and may be refashioned through repair, expansion, or replacement, and may be 
further negotiated by the hearer (see Chapter 2). 
 
For the purposes of the discussion in this section, article errors are ignored. So, for 
instance, in Extract 6.3 it appears that the speaker has infelicitously used a instead 
of the, yet it has been counted as a definite article in the table.  
 
Extract 6.3: Kane and Racquel 
T = 5.23 
 
7-9 
K – it's not . right about the machine, [okay] uh, and when the Chaplin um mm, 
worker worker work on [[TARGET: WALK ON]] walk on way?,and . er a a 
beautiful lady, [yep] just just appeared on the part one, [yep yep] beautiful lady 
gives the bananas [yeh yeh] ah,   
 
A further factor in apparent over-explicitness may be relative familiarity with 
Charlie Chaplin. Clearly, Chaplin would not be equally well-known among the 
participants. With this in mind, part of the data collection procedure involved the 
researcher establishing that the participants could identify Charlie Chaplin by 
asking them to describe his appearance. If necessary, the researcher then showed 
an image of Chaplin from Modern Times. The purpose of this was to try to ensure 
that the participants could refer to Chaplin’s character by name. Nevertheless, 
despite being able to identify Chaplin, it became clear that speakers varied in their 
confidence in using his name. One L1 speaker addressed the researcher during the 
interaction in order to confirm Chaplin’s name: 
 
Extract 6.4: Lillian and Astrid 
4 L – THAT comes into the SCENE, and then the little Charlie Chapman – 
[[ADDRESSES RESEARCHER]] that’s the guy eh? Charlie Chapman  
Res – yeah 
L – he: um, HE . is having his lunch break, and then the machine comes in, and 
they tell HIM to come to the machine, so he’s standing there behind this little 
working thing, and it was like a machine that, I guess you don’t have to stop for a 
lunch break, it feeds you? 
 
Curiously, as in the example above, four of the seven L1 speakers referred to 
Chaplin as Chapman. None of the SLLs made this error, although two (Sabrina 
and Steffi) appeared hesitant in pronouncing his name, and two (Steffi and Shona) 





Extract 6.5: Steffi and Otis 
T = 0.22 
 
1-2a 
S – and after you leave, I watch two segments, and the first one is . um: . 
lunchtime, and it describe the – what happened, um in the factory when the 
workers having their lunch, and ah, ah you know the char- the hero, what’s the 
name?, [um] Chaplin? 
O – Charlie Chaplin  
S – er how do you pronounce that? 
O – Charlie 
S – Charl . Lee 
O – Charlie Chaplin 
S – ok, [yeah] then 
O – with the face like this 
S – yeah, he’s ah: keep the hand shaking  
 
Extract 6.6: Sabrina and April 
T = 1.36 
 
3-6 
S – and then this machine like . give the food, and j- just they can move j- – 
maybe it’s from ##, I don’t know what they use it here, . . and then the mach- they 
choose ah . Ch- Charlie? 
A –mmhmm 
S – and then . . they . start – um, there’s a manager and some peoples they look 
for this machine it’s good or not? 
 
Extract 6.7: Shona and Dallas 
T = 0.20 
1 
S – Um at first um /ʧɪplɪn/ [[target: Chaplin]] w- a:nd . the workers had a lunch, 
ah because the job finished, [right] then @ what happened was  
 
Similarly, the use of definite descriptions (noun phrases other than names and 
pronouns) may be connected to the speaker’s familiarity with Chaplin. Three SLL 
speakers (but no L1 speakers) used a description to introduce Charlie. Besides the 
possibility that this was a deliberate choice (e.g. to indicate low-accessibility), 
there are various other possible explanations for this. It could be that they were 
uncertain of Chaplin’s name, or wanted to avoid pronouncing it. Alternatively it is 
possible that some speakers make a distinction between Chaplin the actor and 
Chaplin’s character, preferring not to equate the actor’s name with the character 
name. 
 
Extract 6.8: Rachel and Renee 
T = 1.24 
 
3 
and:, the boss . mm . come, and the boss came: eh: to the . place where those 
people have rest for the lunch, and the boss was pointed to the . the funny 
guy@, # # with the beard? 
R – oh Charlie Chaplin 
T – Charlie yeah, and then he’s become the volunteer ones to be seated,  
 
Extract 6.9: Anne and Tom 




A – you remember they are working?, [yeh] and after that, they had a 
lunchtime, and er er the boss, I think the boss hired some like scientist, to 
invite [[target: invent?]] a machine, like er automatically, [yeh] um so they 




Pronominal introductions of Charlie 
 
Extract 6.10 is one of five pronominal introductions of Charlie in these data. 
 
Extract 6.10: Shelley and Jacky 
T = 1.22 
 
1 
J – so was there a continuation? 
S – I think so 
J – okay 
S – what happened when you left? 
J – they were in the factory area 
S – oh yeah, yep [yeah, that carried on for a while] 
J – [and then um] they stopped, that he w- that he went back doing [[gesture]] the 
thing that . like, when [yep] I left 
S – umm, . . yeah, that – it continued like that, and then they s- breaked for lunch,  
J – okay [and then like] 
S – [and there] was like a play of like his workmate like having hot soup and stuff,  
 
In this example, the interlocutors collaborate to establish common ground, 
establishing that the previous scene continues, which presumably activates recall 
of the associated characters. The relevant set of characters is then referred to by 
they, and, as Smith et al note in relation to their data (p. 1874), Chaplin is the most 
salient member of this group. 
 
 
6.3.2 Introductions of the girl 
 
As the following excerpts from the stimulated recall illustrate, there was 
substantial individual variation in the extent to which the girl was accessible for 
different L1 hearers. For Jim, the girl was easily recoverable in memory, while for 
Molly the girl was much less recoverable. This finding confirms that there are 
important hearer-factors in the successful resolution of reference. 
 
Extract 6.11: Jim SR 
T = 4.54 
 
4 
R – this girl from the very beginning of the film 
J  – I definitely knew who she was talking about [yep] . when she says this girl . 
she’s– . . . [yeah] 
R – [you’re] thinking with the . . 
J  – yeah, the one who was throwing the bananas to the [uh-huh] to the gamins, fr- 
from the ship 
R – right 
J  – unforgettable  
 
R – unforgettable because? 





Extract 6.6.12: Leonie and Molly 
T = 30.21 
 
13 
L – err, then it, er, then on the street, a 
woman . who um show . showed at the 
first . at first, on the waterfront, who’s 
thro[wing banana] 
M – [oh yeah yeah yeah]  
L – who’s thrown banana to childrens, 
[mhm] she .  
M – I forgot about that <MISC> very 
quietly </MISC> @@ 
 
 
R – okay, um, did you have a clear 
idea . at first that she was RE-
introducing a character that we had 
seen before?  
M – YEAH, I’d just totally forgotten 
that clip [yeah] of the @# @# @# I’d 
totally forgotten the bit [right] with the 
gamin and the bananas  
 
M – but then, yeah, I understood who 
she meant, [yeah] as soon as um, as 




Introductions and non-introductions of the girl 
 
In three cases, SLL speakers did not (or did not appear to) introduce the girl as a 
hearer-known character. In the first case (Nadia and Chloe) this is very clear, as 
Chloe asked whether Nadia was referring to the banana girl, and Nadia replied 
that it was a different girl. This was classified in the present study as non-
reference (mentioning rather than referring; see Chapter 2). In the other two cases, 
it also appears that the speaker had either misunderstood there to be two girls, or 
perhaps recognised that it was the same girl but chosen not to make this clear to 
the hearer. A third possibility is that the speaker attempted to refer, but chose the 
wrong form to refer (indefinite article + noun). These two examples were 
classified as non-reference. 
 
Extract 6.13: Nadia and Chloe 
T = 1.32 
 
5-6 
N – it’s not working. And then the second part, is um, is about Chaplin?, 
[mhm], um, no it’s about this /ði:s/ GIRL who stole a BREAD, . . 
C – oh, the girl from the very beginning? 
N – ah, I think it’s different girl? 
C – okay 
N – ah yah, I think it’s the different girl. 
C – okay 
 
Extract 6.14: Toby and Whitney 
T = 3.40 
 
9-10 
and then, . after this . there was another story, yeah # # story is Chaplin, 
and Chaplin found a girl, in the street, 
W – yeah 





Extract 6.15: Anne and Tom 
T = 3.05 
6-8 
so that's the first part, and the the second part is um, . about um a- also 
the small guy and er, and er a girl, um first, er the girl is . alo- alone, and 
she feelt [[target: felt]] very hungry, 
 
 
REs used to introduce the girl 
The following example illustrates an episodic, interactional introduction of the 
girl: 
 
Extract 6.16: Martha and Paul 
T = 2.18 
 
4 
M – and after that the: s- the first story started back?, 
P – mhm 
M – with the girl?, er and the bananas?, 
P – yes 
M – and the ship 
P – the gamin, yeah 
M – yep the first part, 
 


























































































Adele   *     
Fiona       # 
Jake      *#  
Jeff     *#   
Kate     *   
Kat      *#  
Lillian      *#  
Shaun  *      
Shelley    *#    
Vicky    #    
        
L2         
Aanna      *#  
Albert    *#    
Alice     *#   
Anne        
Becky      *#  
Bruce       *# 
Joel *+bare 
noun 
      
Josie      *#  
Julia       *# 
Kane       *# 
Kyrah   *#     
Leonie       *# 
Martha       *# 
Michael      *#  
Nadia        
Rachel        
Sabrina      *#  
Shona       *# 
Steffi     #   
Toby        
 
Legend 
* High-rising terminal tone 




Figure 6.3 presents data comparing how speakers introduced Charlie (C) and the 
girl (W). All of the L1 participants and 16 of the 20 SLL participants use higher 
accessibility markers to introduce Charlie than to introduce the girl. 
 






















































































































Adele C     W      
Fiona C          W 
Jake  C        W  
Jeff    C    W    
Kate  C  W    W    
Kat         C W  
Lillian         C W  
Shaun C    W       
Shelley C      W     
Vicky  C     W     
            
L2             
Aanna     C     W  
Albert  C     W     
Alice        W C   
Anne     C       
Becky          W C 
Bruce  C         W 
Joel W   C        
Josie    C      W  
Julia    C       W 
Kane   C        W 
Kyrah C     W      
Leonie  C         W 
Martha   C        W 
Michael   C       W  
Nadia   C         
Rachel        C  W  
Sabrina  C        W  
Shona  C         W 
Steffi        W C   







6.3.3 Introducing hearer-new characters 
 
Two major ways to introduce hearer-new referents are identified in the literature. 
The most common of these is the use of an indefinite expression, prototypically 
defined as a noun phrase with an indefinite article functioning as the determiner 
(e.g. a baker), with other options including indefinite uses of this (e.g. this guy) 
and some (e.g. some guy), as well as other determiners (e.g. another; one). The 
second major way to introduce a referent is through a definite description licensed 
by a bridging inference (e.g. Clark, 1975). These typically occur in contexts 
where the referent fulfils a particular role that is expected in the context, either 
licensed through a cognitive script (e.g. a first mention of the waiter in a 
restaurant), or through a more general frame (e.g. the door in a room). In such 
examples the referent is unknown to the hearer, but fulfils a role that is to some 
extent expected. 
 
In addition, there are also ways in which speakers prepare listeners for the 
introduction of a new character (Smith et al., 2005). Such an analysis is not 
presented here, but is considered in analysing which introductions were 









 Appendix to Chapter 7: Miscommunication 7
 
7.1 Referentiality and resolution 
 
In the stimulated recall presented in Extract 7.1, Maddy revealed that she was 
relatively unconcerned with identifying the referent of they: 
 
Extract 7.1: Aanna and Maddy 
T = 10.05 
 
3 
A – ah lunchtime begins, ah the 
workers have their lunch, [mhm] . 
. and . ah they have a rest, and 
then they . come to pick ah one of 
worker to try this mach- ah try the 
machine. [mhm] Ah at first it 
works very well . 
R – now, I think she said something about 
they brought this machine down to . [mm] 
and who did you think was with the machine 
at this point? 
M – I have no idea who ‘they’ was, but it 
didn't matter, because I thought the ‘they’ is 
insignificant, who is GETting the machine is 
more important,  
 
The following extract is a further example of a hearer reporting being comfortable 
with non-resolution of a reference. In Extract 7.2 the speaker (Tina) specifically 
sought confirmation that Arlene had correctly identified the intended machine: 
 
Extract 7.2: Tina and Arlene 
T = 1.10 
2-3 
T – . . . and then, um, . the boss guy, you know that big machine, that was in 
the boss’s office? 
A – oh yeah, yeah 
T – yeh, that like the salesman, he came down with THAT, and then Charlie 
Chaplin got chosen to try it, it was like a food thing?, 
A – oh yeah 
T – and then there was like – so he had to stand there 
 
However, during the stimulated recall interview, Arlene reported having “no idea” 
which machine was meant and explained further in Extract 7.3: 
 




R – yeah, and can you remember wh- why you let it go? 
A – um, ‘cause I understood kind of the rest of the gist of the story, so I didn't 
think it was . that much of a vital part?, of the understanding of the story [yeh] so 
I thought it would just be less complicated to let her explain, and she was 
obviously going to explain what it was, . ‘cause she brought it back up again, [oh 
yeah] so I kind of thought well if I just don't say anything I'll probably find out 




R – oh yeah 




7.2 Miscommunicated introductions of the colleague 
 
In Extract 7.4, Fiona (a L1 speaker) highlighted the colleague’s large size, and his 
location alongside Charlie. Although similar introductions were sometimes 
successful, Geoff reported an initial sense of ambiguity, before opting for the 
wrong interpretation:  
 
Extract 7.4: Fiona and Geoff  
T = 10.22 
2 
there was that really big guy standing next to him?, in the, in the thing,  
 
A notable feature here is that Fiona appeared to emphasize the importance of this 
reference through the use of a particularly informative referential act, and through 
the use of a try-marker (inviting Geoff to accept or reject the reference). Although 
Geoff initially accepted the RE, he later sought clarification before settling on an 
incorrect interpretation. The problem, it appears, is that both competing referents 
match this description. 
 
In Extract 7.5, Steffi (a SLL) uses descriptive content that is far less informative, 
leaving Otis unable to identify the referent: 
 
Extract 7.5: Steffi and Otis 
T = 11.20 
2 
S – and ah the other man . um . bring the soup?,  
 
In this case, Steffi appears less aware of the ambiguity of the RE and of the low-
accessibility of the referent. An alternative interpretation may be that Steffi did 
not prioritize identification of the character (see Chapter 7.3).  
 
Extract 7.6, also from an L1 retelling, illustrates the role of hearer factors in 






Extract 7.6: Jake and Sonny 
T = 0.43 
2-3 
J – and then um so there’s the big industrial worker, the guy who was working next 
to him?, [yeh] so they sit down to have their lunch  
 
This introduction appeared to have some potential for ambiguity, as despite being 
very informative, the relief man was not excluded by a sematic interpretation of 
the reference. Interestingly, during the stimulated recall interview, Sonny 
suggested that, in holding mental representations of the colleague and the relief 
man, “maybe I just merged them together” into one character. Sonny further 
explained “I presume they’re more or less the same character”, suggesting that, as 
far as the narrative is concerned, he considered the distinction between the two 
characters to be unimportant. 
 
 
7.3 Examples of misidentification in referent introductions 
 
This section presents in greater detail some of the miscommunications discussed 
in 7.5.3. 
 
Extract 7.7: Steffi and Otis 
T = 12.22 
 
3 
and then before you 
leave, there is a big 
machine?, did you 
notice that? 
 
R – when she said that, which machine were you thinking 
of? 
O – ahh, the wrong one, I think, because the one that – when 
she said big machine, I was thinking of when there was a 
video screen with a man, and a whole lot of leaders and 
pulleys, and the guy was –  
R – yeah,  
O – that’s the machine that's I thought about because . that 
was the biggest machine that I saw 
R – right, okay, but did that idea change: as the 
O – yes, when she mentioned later on that the machine was 
feeding someone, then I thought to the . um . er contraption 
which was about the height of a man, that they wheeled into 
a room 
R – ahh  






7.4 Failed introductions  
 
 
Extract 7.8: Anne and Tom 
T = 15.33 
 
10 
A – and ah ah and Ø give the 
bread to the to the guy, but ah and 
then, ah er the owner of the store, 
and  < . . > <QUIET ASIDE> how 
</QUIET ASIDE > . . . . er because 
one woman told him, ah 
‘someone, s- s- ah someone steal 
your bread’, so er he . he and the 
police ran to catch – want to catch 
the – wanted to catch the girl, 
R – what was your understanding there? 
T – um, . . that she'd given the bread to Charlie 
Chaplin, then sort of run into the shop and said 
‘look! HE stole the bread’ 
R – oh, okay, so the girl, the banana girl 
T – yep . . who’d stolen the bread gave it to 
Charlie Chaplin . um and the shop owner knew 
he had some bread stolen, possibly, um and 
she was pointing ‘nah it was that guy’ 
R – okay, so she was blaming Chaplin 
T – yeah 




Extract 7.9: Kane and Racquel 
T = 26.52 
 
12 
the beautiful lady . um want to . 
um /stʊl/ some bread [yeh] and he 
he just get a bread, and Ø r- run 
away, [@] . and a – and a old lady 
/si:d/ – ah, h- has saw- saw saw # 
so he just – ah she just stolen the 
bread, 
Res – he mentioned ‘old lady’ there, [mm] I 
got the idea later on, that you hadn't picked up 
initially that 
R – no, no, [no] so it was just a witness 
Res – had seen the girl still the bread 
 
T = 28.50 
 
14 
*K – and er at this time, ah the 
worker has come here – come to 
here – oh, h- h- has come – come 
here,  
R – yep [oh] yep 
K – and . . . and th- the old lady 
told him- ah t- tol- told the worker 
ah < . . . > it’s the girl /stʊlɪn/ ah 
their bread, . . – their bread, . 
R – um, the 
K – uh, old lady told Ø 
R – whose the old lady? 
K – ah just ah 
R – oh, just AN old lady 
K – ah yeah 
R – okay 
 
Res – w- at that point, had you just – [mm] 
you thought he was, yeah . . # 
R – no, I just hadn’t heard the first bit, [oh 
yeah] I probably zoned out@ [@] it’s nothing 
to do with his English @ 
 
*Intervening utterances have been omitted 





Extract 7.10: Leonie and Molly 
T = 7.32 
 
12-17 
L – err, then it, er, then on the street, a woman . who um show . showed at the first . 
at first, on the waterfront, who’s thro[wing banana] 
M – [oh yeah yeah yeah]  
L – who’s thrown banana to childrens, [mhm] she .  
M – I forgot about that <MISC> very quietly </MISC> @@ 
L – she walk . . um when she walk on the street, she saw . a a car- . . . . mm . .  
M – a truck? Or .  
L – ah, it it should be a a truck, well, there – ah, . . a truck of bread? 
M – okay 
L – she’s ah – anyway, she steal ah she stole ah . loaf of bread, . a woman saw her, 
and er . Ø tell tell the ah the owner of the .  
M – the truck <MISC> quietly </MISC> 
L – the the yeah, the truck, 
 
 
Extract 7.11: Michael and Reuben 
T = 13.57 
 
8 
M – looks into the baker's shop, Ø 
sees um a baker carrying bread 
into #his shop, as the baker's 
inside, she runs over to the truck, 
Ø takes one of the breads, Ø runs 
off, but bumps into Chaplin at the 
corner?, lady points at her and 
says ‘look! she stole your bread’ 
to the baker 
Res – what was happening here? You thought 
at the time 
R – okay, she had . stolen some bread, . as she 
bumped into Charlie Chaplin, . um . . . the 
bak- . no no, just a second, . I think the baker 
had seen that someone had stolen it, and was 
pointing to a policeman that . she’d stolen the 
bread, [okay] now what happens is Charlie 
Chaplin says ‘nah nah nah, I did it’, trying to 
protect her,  
 
Extract 7.12: Rachel and Renee 
T = 3.56 
 
11 
ah Charlie hold the breads, [uh-huh] and then she . ah – Charlie wants to protect her 
and Ø ‘she's not takes – is not stolen the bread, but I was the one . stolen the bread’ 
and then 
R – yep  
T – suddenly the police CAME, and they take away Charlie and then, . ah but then 
the girl who saw – ah it’s not a girl, I think it is the old, ## middle womans, . the 
one that’s #sure that she wa- . stole the bread, said ‘not the man but she's the one 













7.5 Miscommunication extracts relating to Chapter 7.5 
 
The extracts in this section accompany the discussion in Chapter 7. 
 
Extract 7.13: Kyrah and Jim 
T = 2.29 
 
2 
K – so you know where the film stop?, 
when um, . . . the head of the company was 
in his office 
J – yep, [that’s right] 
K – [and the] people came in and 
[introduce] 
J – [they were] going to show him . 
something 
K – yes, . a machine:?, so: actually to him, 
and he had to try it 
J  – when she said ‘HE had to try it’, 
and I was . . who was he?, you know, 
obviously I knew the film was 
centered around . Charlie, but I 
thought that she was meaning that it 
was . th- the company director who 
was having to try the machine 
R – ahh-huh. Oh, so < . . > was it that 
you weren’t clear which one it was?, 
or at 
J  – when she said that I thought that 
she was talking about the company 
director  
 
Extract 7.14: Alice and Donna 
T = 1.50 
 
1 
A – ah, after you leave, the 
lunchtime was started, so . the 
Chaplin, th- the worker, . he he 
didn't bring his lunchbox, and other 
co-workers had a lunch, [yes] and 
the principal of that company, came 
to – came down to the co-workers?, 
R – when she said the principal of that 
company, did you have . an idea of who she 
meant there? 
D – mmm, could it have been that guy that 
we saw at the very beginning in that office? 
R – right, okay 
D – like, someone important? 
 
Extract 7.15: Fiona and Geoff 




and then you know the: director 
guy?, and he had the contraption?, 
that he was about to show him 
 
(Later, the hearer asks the speaker 
to clarify) 
G – going back to the director, just quickly, 
um, there was another guy, that big guy in 
the first piece with the dark hair and the dark 
mo’?, I thought he could have also been a 
director because he was sort of telling 
Charlie to hurry up and get into line, so he 
could have been also in line for a director, 
and I think that’s – but . . I swayed towards 





Extract 7.16: Kane and Racquel 
T = 17.57 
 
1 
K – er the title of the part two is: 
er lunchtime, [okay] ah and at the 
beginning of the:  . part two ah . 
ah < . . > when the factory 
< . . . . > when the worker 
< . . . . > go into th- . ah were 
going – going, ah going for their 
lunch?, [mhm] and um:, < . . . . . > 
the the manager of the worker, o- 
or factory [yeh] and er he he ah 
brought a a new machine, [right] 
to to . er to Chaplin to the Chap- 
[okay] Chaplin [yep yep] 
Res – so when he mentioned the manager, did 
you have a clear idea of who he meant? 
R – the: . . . . . I thought it was the person who 
was annoying him, before, but it [okay] could 
it it it could either mean that, or it could mean 
the – . . oh no, I didn't even think to ask 
Res – no, okay, yep 
R – yeah ‘cause it could mean – it could mean 
anyone, actually 
Res – okay 
R – like that one – th- the guy who said – who 
kept giving directives to the man who was 
pulling on the  
Res – oh yeah 
R – it could be him 
Res – yep 
R – or it could be the one who was annoying 
him at the start 
 
Extract 7.17: Julia and Andrina 
T = 14.45 
 
5 
and um < . . . . . . . > okay, let me recall 
what happened then, ah okay after that, 
um . they were fighting – in the midst of 
fighting – and in the end the colleague sat 
his – this colleague sat on thi: bowl of 
soup. Yeah, and the manager, after that 
R: when she said the manager, did 
you have a clear idea who that was? 





7.5.1 Vague introductions and anaphoric reference 
 
This sub-section presents findings in which vague introductions became 
problematic under certain conditions in anaphoric reference. Vague introductions 
are defined here as those in which a term such as they or an indefinite pronoun 
(e.g. somebody) were used, and include the type of antecedent-less pronoun 
identified by Yule (1982) and others (discussed in Chapter 3). In the present data, 
vague introductions of hearer-new entities appeared to become problematic for 
later referent tracking. Although only two such miscommunications were 






In Extract 7.18, Vicky initially used they to introduce a vague plural set of 
characters, and then made a subsequent vague reference to this set by using the 
term everybody. Later, however, Vicky specifically referred to one member of the 
group – the witness – with the term the lady. This final reference was 
misinterpreted by Francesca as being coreferential with the girl. 
 
Extract 7.18: Vicky and Francesca 
T = 7.30 
 
6 
she had an opportunity to grab a piece of 
bread, and she did, so they saw her,*  
 
and then . . everybody was kinda come 
back around them, and they were like ## 
‘she stole bread’ but then he goes ‘no, I 
did it’* 
 
and then the lady’s like ‘no no no it’s her 
it’s her’, so they took her away, as well. 
F – so he got arrested because he 
admitted that it was him, [mhm] 
umm but then she would've felt bad, 
and she said ‘no, it was me’, so they 
just chucked her in as well,  
* Intervening utterances omitted 
 
A similar trigger of problematic reference in SLL speech appeared to occur in 
Extract 7.19: 
 
Extract 7.19: Rachel and Renee 
T = 20.51 
 
10 
and then finally someone watch her, 
and she said ‘oh she st- stolen the . 
um the bread’* 
 
and then < . . > the people who – the 
girl who watch that she’s trying to 
stolen #, and #says ‘she’s stoling the 
bread’, and then suddenly the bread 
was changed because of the falling 
down?, 
R – well, it’s something about somebody 
stealing bread, and then there’s a 
collision, they’re struggling, I suppose 
and they collide, there’s a struggle, 
<UNCERTAIN TONE> the bread gets 
dropped </UNCERTAIN TONE> – 
somebody snatches the dropped bread – 
something like that* 
 
Res – but you don’t really know who was 
involved in this? 
R – well, prob- probably the girl with the 
bana- with the – from the banana scene, 
plus another woman, . . plus . . Charlie 
Chaplin and MAYBE another guy 
*Intervening utterances omitted  
 
The stimulated recall in Extract 7.19 suggests that Renee did form a mental file 
for a second female character, but overall there was a high degree of referential 
ambiguity and non-resolution, and it is not clear at what stage the introduction 
was successfully completed. Although an indefinite pronoun was used to 




the following clause with the co-referential pronoun she. This appears to have 
clarified the reference although it may have created some uncertainty and strain. 
In the next reference to the witness, Rachel appeared to recognize that the witness 
had low accessibility, perhaps due to the vague introduction, and used a 
particularly descriptive and syntactically complex RE. 
 
In summary, it appears that vague introductions of hearer-new entities become 
problematic if the referent is referred to subsequently.  
 
 
7.5.2 Problematic introductions of trivial characters 
 
In Extract 7.20, the SLL speaker (Steffi) introduced a minor character (the female 
prisoner), but this causes a minor communicative breakdown, and, in the SR 
interview, Otis reported some trouble in accommodating this new character.  
 
Extract 7.20: Steffi and Otis 
T = 25.38 
14 
S – and er Charlie um . was . um keep sitting down – ah sitting on the lap of the – of 
a fat lady, @and @ 
O – fat lady? 
S – yeah, because there are – there was a fat lady sat on [okay] the 
 
One possible interpretation is that Otis initially interpreted the introduction as an 
anaphoric reference to a character that he was unable to identify. However, given 
Otis’s comments, it appears more likely that he had attached more referential 
significance to this trivial character (see Chafe, 1994, pp. 88-91) than Steffi had 
intended to convey, and thus become confused by this character’s role in the 
narrative. Thus it may be that Steffi had trouble signalling triviality in the 
introduction of this new character. It is notable that Steffi was the only SLL 
speaker to introduce this character, compared to 4 of the 10 L1 speakers. It is not 
immediately clear how the L1 speakers clarify this triviality, but it may be related 
to the use of indefinite this (two speakers). An important factor may also be 
related to the clause structure used by the SLL speaker, in which the lap of the 
precedes a fat lady. This perhaps gives undue prominence to lap, suggesting that 





7.6 Referent tracking 
 
This section presents extracts and further discussion relating to miscommunicated 
acts of referent tracking. 
 
 
7.6.1 Under-explicit reference 
 
The following two miscommunications appear to have been triggered by under-
explicitness. In Extract 7.21, it is unclear whether the miscommunication occurred 
at point (1) or point (2), but both involve under-explicitness: 
 
Extract 7.21: Fiona and Geoff 
T = 11.32 
 
3 
there was that really big guy standing next to him?, in the, in the thing, and he put 
his soup out in a bowl, and then Charlie Chaplin was like sitting next to the bowl, 
and he asked him to pass it to him, but because he was . . like, you know how he 
was shaking?, [yeah] after@ yeah, so he picked up the bowl and Ø started 
shaking and the soup went everywhere, 
 
The first pronoun underlined (1) was under-explicit (D2 for the speaker-intended 
referent, which is the colleague, campared to D6 for Charlie). If, however, the 
breakdown did not occur at that point, then it appears to have occurred at position 
(2), where the speaker-intended referent (Charlie) had accessibility Degree 4 
compared to the colleague’s accessibility of D6. 
 
In Extract 7.22, the first underlined pronoun was intended to refer to Charlie, but 
Charlie (D4) had lower accessibility than the policeman (D5). The resulting 
miscommunication is revealed in Extract 7.23. 
 
Extract 7.22: Lillian and Astrid 





L – Charlie . . Charlie wakes her 
up because she’s unconscious, 
and then the police officer that’s 
lying next to them wakes up, and 
then he hits him in the head with 
his banger, and then the police 
guy knocks out again 
A – Um, < . . > they’re unconscious or 
something and the policeman wakes up, and 
wants to wake them up, so he hits them over 
the head with his little pole or .  
R – okay, policeman hits them? 





Extract 7.23: Astrid SR 
T = 21.36  
 
A – ahh, okay, [[SURPRISED TONE]] I thought she said HE got his little pole 




7.6.2 Over-explicit reference 
 
The miscommunication presented in Extract 7.24 is discussed in Chapter 7. 
Extract 7.25 provides evidence from the stimulated recall that a 
miscommunication had occurred.  
 
Extract 7.24: Kate and Nina 
T = 0.18 
 
1 
K – that machine into the office?, and in the next part it shows Charlie and that 
other guy . still doing . . whatever’s [@] happening on the conveyor belt, that . #I 
#don-, that twisting thing [‘eah] and then . it comes up that it’s lunch time?, and so 
the conveyor belt slows down. And then, so they’re kinda having a rest, and then 
Charlie’s ticking?, you know how he was ticking ‘cause he’s going [like this] 
((TWITCHING GESTURE)) 
N – [aw yeah] 
K – he’s like ((TWITCHING GESTURE)) 
N – [aw yeah] 
K – he’s like ((TWITCHING GESTURE)) . . anyway, and then the OTHer guy that he’s 
working with, he go- – oh no, Charlie goes away, [mm] and then the other guy pulls 
out his flask, . and Ø pours his soup into a bowl that he leaves . on one side of the 
bench?, [yep] and then Charlie comes back and he’s almost going to sit on it, and 
then the guy . kind of warns him, ‘that’s my lunch, don’t sit on it’, so Charlie picks 
it up and he’s ticking away, and he like shaking it, and it . he tips it on the guy – the 
other guy, [yeah] and then the guy gets kinda angry, Ø puts it down, . on the seat 
beside him, and then the o- the guy sits on it, Ø sits on his own lunch.   
 




N – Oh it’s his soup, ok, I got that part mixed up,  
R – Aw, you thought it was . 
N – I thought it was the other guy 
R – Aw, okay 
N – the one he was sharing his shift with 
 
One further, possible, example of an over-explicit RE resulting in 




communicative outcome presented in Extract 7.27. This miscommunication is 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Extract 7.26: Michael and Reuben  
T = 0.48 
 
1-2 
M – Chaplin came in, Ø started . um winding his nuts again?, and as the machine 
left off, he obviously got up and had #the twitchy motions going on and Ø 
couldn’t control himself properly, um his workmate . poured a plate of soup, um 
@@ Ch- Chaplin nearly sits in it, he gets up again, um Ø gets the plate again 
obviously Ø still going with the twitchy motion, Ø #hands #him #over the plate of 
soup, Ø spills it everywhere,  
 
Extract 7.27: SR Reuben 
T = 20.07 
 
((Charlie spills his colleague’s soup)) 
R – oh, <SURPRISED> . . . okay . . . 
Res – comment? 
R – that’s interesting, ‘cause he said he spilt a bowl of soup on HIM, so I thought 
the workmate had got angry and spilt it on .  
Res – on? 
R – on Charlie 
 
Extract 7.28 is also discussed in Chapter 7 and as presented here in greater 
contextual detail and with the relevant comments from the stimulated recall 
interview. 
 
Extract 7.28: Anne and Tom 
T = 15.33 
 
10 
A – first, er the girl is . alo- alone, 
and she feelt [[target: felt]] very 
hungry, and er, she saw a . a <quiet 
aside> how to make </quiet aside> 
er, a store, . some some bread, so 
they- so she stole a bread, and then 
Ø run away, but er she hate [[target: 
hit]] the . the small guy, and ah ah 
and Ø give the bread to the to the 
guy, but ah and then, ah er the 
owner of the store, and  < . . > 
<QUIET ASIDE> how </QUIET 
ASIDE> . . . . er because one woman 
told him, ah ‘someone, s- s- ah 
someone steal your bread’, so er he 
. he and the police ran to catch – 
want to catch the – wanted to catch 
the girl, 
R – what was your understanding there? 
T – um, . . that she'd given the bread to 
Charlie Chaplin, then sort of run into the 
shop and said ‘look! HE stole the bread’ 
R – oh, okay, so the girl, the banana girl 
T – yep . . who’d stolen the bread gave it 
to Charlie Chaplin . um and the shop 
owner knew he had some bread stolen, 
possibly, um and she was pointing ‘nah it 
was that guy’ 
R – okay, so she was blaming Chaplin 
T – yeah 







7.6.3 Pronoun errors 
 
The following extract contains an error and successful outcome that is very 
similar to the first example presented in the corresponding subsection in Chapter 
7. The relevant lexical relation in this extract is between stolen and steal. 
 
Extract 7.29: Bruce and Seth 




B – and then, you know, you remember the 
lady, in the first part in movie? 
S – . Yep 
B – She: . stolen the: 
S – the banana one 
B – banana [yeah]  
S – [yeah] 
B – and she come a- come again- c- come out 
again, an- in a . br- bread shop something 
S – Mmhm 
B – and he stole a loaf of ah bread and Ø run 
away, an- . and Ø f- fall over with er Charlie? 
R – Okay, tell me what you 
understood at the time 
S – Okay, umm . the banana lady 
has come back, she’s gone into a 
bakery stolen a loaf, and Charlie 
was following her 
 
Extract 7.30 is discussed in Chapter 7 and reproduced here with a longer excerpt 
from the stimulated recall interview. 
 
Extract 7.30: Kyrah and Jim 
T = 15.31 
 
9 
K – Charlie tells her to escape 
and he will stay there with the 
policeman?, but she convinces 
Charlie to come with her – 
him, . and yeah, Ø both escape,  
 
 
J – what I did note, as something interesting, was 
. that she had . . . in saying that . um . . . she 
convinced Charlie to go . with her, and then she 
mistakenly corrects herself to say ‘she convinces 
Charlie . to go with ‘her I mean him’  
R – uh-huh 
J  – which is something that I . thought was 
interesting 
R – but so, she said it RIGHT,  
J  – and then . . . 
R – she- 
J  – mistakenly corrected herself 
R – yeah, it never entered your head that it . that 
it might be some other him? 






Extract 7.31: Rachel and Renee 
T = 20.51 
 
10 
T – and then she’s kind of, . I 
think she’s a BEGGAR, or a 
homeless, something like that?, 
and she’s looking outside of the 
bread – where people the – 
bak- the bakery?, and um . 
she’s looking at the bread, and 
she want 
R – looking at the? 
T – the the window?, out- 
outside the windows, and then 
[okay] suddenly a man carry a 
lot of . ah a lot of ah bread, and 
then he stolen the bread, and 
then finally someone watch 
her, and she said ‘oh she st- 
stolen the . um the bread’, but 
then when she wants to run 
away with the bread and then 
accidentally see . . /kræs/ 
[[TARGET: #CRASH]] or ### 
Charlie:? 
R – Charlie Chaplin? 
T – Charlie Chaplin@, and 
then they fall down and then, 
the the man the owner of the 
bread say that, and then < . . > 
the people who – the girl who 
watch that she’s trying to stolen 
#, and #says ‘she’s stoling the 
bread’, and then suddenly the 
bread was changed because of 
the falling down?, 
R – I’m thinking it now, and I think I was 
thinking it earlier as well like, the pronouns 
she’s getting – the hes and the shes – getting a 
bit confused here, so that’s why I wasn’t sure 
how many people were involved in this . [oh, 
okay] incident she was describing, [okay] and 
wh- what the man – who the man was and how 
he came into it 
Res – right 
R – because really, the only one that . that has 
been mentioned BEFORE, was the girl from the 
banana scene  
Res – right  
R – so that’s the only one I can actually 
visualize? 
Res – okay, do you remember – did you have an 
idea of what they were doing? Or was it 
R – well, it’s something about somebody 
stealing bread, and then there’s a collision, 
they’re struggling, I suppose and they collide, 
there’s a struggle, <UNCERTAIN TONE> the bread 
gets dropped </UNCERTAIN TONE> – somebody 
snatches the dropped bread – something like that 
Res – okay, okay, so s- 
R – Charlie Chaplin’s there, he <QUIET ASIDE> 
what does he? </QUIET ASIDE> snatches the 
bread or, I can’t remember  
Res – okay  
R – but there’s obviously a struggle 
Res – but you don’t really know who was 
involved in this? 
R – well, prob- probably the girl with the bana- 
with the – from the banana scene, plus another 
woman, . . plus . . Charlie Chaplin and MAYBE 
another guy 
Res – right, but who does what [is not really 
clear?] 




7.6.4 Direct and indirect speech 
 
The examples of miscommunication discussed in Chapter 7 are presented here in 





Extract 7.32: Vicky and Francesca 
T = 7.30 
 
6 
V – but then he goes ‘no, I did it’ and – 
‘cause he had the bread, cause he liked 
her I guess, [@] and he got chucked in 
the old, um paddy wagon . . and then 
the lady’s like ‘no no no it’s her it’s 
her’, so they took her away, as well. 
All the time like he just looked so 
funny, ya know, funny stuff’s 
F – [so he] got – so he got arrested 
because he admitted that it was him, 
[mhm] umm but then she would've felt 
bad, and she said ‘no, it was me’, so they 
just chucked her in as well, not not one 
of them, they just grabbed both of them 
 
 
Extract 7.33: Lillian and Astrid 
T = 6.34 
 
10 
L – Charlie grabs the loaf of bread, 
the police come, and the guy that 
owns the bread came running up, 
and this lady said like ‘the chick 
stole it’ but Charlie Chapman said 
he stole it, so the police took 
Charlie, 
A – um, so the woman had it, and then 
Charlie took it, and then –  
R – that’s the woman throwing the bananas? 
A – yeah, [yep] and then um Charlie told the 
police that he stole it, so took blame, and then 
she said, apparently, it wasn’t him, it was her.   
R – right. 
A – I think that’s what she was saying. 
T = 7.02 
 
11 
L – and then the chick said to the 
police ‘no: it was the chick’, so 
Charlie gets put into the police car, 
and then 
R – so ‘the chick said it was the chick’, so 
A – yeah, I was like ‘oh, ok’ @ 
R – so, so, so did you interpret it to be that 
she was owning up to it – I did it – or that 
someone else said ‘no, she did it’? 
A – I was guessing that it was her owning up 
to it, taking blame 
 
 
The third instance of miscommunication resulting from apparent confusion over 
direct or indirect speech, involves an SLL-L1 pair. This case is interesting because 
the speaker did appear to use lexical means (woman and girl) to clearly 
distinguish the two characters: 
 
Extract 7.34: Michael and Reuben 
T = 2.40 
 
10 
M – Chaplin says ‘no no it was me who stole the bread’, ‘cause as < . . > as they 
collided he got the bread off her basically, Ø pulls out the bread, ‘no it was me’, 
um HE gets taken away, the woman says to the baker ‘no no it was definitely the 
girl’ 
 
However, as reported in Subsection 7.54, the hearer (Reuben) formed no mental 
image of a witness (Extract 7.35), and this appears to be due to Michael using a 
bare noun (lady) to initially introduce this witness. Therefore, with no other pre-




have assumed that the RE was co-referential with the girl. This occurs despite the 
relatively overt signals of direct speech. 
 
Extract 7.35: SR Reuben 
T = 26.27 
 
R – mmhm, and somehow she'll be running back to the police and saying ‘no no it 
was me’ 
Res – ahh 
R – because she realises he was so kind and she can’t let him 
Res – ahhh that's what you thought happened?, she owned up 
R – mmm 
Res – to – ah, okay 
R – that's MY take on what happened, [right] I guess we'll find out in a minute 
 
 
7.6.5 Lexical differentiation 
 
A crucial aspect of referential success is the selection of appropriate semantic 
content in a referring expression. However, in the present data, lexical errors were 
seldom implicated as a factor in triggering miscommunication, with perhaps the 
use of principal to refer to the boss being the only exception (Example 7.6, 
Subsection 7.5.2).  
 
However, lexis does appear to play an important role in helping to maintain a 
distinction between matching referents across stretches of discourse. This is 
perhaps best illustrated through analysis of the lexical means by which speakers 
distinguished the girl and the witness. Management of the switches between these 
characters appeared important for successful communication, yet was problematic 
on a number of occasions.  
 
In all of the recounts, the girl was introduced first, and in nearly all cases, she was 
established as a hearer-known (Level I) character. The speaker had then to 
introduce the witness as a new character, and in subsequent utterances distinguish 
between her and the girl. Importantly, both characters could only be referred to by 
description rather than a name. However, the head words in most descriptions 
(girl, woman, lady) were used for both characters in these data, and it was, 





The most obvious descriptively-relevant difference between the girl and the 
witness is their respective ages. Several viewers estimated the girl’s age to be 
between 17 and 20, while the witness is perhaps between 45 and 50. Thus the 
term girl, which in most contexts is semantically marked for youth, was most 
frequently used to refer to the former. Conversely, the terms woman and lady are 
semantically marked for adult, and, indeed, speakers tended to use these terms for 
the witness. More subjectively, several participants commented on the beauty of 
the girl, and some speakers used this feature to distinguish her from the witness. 
Indicators of socio-economic status also distinguish the characters, with the girl 
being barefoot and apparently homeless, while the witness is well-dressed. This 
could be a factor in the use of lady to describe the witness, reflecting an archaic 
yet well-known use of this term. In short, there appear to be a number of 
reasonable grounds on which to make a semantic distinction in the REs used for 
the girl and for the witness.  
 
Analysis reveals that in most cases, the main female characters were referred to 
using one of four lexical items: girl, woman, lady or witness, with terms such as 
chick and passerby confined to one or two narratives each. Most speakers 
maintained a distinction between the girl and the witness by tending to reserve the 
head noun girl to refer to the girl, and woman or lady to refer to the witness. 
However, this pattern was slightly clearer in the SLL data than in the L1 data, 
with four L1 speakers rigidly maintaining a distinction between the REs used for 
the two characters, compared to 11 of the SLL speakers. Whether or not the strict 
maintenance of a distinction between the head nouns was a (conscious) strategy, it 
did seem to assist the hearer’s role in distinguishing the characters.  
 
When analysing examples of miscommunication involving these characters, a lack 
of lexical differentiation often becomes apparent. For instance, an important factor 
in the L1-L1 miscommunication presented in the main text as Example 7.2.3, 
appears to be the lack of lexical differentiation in the passage “the chick1 said to 
the police ‘no: it was the chick2’”. The speaker originally introduced both the girl 
and the witness with the head noun lady, but all subsequent full references to the 




confusingly, the speaker then also referred to the witness as the chick. It seems 
very probable that this lack of differentiation in head nouns triggered the 
miscommunication. Lack of lexical differentiation between these two characters 
also became problematic in one case where both characters were referred to as the 
woman (Extract 7.36). 
 
Extract 7.36: Sabrina and April 
T = 21.01 
 
16 
S – she’s in trouble, he said ‘I’m, 
I’m did that, she doesn’t di- di- 
didn’t anything’? And the police 
take – took Charlie, and the OTHer 
woman she2 still insist, and she2 
say ‘no, that woman she1 steal it, 
not that person’?, an’ the police 
take him in the, in the car, to the 
police to get to the police station? 
And they got also the woman1, um 
both now, he he’s start to /nek/ 
[[TARGET: #MAKE]] her1 
remember? He said ‘I’m the man 
the bread, Charlie’, he said that for 
the woman1, 
J – that bit there?  That was  
A – that was I’m guessing Charlie talking 
to the witness saying it was ME maybe, or 
maybe the cop 
J – oh, okay 
A – I would say – I mean it’s Charlie 
talking again, um [yeah] I would say he 
was saying ‘no, no it was me it, wasn’t her’ 
J – ahhh, telling this to the cop, yeah . you 
weren’t completely sure who [##] 
A – whether – well watching it just then 
I’m not sure whether or not she’s talking 
about the woman or to the cop – I’m 
assuming she’s talking to the cop, as . the 
woman has already said ‘no no’ 
J – at the time 
A – then at the time they’ve got him – um . 
at the time I thought he was talking to the 
cop? 
J – yep 
A – listening to it now, I’m thinking 
maybe, I dunno, I’m not sure 
J – yep, okay 
A – but they’re already in the car at this 
stage, is – I’m guessing they’re already in 
the car at this stage [yeah] – or he’s already 
in the car [uh-huh] so my assumption 
would be he’s talking to the cop 
 
To summarise, it appears that lexical differentiation between referents is both an 
effective strategy for minimizing miscommunication and occasionally a genuine 
trigger of miscommunication. In these data, there was also a suggestion that such 
differentiation may be more frequently maintained by the SLL participants, such 
that it may be a successful feature of SLL reference. It is unclear whether this was 
a deliberate strategy, or whether it arose inadvertently as a consequence of 




semantic range of lexical item. In other contexts, however, a lack of lexical 
resources may preclude this strategy. 
 
Interestingly, however, it appears that the L1 interlocutors were not always 
sensitive to lexical differentiation. For instance, in the narrative preceding the 
miscommunication presented in the main text as Example 7.2.2, the speaker 
always referred to the girl using expressions such as the homeless girl or the 
urchin girl, yet when she used the term the lady (to refer to the witness), the 
hearer misinterpreted this as co-referential with the girl. In short, then, lexical 
differentiation appears to be an effective strategy, yet far from failsafe. 
 
 
7.7 Other factors implicated in triggering miscommunication 
 
The extracts in this section relate to issues discussed in Chapter 7.7 and are sub-




Extract 7.37: Josie and Rochelle 




J – yeah, so, and part one you . ah 
you, the end is like ah, Charlie 
Chaplin just make something in the 
factory, right? 
R – mhm 
J – do you know what happens? 
@@ 
R – ahh, . no 
J – yes, so Charlie Chaplin and to 
finish the- his work in the factory?, 
R – mhm 
J – and er in part one, and did you 
– d- do you know, er, did you see 
the ah #acompling?, ah . . er Ø 
push a kind of machine? [yeah] in 
the office? 
 
Res – so she introduced a, um . she 
mentioned this 
R – machine, I didn't even hear what she 
said, I kept hearing ‘masher’ for the first 
few times, I thought ‘oh machine’ 
Res – oh@ okay@, yeah, yeah 
R – so that when I said yeah, I was thinking 
#about masher, um yeah 
Res – oh okay, but you knew what she 
meant? 
R – I knew what she meant sort of, I I had 
had a vague idea, but because I didn't know 
if she was saying mash – I kept thinking 
she was saying masher? [okay] < . . > but I 
saw a machine in my mind, 
Res – okay 
R – but I figured that was maybe at the 
purpose, where she said – when I heard 
‘mash’ I thought that must be the machine’s 





Res – ahhh oh you thought it was like a 
MASHer [yeah] kind of 
R – and then when she started explaining 
how the- how it started feeding food, I was 
like ‘OH yeah she said machine, right’ 
 
 
Extract 7.38 presents initial evidence of miscommunication through comments 
made by the hearer prior to the stimulated recall interview. Extract 7.39 then 
presents the relevant excerpt from the retelling and the accompanying comment 
from the stimulated recall interview: 
 
Extract 7.38: SR Molly 
 M – there was only one bit where I got a bit confused 
R – oh, okay, what was: 
M – when she: was talking about the first woman and the second woman, I didn’t 
really get where the second woman came from  
R – oh, okay  
M – for a minute I thought that it was the woman the owner of the TRUCK, but 
then that didn’t seem very likely for that time, so I figured she was just like a 
bystander who was a witness to it 
R – uh-huh, okay 
 
Extract 7.39: Leonie and Molly 
T = 33.23 
 
16 
L – she steal ah she stole ah . loaf 
of bread, . a woman saw her, and 
er . Ø tell tell the ah the owner of 
the .  
 
M – I thought no I thought that there was 
only one woman  
R – yeah 
M – yeah, I THINK probably when she said 
‘a woman saw her’ I thought maybe she 
was repeating ‘a woman STOLE’ or 
something 
R – ah, okay 
M – I didn’t cotton on at first that were two 
women and it wasn’t until she said 
something about . the second woman and I 
thought ‘eh?, who 
 






Extract 7.40: Steffi and Otis 
T = 13.35 
 
4 
for um . . ah feeding people . . 
meal, and er um Charlie was the 
man, ah selected from his 
colleagues to . um um to test the 
machine, whether it [uh-huh] the 
machines ah works well or not, and 
the:, the machine starts very well, 
um feed the Charl with um: . 
cakes?, [mm] and there is a little ah 
digit help Charlie to mop the 
mouth, 
R – what was your understanding of the the 
function of this machine? 
O – yeah, I was quite confused when she 
said the word ‘feed’, ‘cause I couldn’t . 
exactly guess how it was feeding the child, 
because . I thought maybe it was 
R – was it a child you said? 
O – yep she said – I thought she said child 
[okay] so then I thought she was talking 
about it feeding the child*  
 
R – uh-huh, okay, okay, interesting. And 
that child, was – so that was a NEW kind of 
character maybe, that’d 
O – yeah, she jumped from Charlie to the 
child, so  
R – yeah, okay, okay 





Extract 7.41: Alice and Donna 
T = 12.16 
 
8 
A – covered her, like Ø ‘that, that’s not . – she’s not 
stoled, I did’, like that, and the . Chaplin was caught 
by police, and . . . that situation that the ladies – the 
ladies and the < . . > the ladies just told police, that 
‘it's not HIM, it’s the LADY – the poor girl – stole 
that bread’, and both of them caught by police, and 
finally they just moved, er they . ah moved to the 
police station by the . police car something?, 
D – okay, um . police got 
Chaplin, [okay] and the 
lady – I’m not sure if it's 
the lady that saw or the 
lady that owned the 
bakery, one of those 
ladies said ‘hey, it wasn't 
Chaplin, it was the lady’  
 
Extract 7.42: Albert and Marg 
T = 14.12  
11 
A – she stole thee: bread from: the 
shop?, and like . . a- another woman 
. saw that . she w- she stole it?, 
M – Mmhmm 
A – and Ø tell the policeman?, . ana- 
. yeah, . an a policeman they: owner 
of the shop?  And she: . whe:n thee 
girl who stole the bread?, ran ah- ran 
away, she: like . . . crash with 
Charlie Chapman,  
M – ah 
 
M – now I wasn’t sure quite what he said 
then, so I was sorta thinking okay: lets 
hear the next bit and maybe I’ll figure it 
out 
R – right, okay. He mentioned an owner of 
the shop, that was the: 
M – I don’t think it was the woman.  That 
called the police. 
R – no. Right. 
M – I didn’t think, but I wasn’t quite sure 
at that stage because I didn’t quite catch 







Event sequencing  
 
Extract 7.43: Bruce and Steven 
T = 24.07 
 
13 
B – So, . maybe they go to tell 
the police again, [mhm] so the 
lady didn’t . get escaped, so she 
was actually arrest again, by p- 
ah police.  So, mm, Charlie 
was . arrested and so they, I 
think they got a van an- on the 
way to: . probably jail or 
something, [mhm] and halfway 
they . they pick up the the lady, 
from halfway. And they meet 
again, .  
R – So at that point  
S – . . . yeah, I think initially at that point I 
wasn’t really sure what was going on.  Um, 
obviously they’ve been arrested, but I couldn’t 
quite work out what was going on.   
R – Right.  Now when he said that they picked 
up the lady halfway, [yeh] . you were thinking 
that was the banana lady? 
S – Well yeah, I thought it might’ve been the 
banana lady, because he said that – or MAYbe 
that was because he’d said that . um . she’s tried 





In Extract 7.44, the speaker failed to successfully introduce the feeding machine 
despite using the strategies identified in Chapter 7.5 as generally being successful. 
One factor in this may be the morphological error in the key verb bring/brought. 
There is evidence that this has been misunderstood by the hearer, as the entities 
that she identified are large, fixed, stationary machines that are incapable of being 
brought anywhere. 
 
Extract 7.44: Sabrina and April 
T = 10.23 
 
1 
S – okay, I will start talk about 
part two, of the movie? 
A – mmhmm 
S – so, you know at the last 
part, we see together, #when 
they #bringed the machine? 
 
J – when she said the machine, did you have a 
clear idea  
A – when she said the machine, I thought of two 
machines obviously, the first one with the big 
buttons and the levers, .  
J – yep 
A – and the second one was the one where they 
were doing the whole [[gesture]] 







7.8 Generic reference 
 
In this example, a specific reference to the feeding machine was interpreted as 
generic reference. The initial trigger appears to be the use of a bare noun. 
 
Extract 7.45: Rachel and Renee 
T = 0.57 
 
1-3 
T – umm we stop at the first part, #where [[TARGET: #WITH]] we have a man, there 
. #think were three or four men, they came to meet the boss?, [yeh] and they tried 
to promote like, new machine, to the boss – like people that have to EAT, like 
didn’t have to eat your – #where [[TARGET: #WITH]] your #spoon, like did you th- 
all the machine feeds you and things like that.  
 
 
7.9 Repair and clarification as a discourse troublespot 
 
Extract 7.46 is discussed in Chapter 7, reproduced here in greater contextual detail 
and with the relevant comments from the stimulated recall interview. 
 
Extract 7.46: Kane and Racquel 
T = 26.10 
 
10 
K – Ø [w- w- walking] on the street, ah when when the 
beautiful lady . mm, . oh, he – she is very . ah hangry, .  
R – hungry? 
K – uh uh HUNGry, [oh] hungry, he wa- he was very 
hungry, and er . 
R – SHE, or HE? 
K – she sh- sh- she, er . mm . he he he just walking . . 
< . . . > a bread shop, bread shop [yeh], h- he see a – he 
saw a bread shop, um, and the the worker, just . . mm put 
the bread er, . out of the car, 
Res – was this still 
Chaplin?, whose in 
the bread shop? 
R – no, Charlie 
Chapman’s working 
– walking towards 
the bread shop, and 
the worker’s 
unloading bread in 
the shop 
 
*Pronoun errors are in bold 
 
The following extract reveals a lengthy passage of clarification and negotiation 
over the identity of a referent. The stimulated recall interview that follows in 
Extract 7.48 reveals that miscommunication occurred. 
 
Extract 7.47: Fiona and Geoff 
T = 16.01 
 
5-6-7 
F – and then of course it wouldn't work, ‘cause trying to – a contraption putting a 
um a plate up to your mouth, and pouring it into your mouth, is never @really 
@gonna @work@, 
G – so it – so um, just to re-cap this little bit, [yep] . so um, . . they’re having 
lunch, and the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw because [yeah] there 




and a and a dark moustache, not that guy in the lunch, 
F – no  
G – it was the second guy, the last guy 
F – yeah, no the big 
G – before I left, he was sort of balding, little bit, sort of [yeh] fairer [yeh] so he – 
so he – they were having and then Charlie lost soup all over him, 
F – yep, lost the guy’s soup 
G – oh, lost HIS soup [yeah] and so they were getting a bit agitated with each 
other, then the big boss man with the lunch like – [yep] contraption had a device 
[yep] that could feed you while you're working at the same time? [yeah] okay, 
cool. 
F – but it kind of all failed. [Okay] and it kind of went everywhere and . it was 
sort of a comedy sketch, 
 
Extract 7.48: SR Geoff 
T = 30.59 
 
G – so this is a different big guy that I'm – this is – this is the start of the – from 
when I left, was it? 
Res – yeah 
G – see that – this is a different big guy, 
Res – right, yeah, you were thinking of the baldy guy [was it?] 








 Appendix to Chapter 8: Discussion of the nature 8
of reference 
 
8.1 Reference and noun phrase types: Definiteness and 
indefiniteness 
 
Also supporting the pragmatic distinction between referential/non-referential is 
the well-known correlation between these concepts and the linguistic distinction 
of definiteness/indefiniteness. In particular, analysis of the present data supports 
the widely held view that indefinite NPs are almost invariably used non-
referentially. The archetypal marker of indefiniteness is the indefinite article, and 
in the present L1 data there were 149 uses of a/an, with only 2 of these appearing 
to be possibly referential. In both of these cases the speaker was making a 
subsequent reference to an entity already within the current discourse, and so 
these were coded as referential. However, it could be that they were performance 
errors, or that (for an unknown reason) the speaker chose to reintroduce the entity 
as being hearer-new. The present data therefore support the view (e.g. Ariel, 1990; 
Bach, 2008; Carlson, 2004; Lycan, 2000) that the canonical uses of indefinite NPs 
(a/an and indefinite article-like uses of some and this) are non-referential. They 
are non-referential in the sense that they do not prompt the hearer to attempt 
identification of the referent, and, as claimed elsewhere (e.g. Bach, 2008), 
exceptions are very rare.  
 
Conversely, definite NP’s are closely associated with the pragmatic notion of 
reference. In particular, it is widely accepted that the canonical use of names is 
referential, with non-referential uses being relatively infrequent, and largely 
confined to talk about names (e.g. Jack was the most popular boy’s name last 
year). In the present data, the only use of a name that was identified as being 
arguably non-referential is the one presented in Extract 8.1, where the speaker 
appears to be speaking of a type of action or sequence of events associated with 
Chaplin movies, rather than about Charlie. However, even in this case it may be 
argued that the larger NP constituent is best understood as having an embedded 





Extract 8.1: Shelley and Jenny 
T = 7.57 
 
22-23-24 
and so Charlie Chaplin’s on the police thing in the back of the police truck, and 
he's just doing something funny – I don't know, sitting . . <QUIET ASIDE> or 
something < QUIET ASIDE > oh that's right, he’s like falling onto this big lady, . 
you know, just this same Charlie Chaplin thing, . . and then the girl gets put on 
to the police truck as well, 
 
However, although names and indefinite NPs appear to correlate strongly with 
referential and non-referential respectively, as expected, evidence in the present 
data demonstrates a somewhat weaker correlation between the concept of 
reference and uses of the definite article. Of the 552 uses of the in the L1 data, 446 
(80.8%) were referential. Non-referential uses in the data included expressions of 
time (e.g. the same time; the lunch break), location (e.g. the ground; at the back), 
events (e.g. the incident; the accident), attributes and roles (e.g. being the 
gentleman; to be the guinea pig), generic entities (e.g. they try to take her to the 
cops), numerical order (e.g. the first; the next one), equative constructions (e.g. 
she’s the one), and other non-referential uses (e.g. the purpose; the expression on 
his face).  
 
To summarize, although the linguistic concept of definiteness/indefiniteness is not 
to be considered a grammaticalization of the pragmatic notion of referential/non-
referential, there are strong correlations between some NP types and the 
referential/non-referential distinction. In the present data, there is seen to be a 
particularly strong correlation between indefinite NPs (a, this and some) and non-
reference, and also between names and reference. 
 
 
8.2 Referentiality and they 
 
One type of RE that is frequently used in these data with apparently low 
referentiality is the vague or antecedentless use of they identified by Yule (1982) 





Extract 8.2: Kath and Nikita 
T = 00.00 
 
1-4 
the Charlie Chapman character went away, and Ø got < . > his lunch, Ø almost 
sat in the soup?, and then um there was that big machine?, towards the end of 
[yep] the first part?, they bought that in with a whole heap of kind of older men, 
and they chose the Charlie Chapman guy  
 
Here, the first they has no antecedent. Without prior knowledge of this scene, it 
would be uncertain who the pronoun refers to, although a logical (and correct) 
assumption based on the hearer’s knowledge of Part One would be that it is the 
inventor and the boss. The antecedent of the second they would probably be 
interpreted as co-referential with the first they. Unlike many of the examples 
discussed in other works (e.g. Jucker, Smith, & Lüdge, 2003; Yule, 1982), 
examples such as this involve hearer-known referents in a context where there 
seems to be a strong preference for a particular interpretation.  
 
It also became apparent very early in the coding process that it was frequently 
ambiguous, particularly in the episodes relating to the feeding machine. For 
example, Extract 8.3 includes two uses of it which (although they have 
antecedents) appear to be ambiguous without knowledge of the film (e.g. did the 
corn break during the malfunction or did the machine break?). However, there is 
no indication that this was communicatively problematic (see also examples in 
Jucker et al., 2003, p. 1744). 
 
Extract 8.3: Lillian and Astrid 
5-6 L – it had little gadgets that would make him eat, Ø made him . yep, drink.  And 
then there was a corn cob, and the corn cob was spinning around and then it broke, 
like the machine went out of control and Charlie Chapman couldn’t keep up with 
the machine, and then the machine like blew up, and then it went to dessert  
 
The point is that even if pronouns have referents, some do not require resolution 
in order to understand the speaker’s main purpose of clarifying what is predicated 
on the RE (see Yule, 1982). 
 






Extract 8.4: Shelley and Jenny 
T = 1.22 
 
1 
S – [and there] was like a play of like his workmate like having hot soup and 
stuff, and it ah [was just – you know] 
J – [in like canteen, or] what? 
 
 
8.3 Clarification requests as interruptions 
 
These examples illustrate a point made in Chapter 8, in which it was argued that 
frequent clarification requests can be a source of annoyance for the speaker. In the 
interaction between Shelley and Jenny, such requests were frequent and a distinct 
sense of annoyance was detected in the extract presented in Extract 8.5, 
particularly through Shelley’s tone over her last two turns: 
 
Extract 8.5: Shelley and Jenny 
T = 3.56 
 
9b 
S – it would rotate to the next plate 
J – [oh cool] 
S – [to the next] course 
J – so the tables rotating? and 
S – wait, okay, it [starts off with] 
J – [###] 
S – right let me finish@, 
J – @alright 
 
A further example occurred in Extract 8.6, where Shelley’s apparent annoyance is 
prefaced with “I told you”: 
 
Extract 8.6: Shelley and Jenny 
T = 9.57 
 
26-27 
S – Charlie Chaplin, the banana girl and the poh-poh at the back?, fell out of 
the truck 
J – the Charlie Chaplin @, the banana girl, and the poh-poh? 
S – yeah, Ø FELL out of the back of the truck 
J – when did the poh-poh come into it 
S – I told you, the policeman was standing at the back of the truck, 
J – oh yeah 






8.4 Referentiality and vagueness 
 
In this subsection, the concept of referentiality is distinguished from the concept 
of (referential) vagueness that was discussed in Chapter 2. The major work 
relating to vague language is by Channell (1994), but little of this work (outside of 
placeholder words such as thingy and whatchamacallit) relates to reference 
(although issues relating to denotation are discussed). Of more interest to the 
present study is Jucker et al. (2003), where some vague uses of pronouns are 
discussed. Jucker et al. argue that speakers strategically use vague expressions to 
focus the hearer’s attention on what is predicated of a referent rather than the 
precise identity of the referent. This conclusion is similar to the one reached by 
Yule (1982) in relation to similar uses of pronouns, and the present study draws 
on these perspectives in explaining limited and partial referentiality.  
  
However, the concept of limited referentiality is not to be confused with 
vagueness. Vagueness appears to relate to the degree of specification, or richness 
of description, presented by the speaker in relation to context and context. Thus, 
Jucker et al. (pp. 1743-1744) discuss passages in which it is used in relation to a 
shifting range of entities, and which are vague in the sense of being semantically 
and syntactically under-determined, even though “it can safely be assumed that 
the addressee had no difficulties” in interpreting the expression. Similarly, Jucker 
et al. discuss antecedent-less uses of they relating to hearer-new entities. What is 
not discussed, then, are acts of Level I or Level II reference in which reference 
resolution is de-emphasized. 
 
A further important difference between what is proposed in this study and what is 
proposed by Jucker et al., is the role of the hearer. In the present study, I have 
argued that the referentiality of a speech act is determined as a joint action 
involving both the speaker and the hearer. As argued in Chapter 8, interactants do 
not always focus on prioritizing the resolution of references, and this is directly 
relevant to the definition of reference as a communicative act. Furthermore, the 
overall degree of referentiality in a speech act is initially established by the 
speaker, but the perspective of the hearer can function either to maintain this 




vagueness appears to have been used solely for what is communicated by the 
speaker, relative to context and co-text. That is, in relation to reference, the 
speaker can either choose a clear and precise term or a term with some degree of 
semantic ambiguity. 
 
To summarize, the concept of vagueness is both broader than referentiality 
(applying to many areas of language use) and also narrower in the sense that it 
applies to only what the speaker does, rather than to how speakers and hearers 
align in the joint action of communication. In general, the focus is largely on the 
extent to which discourse entities are invested with attributes in the mental 







 Appendix to Chapter 9: Discussion of learner 9
reference and miscommunication 
 
9.1 The range of REs in advanced learner varieties 
 
In Chapter 3, evidence was reviewed of typical developmental patterns in the 
acquisition of English RE types, with relevant studies including those of Klein 
and Perdue (1992) and Kim (2000). As few findings have been reported in 
relation to advanced learner varieties, the following research question was posed: 
 





Perhaps unsurprisingly, the SLLs used a much more restricted range of RE types 
than the L1 participants, averaging just seven conventional RE types, with only 
one reaching the L1 average of ten. Analysis of the L1 retellings suggested a core 
set of RE types that appear to be required in target-like retellings. Five SLLs did 
not use the full range of these forms, with four failing to use two or more forms. 
Of most interest is that all five of these speakers failed to use any demonstrative 
RE type. This suggests that intermediate-accessibility markers may be the last of 
the main RE types to be functionally acquired by advanced SLLs. 
 
 
Relation to previous findings 
 
Few other studies have reported on SLL use of English demonstrative REs, with 
the most prominent being Niimura and Hayashi’s (1994, 1996) work using a 
research design (cloze tests) that specifically prompts a choice between this, that 
and it (discussed in Appendix 3). Of the studies reviewed, only Swierzbin (2004) 





Swierzbin’s findings contrast with those presented here, with all 15 of Swierzbin’s 
Japanese participants using at least one demonstrative form. This contrast occurs 
despite a nearly identical film retelling task (also involving Modern Times), and a 
comparable number REs per retelling. Source language background provides only 
a partial explanation, as the only Japanese participant in the present study was also 
one of those who avoided all demonstratives. Rather, the most relevant factor 
appears to be differing definitions of reference, with Swierzbin’s framework 
including NPs relating to events, location, and time. Re-analysis of the present 
data reveals three of these five speakers using demonstrative forms in such ways.  
 
A further, partial, explanation may be differences in the participants’ proficiency 
levels. Although the participants in the present study may have higher overall 
proficiency than those in Swierzbin’s study, language development does not 
always occur in a linear fashion, and it may be that some of Swierzbin’s 
participants overused these forms. Indeed, a calculation of Swierzbin’s figures (p. 
77 and p. 100) reveals the SLLs using substantially more demonstrative forms 
(10.3% of all definite NPs) than the L1s (7.5%) in her study. This is supported by 
the findings of Niimura and Hayashi (1994, 1996), who found frequent semantic 
errors by intermediate and advanced Japanese learners, with over-use in some 
contexts, and under-use in others. In the present data, three participants appeared 
to substantially overuse these forms (13%-16% of all REs, compared to the L1 
mean of4%).  
 
These findings suggest a developmental stage in which intermediate or advanced 
learners move from a stage of avoidance of demonstrative forms to a stage of 
overuse, before developing target-like use. Certainly, the two speakers who 
appeared most competent (Michael and Julia) were among those who did use 
these forms with target-like frequency. Similar developmental patterns have been 
suggested for other language forms, such as the acquisition of articles (Huebner, 






Summary and implications 
 
Although some elementary level learners may use demonstrative forms for some 
purposes (Klein & Perdue, 1992), evidence from both the present study and 
previous research (Niimura & Hayashi, 1994, 1996) suggests that even some 
advanced learners struggle to identify pragmatically appropriate contexts for the 
referential use of these forms in narratives. This appears to occur despite advanced 
SLLs accurately using such forms for non-referential communicative purposes 
(e.g. in relation to time and location), and presumably also in contexts of deictic 
reference. It therefore appears that demonstrative forms may be the last of the core 
RE types to be functionally acquired by advanced learners of English, at least in 
narrative communication.  
 
This finding contributes a further detail to the literature relating to the 
development of referential systems in learner English. As discussed in Chapter 2 
of the main thesis, previous studies have mapped a general progression from 
elementary to advanced levels (Kim, 2000; Klein & Perdue, 1992). The finding 
presented in this subsection relates to a specific detail within the (relatively under-
researched) areas of advanced varieties of English and acquisition of referential 





9.2.1 Under-explicitness and miscommunication 
 
The following example is discussed in Chapter 9.3.3. 
 
Extract 9.1: Lillian and Astrid 
14-15 L – Charlie1 wakes her up because she’s unconscious, and then the police 
officer2 that’s lying next to them wakes up, and then he1 hits him2 in the head 
with his2 banger 
 
As with the other relevant L1-L1 miscommunications, the hearer’s interpretation 




system: the first underlined pronoun will be interpreted as referring to the most 
accessible male referent (the policeman), and the second pronoun (because of 
binding constraints which disallow co-reference with the previous pronoun) will 
be interpreted as referring to Charlie. 
 
 
9.3 Clarification strategies resulting in miscommunication 
 
The nature of clarification moves as a troublespot is illustrated in Extract 9.2 
where the hearer (Geoff) initiated an extended sequence to clarify the referent, 
which resulted in miscommunication. 
 
Extract 9.2: Fiona and Geoff 
T = 1.23 
 
5b-6-7a 
G – so it – so um, just to re-cap this little bit, [yep] . so um, . . they’re having 
lunch, and the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw because [yeah] there 
were two big guys ay?, [yeh] that first . um . the first I think he had a dark hair, 
and a and a dark moustache, not that guy in the lunch, 
F – no  
G – it was the second guy, the last guy 
F – yeah, no the big 
G – before I left, he was sort of balding, little bit, sort of [yeh] fairer [yeh] so he 
– so he – they were having – or were just about to have lunch, [yep] and, and 
then Charlie lost soup all over him, 
F – yep, Ø lost the guy’s soup 
 
An interesting feature here is that Geoff initially identified the intended referent 
(the big guy that that in the last scene that I saw), and initiated the clarification in 
order to confirm this interpretation. However, the negotiation was somehow 
flawed, and lead Geoff to abandon this (correct) interpretation in favour of an 
incorrect one. 
 
It may be that the phrase a dark moustache was taken by Fiona to refer to Charlie, 
and so she attempted to clarify by saying no, then agrees with Geoff’s second 
attempt, and introduced the description big. Geoff appeared to detect some 
ambiguity, and made further attempts to clarify the reference, which Fiona 
infelicitously agreed with. As a result, Geoff confidently assumed that he had 
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